

# HOW THE IRAQI ARMY



# OPERATES

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## EDITION 1 (FOUO)

### INTRODUCTION

This smart book is designed to provide transition teams, and organizations that are partnered with Iraqi forces with a baseline reference on processes and procedures integral to the Iraqi Army. It attempts to connect “theory” to “practice” by providing a means by which transition teams and partner units can differentiate between how things are *supposed* to be done, and how they *are* being done. This smart book does not address procedures internal to the transition teams, partner units and their chains of command.

The repetition and refinement of processes within the Iraqi Army directly supports reduced dependence on Coalition forces and ultimately leads to a capable, competent, Iraqi Army. Prior to solving problems through coalition support, partner units and transition teams must exhaust the range of options provided by the Iraqi Army and its supporting establishment. Partner units and transition teams in concert with their Iraqi Army counterparts ultimately create the processes and procedures which produce a sustainable force.

There are several important caveats that must be declared to the warfighter using this Smartbook.

- The Iraqi Army is a rapidly evolving organization. As such, many of the processes described in this smart book are undergoing rapid change. A deployed transition team or partner unit is advised to continuously seek updates on procedures from Multi-National Forces – Iraq (MNF-I), Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I), Iraqi Assistance Group (IAG), and other headquarters. The best source of information on processes may be the Iraqi units themselves.
- Many of the processes described in this book were designed by coalition forces. It is clear that these types of processes mirror similar aspects of the U.S. DOD. Transition teams and partner units must make a clear analysis of how closely Iraqi units are following processes defined by the coalition. In some cases they may be using a process from the legacy of the Iraqi Army prior to OIF, or have modified a coalition designed process to suit their needs.
- All of the source material used within this smart book was collected from sources subordinate to or within MNF-I. The preponderance of the source material is U.S. Some of the source material is Iraqi and was translated from Arabic. It is likely that there are numerous procedures that are viewed differently by the Iraqis and the Coalition due to differences in translation and culture.

This smart book is divided into 11 chapters that describe many of the battlefield and support systems. This is the first edition. Notes pages have been provided in

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the smart book for coalition personnel. It is through these notes, and feedback on the Iraqi Army processes and procedures that each subsequent edition of this smart book will become more effective. JCISFA encourages active participation in this refinement process. Points of contact are provided at the end of this smart book for any personnel who wish to provide refinement or who have questions that JCISFA may answer.

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## HOW THE IRAQI ARMY OPERATES

### CHAPTER 1 GENERAL BACKGROUND

#### 1. Mission and History.

##### a. Role of the Iraqi Armed Forces

(1) Under the Constitution's framework, Iraqi military power operates for and under the conditions determined by the people through their elected representatives. It is subject to ultimate civilian control and command at all times, in war as well as peace. This political context establishes the objectives and the limits of legitimate military action in peace, crisis, and conflict within Iraq and along its borders.

(2) The Armed Forces of Iraq fulfill the constitutional imperative to provide the common defense. Defense of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, societal values, and national interests is the essential goal and measure of value of the profession of arms in Iraqi society.

##### b. History of the Iraqi Security Forces.

(1) The brief history of the ISF has seen numerous organizational changes, mission changes, redesignations and component mergers. In January 2005, what had been the Iraqi National Guard (ING) (and earlier the Civil Defense Corps) was merged into the Iraqi Army.

(2) Between April and June 2005, almost every Iraqi Army unit at battalion and brigade level was redesignated to fit into a pattern where battalions and brigades were numbered sequentially within their parent brigade and division. Generally speaking, even numbered divisions (2d, 4th, 6th, 8th, 10th) started out as regionally organized ING units, while odd numbered divisions (1st, 3d, 5th) began as Iraqi Army units recruited at the national level.

(3) In addition to the Iraqi Army, which falls under the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of the Interior fields a sizeable force of land forces under the umbrella of National Police units and the positional forces: the Border Police and Iraqi Police Service.

(4) The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) officially disbanded the former Baathist regime Iraqi armed forces on 23 May 2003. The CPA started the process to establish new Iraqi armed forces earlier the same month.

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(5) In June 2003, the CPA established the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT). While CMATT was instituting a new Iraqi Army, the CPA started paying a stipend to former Iraqi Army NCOs and officers roughly equivalent to their former salaries. This stipend would last for a year. Originally the New Iraqi Army was envisioned as a small three-division force which would be recruited nationally and have the mission of defending the country from limited external threats. The first battalion of this force began training at Kirkuk in August 2003.

(6) In addition to this small force under the new Ministry of Defense (MOD), in September 2003, the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) began forming local militia-style units for internal defense called the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC). The ICDC, while under the MOI, was formed initially on a decentralized basis at company level by Coalition forces. The ICDC eventually created battalions, brigades and divisions and was transferred to MOD control. This force was later redesignated as the Iraqi National Guard (ING) and in early 2005 merged with the Iraqi Army. It is important to remember that while the Iraqis have a proud military tradition that traces back centuries, the current configuration of their military forces has existed for only a short period of time and experienced several major organizational shifts.

### **2. Iraqi Security Forces.**

a. The Iraqi Security Forces are currently controlled by several different ministries. The Minister of the Interior is scheduled to absorb all the other security forces that do not belong to the Ministry of Defense. Figure 1-1 illustrates the complexity of the MOI structure and some of the other security forces controlled by other ministries that will eventually fall under the MOI.

b. During times of peace, the Minister of Interior is designed to have authority over joint operations with MOD inside Iraq's borders.




FIGURE 1-1. Iraqi Security Forces.

c. Figure 1-2 shows the approximate numbers of Iraqi Security Forces based on function. It is easy to see that the Iraqi military is only a part of the total security picture in Iraq.

## Iraqi Security Force Breakout





Figure 1-2. Iraqi Security Forces by Function

c. The Ministry Of Defence (MOD).

Ministry Of Defence Headquarters Organization




**Figure 1-3. Iraqi MOD Organization.**


(1) The Minister of Defense works for the Prime Minister, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and head of the National Command Authority (NCA), but receives its direction through the Ministerial Committee for National Security (MCNS). The MCNS is comprised of the Prime Minister, the Minister of State for National Security Affairs, the Deputy Prime Minister for National Security Affairs, the ministers of Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Finance, and the director of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service.

(2) The MOD issues orders to the Iraqi Joint Headquarters. The Joint Headquarters commands the Training and Doctrine Command, Iraqi Support Command, Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC), the Iraqi Air Force, The Iraqi Navy, Iraqi CTC and the Iraqi Special Operations Force.

## Joint Headquarters Structure Iraqi Armed Forces



(3) The Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) provides operational command and control over all the Iraqi Army Forces. Figure 1-3 shows how the IGFC itself is organized.



**FIGURE 1-3 IGFC Organization**

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(4) By early 2006, the Army had evolved into a ten division force which is primarily concerned with fighting the insurgency throughout the country. Additional battalions have been raised to protect oil and electrical infrastructure which are frequent targets of the Anti-Iraqi forces (AIF).

(5) The organization and common systems associated with the Iraqi Divisions are located in chapter three.

### NOTES

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
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## CHAPTER 2 CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

**1. General.** As with many national armies, the Iraqi Army is composed of individuals from the general population with deeply ingrained cultural perspectives and biases. The Iraqi Army and Coalition forces must consider these cultural factors during operations, and training. Understanding the cultural framework of the Iraqi Army will not guarantee success, but failing to understand it will certainly lead to frustration and possible failure in building a credible and viable security force. This short chapter provides a basic level of detail necessary to understand the complexity of the Iraqi culture and its affects on Iraqi Army force generation and operations. The intent is to point out to the planners, advisors, and trainers that culture will impact operations. If they don't try to understand the culture, they may not understand why their efforts are not having the desired effect.

**2. Cultural Factors.** Iraq's culture incorporates many aspects of traditional Arab/Islamic culture. The cultural mix presents a very complex set of circumstances in developing courses of action to organize, equip, train and advise Iraqi Army forces. As a means to understand the perception and approach of IA members, there are several key cultural factors that influence their behavior: gender, family origin, sub-tribe affiliation, ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, and current or former occupation. While these factors do not represent all of the influences on an Iraqi or the IA unit, they are the most significant in terms of assessing the relationships they may establish with other personnel, units, or government organizations. Figure 2-1 represents a sample of the influences of these factors on the relationships between members of each group that now compose the Iraqi security forces.



**Figure 2-1, Cultural Factors Affecting Relationships**

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a. Gender. Iraqi males and females have a significantly different view of their roles and responsibilities than in Western cultures. While there are changes in the roles and responsibilities that women fill in the Iraqi Army, there is still significant separation between the genders. Women are placed in a subservient role but at the same time protected or restricted from interaction with outsiders.

b. Family. In Iraq, the family remains the central pillar of the structure of the society. The honor of and loyalty to the family and tribe are pervasive throughout the Iraqi approach to life. As in many patriarchal societies, the male children learn the trade of their father and follow in the same occupation. The context for recruits for the Iraqi Army comes from this cultural approach of veneration and respect for their family.

c. Sub-Tribe. Loyalty and association with a tribe serves as the basis before all else; family first, tribe second and government last. The father and male elders of a tribe are respected and revered and they dictate the loyalties of the family or tribe. If they dictate that education is of little purpose for a son or particularly a daughter, then the children will, in most cases, not attend school. Within Iraq, there is widespread illiteracy with only 58% of the population achieving a basic level of education. Of that 58%, the literacy breakdown among the sexes is 71% for males and 45% for females.

d. Ethnicity. The Iraqi Army faces the challenge of organization with soldiers from several different ethnic groups, often with long-standing animosities. Many factors impact the effectiveness of an Iraqi Army unit starting with its ethnic composition of Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen. Ethnic perceptions and biases of IA units will significantly affect interaction with the population or other groups such as the Iraqi Police.

e. Religion. In addition to ethnicity, religion is a major factor with the various Islamic sects such as Sunni and Shia further stratified by a mixture of tribes or families. The majority Shi'ite religious group is further divided into followers of various imams such as the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani of Najaf and Muqtada al-Sadr, one of the few surviving descendants of Grand Ayatollah Mohamed Bakr al-Sadr. Equally fractured are Sunni religious groups seeking to restore or strengthen their position in the new Iraq.

f. Political. Under the former regime, the number of political parties was limited due to repression but under the new Iraqi Constitution, there is no such restriction. The result of the new Iraqi Constitution and democratic process created numerous political parties. The heavy political involvement of the Iraqi population gave birth to numerous parties and no one party holds enough political power to control the Parliament. Political parties form coalitions to gain enough influence in the political system to give voice to their desires and point of view. While Iraqi Army military members retain the right to vote, the new Constitution prohibits organized political action by units or leaders.

g. Occupation. Current inductees in the Iraqi Army join the force with the knowledge that they place not only their lives but also those of their family in jeopardy from attacks by insurgent and terrorist elements. Unconfirmed estimates place the number of casualties in the Iraqi Army and Police forces, between June 2003 and November 2006, at 5,736. Knowledge of the high number of casualties and the perils of military service do not dissuade Iraqis from continuing to volunteer for service. Personnel with previous army or police service under the former regime also have

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certain cultural approaches to security operations that may not fit with the currently approved methods.

(1) Military. Iraqi military history and culture also create some of the context for development of the new Iraqi Army. While Coalition forces and the new Iraqi Government seek to create a military that responds to the civilian government with the capability to protect and defend the nation, there are many elements of the previous force that linger with the soldiers and leaders that make up the new force. The history of the Iraqi military created under the former regime saw the military and intelligence services used to control and suppress the Iraqi population and ensure that those forces remained loyal to the regime. While certain elements of the intelligence services focused on external issues and carried out operations against opponents of Iraq and Saddam, the majority monitored, interrogated, coerced, and took direct action against the population. Saddam used the intelligence apparatus to ensure his continued control of the Iraqi population and military forces.

(a) As the former intelligence organizations brutally maintained Saddam's control over the population, a great deal of hatred, mistrust, and fear towards the intelligence apparatus remains in the population. The former Iraqi military forces combined elements of British and Soviet doctrine coupled with their own combat experiences gained during the Iran-Iraq war to form their structure and TTPs. As found throughout Arab culture, there is general submission and obedience of superiors. Projecting a paternal image, leaders securely occupy the top of the pyramid of authority with little history of delegating authority to subordinates.

(b) Leaders in the new Iraqi Army will approach their leadership roles and responsibilities based on their historical and cultural perspective on military service. Through interviews with former Iraqi regime officers, there are some indicators of the perceptions of military officers from that period. Those IA officers that transitioned into the new IA developed much of their military culture based on experience gained during the period leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

(c) After Desert Storm, the Iraqi Army attempted to gather insights and lessons from experiences during the conflict. Because Saddam believed the Iraqi ground forces had generally performed well during the war, the officers compiling their lessons learned focused on peripheral and irrelevant elements of their warfighting efforts. The resulting review of wartime operations diverted or avoided constructive criticism of Iraqi military operations and in some cases turned negatives into positive observations. One finding stated that the Republican Guard actually won the war by avoiding annihilation. The logic of the observation was that with the superiority of the Coalition forces the Republican Guard succeeded by hiding to avoid annihilation. Repetition of these lessons concerning dispersion, construction of deep bunkers, and hiding equipment actually became the operational doctrine of the ground forces. The result was that leaders and the Army no longer measured success by a unit's ability to engage and defeat an enemy force but rather by how well a commander or leader avoided combat and conserved his forces.

(d) Commanders and unit leaders also operated in an severe atmosphere of suspicion, paranoia, and distrust. Saddam's security apparatus conducted extensive

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spying and surveillance of unit leadership to ensure that there was no attempt to overthrow the government. Leaders were often subjected to spies and technical surveillance within their units. The result was a military culture that avoided contact and coordination with other units and was suspicious of the motives of anyone that was not of proven personal loyalty.

(e) The command and control conditions produced leaders that expected a great deal of micromanagement from the upper levels of the government bureaucracy. While retaining the responsibility for unit performance, commanders routinely saw subordinate units ordered into action or to new locations without their knowledge. Extreme suspicion on the part of Saddam and the senior leadership made it very risky for unit leadership to move their forces for training or other operations. These conditions created a perception by unit leadership that the regime security spies were out to “set them up” or find some mistake. Consequently, unit leaders avoided taking action, remained as isolated as possible from other commanders or leaders, and avoided contact with their higher headquarters if possible.

(f) Largely based on the historical military culture, leaders in the Iraqi Army will seek to establish and hold their position based on whom they know and trust. Previous loyalties will be a very strong influence in the command and control of the new Iraqi Army. For instance, a battalion commander may hold what we would think of as unusually strong influence with the division commander based, not on performance or efficiency, but rather on family, tribe, or previous personal relationship.

(g) Other cultural influences. In addition, other cultural conditions will directly affect development and operation of the new Iraqi Army. Some approaches or perceptions by IA members are formed from the previous military culture, religious, or family influences. Examples of some of those conditions are:

[1] Discipline in the former Iraqi regime forces was very harsh by Western standards. Unit leadership was subject to execution if their subordinate units were defeated. Soldiers were subject to amputation of hands, being thrown off buildings, beatings with whips or canes, stoning, and cutting out tongues for a variety of infractions ranging from criticism of Saddam to capitol crimes such as murder.

[2] Iraq is primarily a cash based society because of a distrust of banks by the average person, lack of pervasive technical capabilities within the financial sector, and policies of the previous regime. Soldiers will require cash payments on payday creating the need for pay officer, security and accountability procedures.

[3] Religious requirements such as holidays and prayer times can dictate operational tempo. The Ramadan holiday starts on the beginning of the ninth month based on a lunar calendar year and is roughly a month long observance. Its start date shifts forward by approximately eleven days every year in relation to the Gregorian calendar. The faithful observe a strict fast and celebrate the end of Ramadan with Eid al-Fitr, the Feast of Breaking the Fast which lasts for three days. Another sacred observance Eid al-Adha, The Feast of Sacrifice, occurs at the end of the Hajj on the tenth day of the twelfth month and lasts for three days. Observance of these religious holidays will disrupt training and operations of the IA.

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[4] There is a reluctance to share information because of a belief that holding information strengthens a person's power base. There is also the tendency towards paranoia caused by the pervasive spying and monitoring the military forces experienced under the former regime.

[5] Family responsibilities can dictate military procedures; soldiers receive their pay in cash and travel home on leave to give it to their family. A serious family need for assistance can cause IA soldiers to abandon their responsibilities and travel home to respond.

[6] Patriarchal authority is strong; a soldier may leave his unit if his father or clan sheik directs him to come home for some purpose.

(2). Police. The primary Iraqi security force that the IA will interact with in their area of operation will in most cases be the Iraqi Police. Generally, the Iraqi military and police security forces do not enjoy a similar culture in their approach to security operations. The different operational approaches used by the Army and Police at times may impair the intended security objective in an area of operation. A basic difference in security operations is that the Police stay in the same precinct, district, or community whereas assignment of IA units depends on the security situation and mission task organization. Personnel that form the IP forces in a given area will most likely share the same cultural factors as the local population. The IA units on the other hand may be from other provinces with other cultural traits. As a result, there are obstacles to effective cooperation and coordination between the two elements that require concerted efforts to overcome.

**3. Operational Impacts.** To assess the affects of cultural factors on operations, Transition Team (TT) members analyze the unit and it's functions by answering questions focused on the cultural factors. As the analysis occurs, the TT also identifies means and methods to mitigate or alleviate any adverse cultural impacts on IA unit effectiveness. The example leading questions below are not a checklist to follow but rather are intended to assist TT members in building an understanding of the cultural conditions impacting their IA unit.

a. In addition, the mitigation actions do not apply in all cases and are only a start-point for further development. Members of a TT focus on developing new skills, methods, and approaches with the soldiers and leaders of the IA. Mitigation of cultural impacts must, in many cases, take the form of selling the new idea or method to the IA unit and leadership.

### • Leader to Subordinate Relations.

#### Leading Questions

- Are the leaders/subordinates related to each other?
- What is the perceived prestige level between the leader and subordinate (i.e. Is the subordinate related to a local person of great power?)
- What are the ethnic/religious affiliations of the leader/subordinate?
- What is the professional experience of the leader/subordinate?
- Have either the leader or the subordinate been through any formal leadership education?

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- Were unit leaders former members of the Iraqi military under the previous regime?
- Does the unit leadership understand and apply the requirements found in the Code of Military Discipline?

### Mitigation

- Build on the value and benefit of training and schools for both unit leaders and soldiers. The more personal value gained by the IA soldiers and leaders the easier it is to convince them of the need for formal schools.
- Seek out and build on the professional experiences of the leader/subordinate. While their experience may not match our expectations according to doctrine or tactics, there are elements of value the TT can use to build unit capability.
- Identify the family and power influences within the unit and employ those relationships to the benefit of the IA unit.
- Determine the level of experience of former regime military members and develop an understanding of their perception of operations to target key beliefs that need to change to improve operations and leadership.
- Ensure the unit leaders and NCOs have Arabic copies of the Code of Discipline and understand it's requirements.

### • Role of the NCOs.

### Leading Questions

- Who holds the real power or control within the unit?
- Does the NCO take charge in the presence of an officer?
- Do the officers allow the NCOs to perform their duties?
- What is the literacy level of your NCOs?

### Mitigation

- Start with small tasks for the NOC chain and build their confidence and the trust of the leadership through repeated small successes.
- Instill confidence in NCO leaders through repeated battle drills and expand their level of expertise through progressively more difficult training scenarios.

### • Staff Officers compared to Field Commanders.

### Leading Questions

- Do Commanders delegate authority to conduct tasks and development of plans to designated staff officers?
- Are unit leaders confident in the abilities of the staff and trust them to carry through a staff action to completion?

### Mitigation

- Track and guide staff officers as they plan, prepare, and execute staff actions to support unit operations.
- Ensure the Commander notes staff successes and coach rather than direct staff members when they miss the mark for coordination or execution.

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### • Old Military Vs New Military.

#### Leading Questions

- What is the leadership mix of old and new military officers within your unit?
- Is there a perceived distinction between the two types of officers?
- What formal schools did the old Iraqi Army leaders attend?
- Are the old Iraqi Army leaders actively using techniques learned under the former regime?

#### Mitigation

- Coach and correct operational and leadership techniques that are substandard regardless of their origin. Sell the benefit of new TTPs without denigrating previous military service or lack of experience.
- Determine the level of experience for former regime military members and develop an understanding of their perception of operations to target key beliefs that need to change to improve operations and leadership.
- Build on the value and benefit of training and schools for both unit leaders and soldiers. The more personal value gained by the IA soldiers and leaders the easier it is to convince them of the need for formal schools.

### • Shi'ite, Sunni, or Christian.

#### Leading Questions

- What is the ethnic mix of Shi'ite/Sunni/Christians within your unit?
- Is there a perceived separation between the groups in a social environment?
- Does observance of different religious practices create adverse impact on unit capabilities and operation?

#### Mitigation

- IA unit leadership recognizes the requirements of different religious practices and plans for the resulting impact on unit operations and support.
- Don't allow IA soldiers and leaders to use their religious observances as a crutch to avoid tasks or missions.
- Recognize that there are valid religious requirements that all IA members will observe and plan accordingly.
- Use unit training and mission experiences to build a shared identity and unit loyalty regardless of religious affiliation.

### • Military to Police.

#### Leading Questions

- What is the ethnic mix of Arab/Turkmen/Kurd for the local leaders of Police and military forces?
- Who holds the real power in your unit's AO?

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- Do the police or the military have closer relations to the civilian population and government?
- Are there any combined operations between military and police forces?
- What is the predominant religious mix (Shia/Sunni/Christian) of the police forces vs. the military forces?
- Do the military and police leaders regularly meet socially or for professional talks?

### Mitigation

- Ensure the IA unit meets and interacts with the local community leaders including the Police.
- Seek to develop a working relationship between the IA commander and the police chief in the local community to develop a common understanding of problems and issues faced by the local population.
- Involve local leaders, formally elected or otherwise, in developing methods to improve security within the community. Recognize that it will be difficult to ensure that none of the leaders publicly appear to be without influence or power. Including local leaders in meetings and planning should serve to build the public's perception of their effectiveness and status.

### •Military to Militias.

#### Leading Questions

- Does the military leadership have any blood relationships to local militias?
- Who is considered more powerful in your unit's AO – military forces or militia forces?
- Are the militia and police complicit in your unit's AO?
- Is your unit complicit with the militia in your unit's AO?
- Do the militia's receive active support from the military in your unit's AO?
- Does your unit's leadership have a social or professional relationship with local militias?

### Mitigation

- The Iraqi Constitution does not allow militias outside the structure of the Iraqi military. While this is an absolute statement, recognize that unless the rules of engagement change, it will take time to overcome the reliance on militias in local communities for security. Supplant the militias at every opportunity with effective operations by the IA and IP.
- Identify personal and unit relationships between the IA unit and the local militia. If possible, isolate or restrict access of IA personnel to local militia contacts.

### •Military to religious leadership.

#### Leading Questions

- In your unit's AO, is the military leadership affiliated with the religious leadership?
- How does your unit respond to a FATWAH?
- Does the military or the local religious leadership have more power?

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- Does your unit's leadership meet regularly on a social or professional basis with the local religious leadership?
- How does your unit function during religious holidays?
- How do daily prayers impact your unit during routine and combat operations?

### Mitigation

- Incorporate religious holidays and daily observances into the battle rhythm of the unit.
- Strengthen unit leadership and unit cohesion whenever possible to enhance loyalty to the unit as opposed to loyalty to local religious leaders.

### •Military to family

#### Leading Questions

- How close physically is your unit's military leadership to their family?
- How close physically are your unit's soldiers to their families?
- Are there information sources available based on family ties?
- Does the IA unit or its soldiers balk at conducting operations in communities where their families live?
- Have the families of IA members been threatened or attacked?

### Mitigation

- When possible, shift mission tasks so that IA units do not conduct operations in their "home" community.
- Identify threats to the families of IA unit leaders and soldiers and recognize that the threat may compromise their effectiveness.

### • Military relationship to sheiks.

#### Leading Questions

- What is the religious difference (if any) between your unit's leaders to the Sheiks?
- In your unit's AO, is the military leadership affiliated with the Sheiks?
- Does the military or the local tribal leadership have more power?
- Does your unit's leadership meet regularly on a social or professional basis with the local tribal leadership?
- Does the local tribal leadership control resources required by the military forces?

### Mitigation

- Ensure the IA unit meets and interacts with the local community leaders including, whenever possible, the local sheik.
- Seek to develop a working relationship between the IA commander and the sheik in the local community to develop a common understanding of problems and issues faced by the local population.
- Involve the local sheik in developing methods to improve security within the community.

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### Male/Female.

#### Leading Questions

- Do female personnel serve in or support operation of the IA unit?
- Are there adverse reactions to females being involved in unit operations?
- Are female soldiers trusted to do their duty?
- Are there male or female soldiers that are ineffective when working in a mixed-gender environment?

#### Mitigation

- Develop common and shared training experience in mixed-gender units to build understanding and trust among unit members.
- Whenever possible/practical include female soldiers and leaders in all aspects of unit operations.
- In mixed-gender units ensure that there are specific roles and responsibilities that are understood by all involved. The intent is to dispel the perception of favoritism or unrealistic expectations by either males or females.

## NOTES

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
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## CHAPTER 3 COMMAND AND CONTROL

**1. General.** The purpose of this chapter is to describe the command relationships within the Iraqi Army, and how these command relationships intersect with other coalition forces. This chapter discusses Iraqi ground forces and associated support elements. This chapter does not discuss naval and air forces. Specific wire diagrams for each Iraqi Army division are included in this chapter as well as diagrams for the supporting/base/training establishments and special operations establishment. Additional details on the supporting establishments are found in subsequent chapter – i.e. logistics.

**2. Joint Headquarters and its superior and subordinate organizations.** The Joint Headquarters reports to the Ministry of Defence. It is roughly equivalent to the Joint Staff within the U.S. DOD. The Joint Headquarters exercises Command authority over the Navy, Air Force, Training and Doctrine Command, Support Command, Iraqi Ground Forces Command and the Iraqi Special Operations Forces. This booklet addresses the ground forces so for the purposes of this booklet, the operating procedures for the Iraqi Navy and Air Force have been excluded. Figure 3-1 depicts this chain of command.



**FIGURE 3-1. Chain of Command.**

**3. Assumption of OPCON of the Iraqi Armed Forces by the Iraqi Joint Headquarters.** The Joint Headquarters now has OPCON of a large portion of the Iraqi

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Armed Forces. The underlying basis for this change of command relationship from previous command relationships is the “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Iraqi Ministry of Defence and Coalition Forces.” (MOU) It is critical for deploying partner units and transition teams to familiarize themselves with this MOU and the other documents referenced within it. This memorandum describes command relationships within multiple contexts. There are many possible permutations of these relationships - therefore understanding this process is critical. **Despite what may be written, differing tactical situations and different personalities of Coalition and Iraqi commanders will have the largest impact on the true meaning of a command relationship.**

**4. Legal Basis for Iraqi Military Forces Operations.** From the Memorandum of Understanding mentioned in paragraph 3 above - “Once the Iraqi Joint Headquarters assumes OPCON of Iraqi military forces, those Iraqi forces shall no longer operate under UNSCR 1546/1637 or any successor resolutions. Instead they shall operate in accordance with Iraqi domestic laws.”

**5. Communication between MNF-I and the Iraqi Joint Headquarters.** A Liaison and Partnership Directorate (LAPD) was created to facilitate communication and coordination between the Iraqi Joint Headquarters and MNF-I. It is at this level that operational deconfliction and cooperation issues are decided. At lower levels the command relationships are defined and executed based on a variety of factors. These factors are explained below.

**6. Command/Coordinating Relationships and conditions.** Within U.S. doctrine the command relationships of ADCON (administrative control), TACON (tactical control) and OPCON (operational control) are used frequently within U.S. joint forces. This does not mean that they are well understood at all levels, or executed precisely per the joint definition at all levels. Even within U.S. execution there are many compromises associated with Command Relationships. For the Iraqi Army it is even more complicated. The paragraphs below describe most of the factors that will exert influence over who or what organization controls and influences operations. It is important for each partner unit and transition team to precisely understand their command relationships on both the Iraqi chain and the coalition chain. These command relationships may change from operation to operation. The definitions of ADCON, TACON, and OPCON are detailed below because the definitions offered in the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Iraqi Ministry of Defence and Coalition Forces differ slightly from Joint Publication 0-2.

a. Command Relationships:

(1) ADCON. ADCON refers to direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, discipline, and any other matters not included in the operational mission of the military formation.

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(2) TACON. TACON refers to the command authority over assigned or attached units or commands or military capabilities that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within an operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task.

(3) OPCON. TACON refers to the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate units involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and training necessary to accomplish assigned missions. OPCON does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.

(4) Command. Command is the authority vested in an individual by virtue of their position for the direction, coordination, and control of subordinate organizations, forces and personnel.

### b. Coordinating Relationships:

(1) Lead Command. Lead command refers to the unit/force that has primary responsibility for accomplishing the assigned mission and receives assistance from another command's unit/forces or capabilities and is responsible for ensuring that the supporting command understands the assistance required. When designated as the Lead Command, the designated Iraqi Joint Headquarters or Coalition Forces Commander will clearly define the required assistance and coordinate operations with the forces of the supporting command.

(2) Supporting Command. Supporting command refers to the unit/force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains the lead command's force/formation, and is responsible for providing the assistance required by the lead command's unit/formation. When assigned a Supporting Command role, the designated Iraqi Joint Headquarters or Coalition Forces Commander will provide the required assistance and effects within its capability and will support operations of the forces of the lead command.

(3) Tactical Overwatch. Coalition forces provide overwatch at the tactical level of command for Iraqi Army units which have achieved Training Readiness Assessment (TRA) level 2 and are capable of taking the lead in operations within assigned AOs.

(a) Coalition forces will posture tactical response forces in close proximity and within quick response times for Iraqi Army units assigned an AOR. The purpose of these forces is to: (1) prevent the defeat of the Iraqi Army, (2) reestablish local security control in situations that exceed Iraqi Army capability, and (3) provide support to coalition force transition teams.

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(b) Under tactical overwatch, coalition forces provide enablers for support and sustainment to Iraqi Army units until such time the Iraqi Army unit level organic combat service support capability achieves TRA level 2, and the unit's overall TRA level reaches 1.

(c) Authority to intervene during tactical overwatch is held at Coalition Force Multinational Division level.

(4) Operational Overwatch. Coalition forces provide overwatch at the operational level of command for Iraqi Army units which have achieved TRA Level 1 status and are capable of independently planning, executing, and sustaining counter-insurgency operations in the lead. Additionally, coalition forces provide operational overwatch to Iraqi Army formations that are assigned within provinces that have achieved Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). During operational overwatch, coalition forces will maintain forces capable of providing reaction forces, with relatively longer response times to intervene in situations that exceed ISF capability and endanger civil security control at provincial level.

(a) Coalition forces are also postured to provide emergency CSS support.

(b) The authority to intervene with operational overwatch forces is held at Multinational Corps – Iraq for Iraqi Army units operating in areas under Iraqi Army Lead (IAL) and at Multinational Force – Iraq for areas under Provincial Iraqi Control.

### c. Factors Affecting Command/Coordinating Relationships:

(1) Iraqi Army Lead. In IAL, an Iraqi Army unit has attained a minimum TRA level 2 and has been allocated an independent area of operations by a superior headquarters. The unit is capable of planning and executing directed security operations within its area of operations. Ideally the Iraqi Army unit is capable of being sustained by Iraqi Army resources and enablers; however, this is not a necessary precondition to achieving IAL. The Iraqi Army unit is assigned TACON to a higher coalition or Iraqi Army headquarters that positions and assigns tasks to the unit. Coalition Forces may be postured in tactical or operational overwatch, depending on the TRA level of the unit and the prevailing security conditions within the resident province or area of operations. Military Transition Teams continue to advise and train the Iraqi Army unit, as well as provide a link to coalition enablers and combat service support in order to help the Iraqi Army unit achieve TRA Level 1 status.

(2) Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). The Prime Minister of Iraq will authorize the transfer of a province to PIC status. This transfer of status is based on four conditions: the security threat level, the capability of the Iraqi security forces, the level of proficiency of the provincial and local government, and the ability of coalition forces to maintain an appropriate overwatch stance.

(3) Combined Operating Areas. A combined operating area will exist when both Iraqi Army and coalition ground forces are conducting combined tactical operations within the same area of operations. In such circumstances, by mutual agreement coalition forces may lead these operations. Combined operating areas will generally be established on a temporary basis to resolve a specific security situation. Combined operating areas will be determined by agreed boundaries and limited by time and function.




FIGURE 3-2. Command/Coordinating Relationships

**7. Questions that should be asked by deploying MTTs and Partner Units.** Figure 3-2 above describes the factors identified in the MOU between MNF-I and the Iraqi MOD. However, there are additional factors that will affect the reality of command/coordinating relationships on the ground. For deploying partner units from Division to Battalion, and for deploying transition teams, it is absolutely critical to develop a clear picture of the actual command relationships for all Iraqi forces within your potential area of operations. **The most important aspects of these command relationships will be the level of oversight (tactical or operational), and whether or not the coalition organization will have TACON of the Iraqi forces.** Factors that affect these command relationships are listed below:

- a. What is the TRA level of the Iraqi Unit?

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- b. What is the TRA level of the Iraqi Unit's higher headquarters?
- c. Is the province under Provincial Iraqi Control?
- d. Is the province under coalition control?
- e. Will the command relationship change for a specific operation?
- f. Will there be a combined operation that will require more specific definitions of command relationships between coalition and Iraqi forces?
- g. What is the security condition of the Iraqi forces' area of operations?
- h. Does the Iraqi force have its own area of operations?
- i. Does the Iraqi Ground Forces Command have OPCON of the Iraqi unit?

Continuous reassessment based on the factors above is crucial to unity of effort. Exchange of liaison officers (beyond the responsibilities of transition teams) is always a good practice. A thorough review of the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Coalition Forces is absolutely necessary if coalition units and transition teams expect to understand the C2 relationships that they will execute.

**8. Organization of Conventional Iraqi Forces under Iraqi Ground Forces Command.** Figures 3-3 through 3-4 below depict the organization of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command. Note – the 11<sup>th</sup> Division is templated for planning purposes. Portions of the 11<sup>th</sup> Division are likely to be mapped from structure within other Divisions. The 11<sup>th</sup> Division does not exist as an operational unit and is not depicted on figure 3-4.




FIGURE 3-3. Division AOs.




FIGURE 3-4. Iraqi Ground Forces Command.

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


FIGURE 3-5. 1<sup>st</sup> Division.




FIGURE 3-6. 2<sup>nd</sup> Division




FIGURE 3-7. 3<sup>rd</sup> Division




FIGURE 3-8, 4<sup>th</sup> Division.




FIGURE 3-8. 5<sup>th</sup> Division.




FIGURE 3-9. 6<sup>th</sup> Division.




FIGURE 3-10, 7<sup>th</sup> Division.




FIGURE 3-11. 8<sup>th</sup> Division.




FIGURE 3-12. 9<sup>th</sup> Division.




FIGURE 3-13. 10<sup>th</sup> Division.




FIGURE 3-14. 11<sup>th</sup> Division.

**9. Organization of Iraqi Special Operations Forces.** The Iraqi Special Operations Forces fall directly under the Joint Headquarters and do not report to the Iraqi Ground Forces Command. There are five major subordinate organizations to the Iraqi Special Operations Forces:

- a. Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force (ICTF): Focused on high level terrorists and terrorist organizations. Capable of hostage rescue operations and other direct action type operations.
- b. Commando Battalion (CDO): Capable of conducting raids, airfield and port seizures and reinforcing ICTF operations.
- c. Reconnaissance Company: Conducts surveillance of insurgent activities. Operate clandestinely.
- d. Training and Development Detachment: Conducts screening and assessment of candidates for ISOF. Conducts specialty training for all members of ISOF.
- e. Support Battalion: Provides logistics and administrative support for ISOF.





FIGURE 3-15. ISOF.

**10. Organization of Training and Doctrine Command.** The Training and Doctrine Command is not yet fully formed. However, there are several functional schools within the lower levels of this Command. Figure 3-16 below depicts the structure of the Training and Doctrine Command. There are two major subordinate organizations to Training and Doctrine Command – the Tactical Training Command and the National Defense University. Additional details on the Iraqi Army’s education and training process can be found in Chapter 11.



**FIGURE 3-16. Training and Doctrine Command.**

**11. Organization of Support Command.** The Iraqi Support Command provides support to more organizations than just the Army. However, in order to understand how this support is distributed, non-Army units have been included in the figures below. The Iraqi Support Command is a regionally organized Command with a Regional Support Unit having command and responsibility over a series of Garrison Support Units. The Garrison Support Units come in four sizes – Extra Large, Large, Medium and Small. Additional detail on the Iraqi Support Command can be found in Chapter 7 (Logistics).

a. **Command and Control within Support Command:** The command relationships between the Support Command organizations and operational organizations is not clearly defined. Support Command organizations generally own the real-estate that an operational unit is based on. However, this will vary from case to case depending upon whether an operational unit is co-located on a coalition FOB or separate. The Commander who commands the base may not be the Commander in command of the support unit. In some cases the Commander who Commands the base will also be the Commander of the support unit. The concept of Garrison commands, vs. operational commands is not well executed by the Iraqi Army and there will be a certain amount of ambiguity regarding command responsibilities for real-estate and facilities, vs. operational units and capabilities.

b. The Iraqi Support Command has command authority over 5 Regional Support Units. In turn, these Regional Support Units command multiple Garrison Support Units within their geographical location.




FIGURE 3-17. RSU/GSU Locations.




FIGURE 3-18.

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


FIGURE 3-19.




FIGURE 3-20.

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


FIGURE 3-21.




FIGURE 3-22.

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
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NOTES

## CHAPTER 4 PERSONNEL

**1. Recruiting.** The process of accessing a citizen into the IAF involves a number of organizations and supporting documents which are almost always done on paper instead of electronically.


### Recruit to Soldier



**FIGURE 4-1. Recruit to Soldier.**

a. The process begins via collaborative effort in which the force generated or sustainment needs are determined by JHQ based on requirements identified by the IGFC. Training and Doctrine command will then schedule the required number of BCT classes based on its capability and capacity.

b. Basic Combat Training (BCT) course schedules define recruiting quotas. Figure 4-1 shows the Recruit to Soldier process. Recruiting centers attempt to keep a sufficient pool of recruits to meet the expected demands of the scheduled BCTs and short courses for former IA soldiers. When a BCT is scheduled to begin, the M1 orders the Recruiting Center to generate a list of recruits (1) to ship according to class size. This list is used to prepare the Shipping order (2) which lists names and receiving BCT. This list must arrive at the BCT location before recruits arrive in order to efficiently in-process students. The individuals are identified by a 12-digit recruit number. The Recruiting Centers are identified in Figure 4-2.



**FIGURE 4-2. Recruiting Center Locations.**

c. Enlisted Accession Criteria. The following minimum criteria are used for screening recruits:

- (1) Age: 18-29
- (2) Height: >165cm tall (5'3")
- (3) Weight: 40-150 Kg (88-330lbs), not obese
- (4) Literate: (read, write and speak Arabic or Kurdish)
- (5) Hearing: 256 Hz tuning fork at 0.5 meters both ears
- (6) Vision 6/9 vision both eyes (can be corrected). No color blindness.
- (7) 22 intact teeth
- (8) Identification: One original ID (Naturalization, Citizenship, Military ID)
- (9) Male (Female when specified – medical, security, etc.)

(No requirements may be waived without approval from the Joint Headquarters.)

d. Officer Recruit Processing. Individuals desiring to enter the IAF as officer candidates will initially go to a local recruiting center where they can apply to join the IAF. In no case will an individual be accessed into the IAF without first processing through a recruiting center.

e. Accessions Processing. At the recruiting center, all officer candidates must be vetted, given a medical examination, and will undergo a basic evaluation of their background and schooling. Initial contracts for officers will be prepared and specify a service obligation of 2 years following the completion of individual training. Recruiting

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centers will create personnel records files for each candidate which will contain the candidate's application, results of medical examination, an interview sheet, and when the individual will report for training. A copy of the candidate's contract agreement will also be included in the folder. Once a final determination has been made as to where and when the individual will go for training, the recruiting center will publish an accession order and forward it along with the individual's record file to that location (or allow the individual to carry the file with him/her) and forward a copy of the file to JHQ to begin the permanent record file in accordance with the MOD personnel records management policy.

f. Immediate Disqualifications for Entry in the IAF: The following are immediate disqualifications for entry into the IAF:

(1) former 4th Level or Higher Ba'athist who was not exempted by the Ba'ath apprehension Board.

(2) former Special Republican Guard members

(3) former Secret Service and Ba'ath Party security or Militia members

(4) accused of criminal activity (robbery, forgery, bribery)

g. Entry requirements may be waived with a recommendation from the General Command and with the approval of the Minister of defense.

h. Accession of Prior Service Officers. Officers below the grade of General who were formerly in the Iraqi Army, may be accessed at their former grade provided they meet the minimum initial entry requirements. Members will have to provide proof of their former grade upon entering into the IAF. The JHQ M-1 will make grade determinations of all officers entering into the IAF.

i. Training and Assignment of Prior Service Officers. Upon acceptance of their application and grade determination by the JHQ M1, the newly accessed officer will receive their assignment instructions to their next permanent duty station. The JHQ M1 is responsible for issuing assignment orders and ensuring each officer is entered into the JHQ personnel management database.

j. Accession of Former General Officers. Former general officers may be accessed into the IAF based on the needs of the service. The approval authority for accession of general officers is the Prime Minister, with the advice and consent of the National Assembly. The Defense Council will screen all potential nominations based on recommendations from the M-1, the appropriate Service Chief, and the IAF Chief of Staff. Prior to being considered for accession, a valid position must exist to which the officer will be assigned to and nominated against. The officer's grade must match that of the position and they must meet the minimum qualifications for entry into the IAF to include the completion of all military and civilian schools. In no case will a general

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officer be accessed without a valid position, or promoted for the purpose of meeting the grade requirement for the position.

k. General Officer Accessions Process. Upon nomination by the M-1, appropriate Service Chief, or the Chief of Staff, the officer will be scheduled to report to the nearest recruiting center at which time they will be vetted and medically screened. Once the officer has completed the requirements at the recruiting center, they will report to the M-1 for a personal interview. Once the interview has been completed, the M-1 will forward the recommendation through the chain of command to the approving authority for approval. Approved requests will be forwarded to the M-1 for publication of accession and assignment orders.

l. Recruits should be in-processed as soon as they begin to arrive at the BCT. All arrivals who are enrolled in the course are recorded on the Arrival Report, (3) of Figure 4-1, which is sent to the JHQ M7 to oversee course management. **This starts the clock on the timeliness of receipt of pay.** This report is forwarded by the JHQ M7 to the JHQ M1 who will prepare the Assignment Order (4) in compliance to the direction of JHQ M3 (via CMATT) so that soldiers names can be entered into the MOD personnel database and an 8-digit pay number assigned. This data is provided to DG Programs and Budget to be entered into Payroll database and to await notification of the soldier's arrival at unit of assignment.

m. Before training is complete, M1 will publish the Distribution Order, again, in compliance with the direction of the M3 (via CMATT), (5) of Figure 4-1, which should contain the names from the Assignment Order. The Distribution Order authorizes transport from school to the unit. It also authorizes the unit to accept the personnel transported to their doorstep. The Distribution Order should always precede the arrival of the new personnel.

n. The final critical step to initiating pay at the unit of assignment is the preparation and submission of the Gained to Unit Report, (6) from Figure 4-1, from the unit to the MOD M8. The M8 validates this list and forwards to the DG of Program and Budget who compare the list of names to those originating from the Assignment Order before flipping the pay switch to "ON"... the desired end state.

o. The M1 has the role of publishing orders and the M8/DG of Programs and Budget has the control on pay.

p. Officer Training.

(1) In Processing. Upon arrival at the training location, the JHQ M-1 will publish an assignment order for the officer candidate assigning them to the training unit. Once assigned, officer candidates will be in-processed into the IAF at their training location prior to the commencement of their basic training at the Military Academy. In processing will at a minimum include issuance of an identification card, issuance of

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clothing and equipment, initiation of a training record, updating of the personnel record file, and such additional processing as deemed necessary.

(2) Upon completion of training, officer candidates will be commissioned and will receive their assignment instructions to their next permanent duty station. JHQ M1 will issue assignment orders and ensure that each officer is entered into the JHQ personnel management database. The training center will forward the initial record folder created in the recruiting center to the officer's new unit along with the assignment orders.

### **2. Reenlistment.**

a. All Enlisted, Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs), and Warrant Officers (WOs) serving in the Iraqi Armed Forces may be able to apply for reenlistment. The Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) will only retain personnel who consistently demonstrate the capability and willingness to maintain high professional standards.

b. Battalion commanders have overall reenlistment approval authority for members within their command, provided that those members are eligible for consideration. Commanders may not consider a member's career intent in the reenlistment process.

c. Commanders must ensure that members under their command who fail to meet quality standards during their enlistment are advised that their reenlistment eligibility could be in jeopardy. They must ensure that recommendations for reenlistment are consistent with other qualitative decisions such as advancements or promotion, and are based on substantial evidence.

d. Commanders may reverse their decisions at any time prior to the execution of the contract for reenlistment.

e. Commanders will not use the reenlistment program to prevent a member from continuing to serve in the IAF when involuntary separation under other authorities is more appropriate.

f. Commanders will consider the following prior to making final decisions regarding a members request to reenlist:

(1) Performance evaluations.

(2) Documented favorable and unfavorable information in the member's personnel file.

(3) The member's willingness and ability to comply with IAF standards.

(4) The member's ability (or lack of) to meet required training and duty performance levels.

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g. The Director General for Personnel has the responsibility for establishing and overseeing the implementation of a reenlistment policy.

h. Joint Headquarters (M-1) has the overall responsibility for developing and disseminating procedures for implementing the reenlistment program of the Iraqi Armed Forces. It oversees the execution of the reenlistment program throughout the Iraqi Armed Forces. The M-1 also provides periodic reports to the Commander of the Joint Forces, and the Director General for Personnel, along with such recommendations as may be appropriate. Recommendations may involve the need for reenlistment incentives (either general incentives or specialty/skill-related incentives for critical shortage occupations), additional criteria or qualifications for reenlistment, or recommendations that improve the readiness of the Iraqi Armed Forces.

i. M-1 publishes reenlistment orders and forwards them to the member's unit and local supporting BSU.

j. In cases of command disapproval of reenlistment extensions, M-1 publishes separation orders and forwards them to the member's unit, local pay section, and the JHQ Finance section.

### k. Responsibilities of Immediate Supervisors.

(1) Maintain performance and counseling records on subordinate personnel in order to provide feedback, influence service member performance, and support recommendations for reenlistment, as appropriate.

(2) Provide unit commanders with recommendations concerning the member's career potential.

(3) At a minimum, review the member's personnel record and any unfavorable information to evaluate the individual's duty performance and leadership abilities and potential.

(4) Complete IAF Form 2 (Request for Reenlistment), and provide a recommendation for retention or non-continuation in Section II. Supervisors will forward requests to the unit commander for consideration.

(5) If the supervisor recommends disapproval of the request, he must justify, in section II why the member should not be retained in the IAF. The justification should be fact-based and documentation should be attached. Justification for disapproval must cite specific examples of conduct or performance that support the recommendation such as: "the member received a letter of counseling for being late to formation on 1 May 2004; received a letter of counseling for inciting a fight in the barracks on 3 May 2004; received a punishment for being AWOL for 10 days on 24 May 2004, etc."

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### I. Responsibilities of Unit Commanders.

(1) Unit commanders will consider the supervisors' recommendation, the member's duty performance and any other pertinent information before making a decision.

(2) When a supervisor recommends retention and the unit commander agrees, the commander will initial the appropriate block and sign in Section III.

(3) When a supervisor recommends disapproval, or when the commander non-concurs with the supervisor's recommendation, the commander will initial the appropriate block and sign in Section III. At a minimum, commanders must notify the service member in person as to the reasons why he or she is not being recommended for retention.

(4) When a commander decides not to recommend a member for retention the commander will advise the member of their right to appeal, in accordance with Iraqi procedures.

### m. Rights of Appeal.

(1) A member has the right to appeal a reenlistment non-selection recommendation made by a supervisor after the unit commander endorses it. The member must indicate in Section IV if he or she intends to appeal. The member then has 10 days to present a written appeal to the unit commander (extensions will be provided if circumstances dictate). The appeal must be in writing and will become part of the official record. If the member fails to submit a written appeal after 10 days, (unless otherwise extended), the decision of the unit commander becomes final, and no further appeals will be considered.

(2) Once complete, the member's letter of appeal will be submitted through the unit commander to the battalion commander. Upon receipt of the appeal, the unit commander has the option of changing his or her recommendation before forwarding the recommendation to the battalion commander. The unit commander must forward reenlistment recommendations, including any appeals, to the battalion commander within 10 days.

(3) Upon receipt of the reenlistment recommendation, including any appeal, the battalion commander may grant a face-to-face interview to the member. If a face-to-face interview is held, the meeting must be summarized in writing and signed by both the battalion commander and the member.

### n. Final Approval Authority.

Battalion commanders are the final approval authority for both reenlistment requests and appeals. In the event of an appeal, the unit commander will prepare a cover letter recommending approval or disapproval of the appeal and forward the request to the

## EDITION 1 (FOUO)

battalion commander for final decision. Upon receipt of the member's appeal request, the battalion commander will have 10 days to make his or her decision.

o. When Members May Reenlist.

Members may reenlist when they are within six months of reaching their expiration of term of service & the CDR will be responsible for any Delay.

p. Reenlistment Terms.

Members must reenlist for 2 years if entering their second or subsequent enlistment. In case the Military Retirement & service Law will be issued, this law will be considered even if it is conflict with the implementation of this policy.

q. Processing of Reenlistment Extensions.

(1) Upon execution of the reenlistment extension, the battalion S1 section will forward the approved request to the JHQ, M1 for publication of reenlistment orders.

(2) Upon receipt of the approved reenlistment extension, the JHQ, M1 will publish a reenlistment order and forward to the member's unit, local pay section, and the JHQ Finance section.

(3) Requests for reenlistments that are disapproved by the battalion commander will be forwarded to the JHQ, M1 requesting that separation orders be published. A copy of the appeal and any other substantiating documentation will also be forwarded to the JHQ.

(4) References:

Policy Guide for Administration of Personnel Affairs in the Iraqi MOD.  
Enlisted Accessions Policy

### 3. Personnel Accountability.

a. Personnel are accounted for using the following reports:

- (1) Daily PERSTAT
- (2) Monthly Unit Manning Document Roll-up
- (3) Iraqi Casualty Reporting and Processing
- (4) Commencement Report (Gain Report)
- (5) Unit Transition Point Concept

b. Daily PERSTAT Reporting.

- 0900 - From Platoon to Company
- 1100 - From Company to Battalion
- 1300 - From Battalion to Brigade
- 1600 - From Brigade to Division
- 1700 - From Division to HQ IGFC
- 0900 – HQ IGFC to JHQ M1

Figure 4-3 shows an example of a PERSTAT.

**Current PERSTAT**

**Example** لوگم

Present For Duty	Other	Quarters	TDY	Leave	AWOL	Assn	Auth	Unit
بجاء الله بصرح	غير محال	ببستون	بجاء الا	قردايها	نوب بلوغ رذع	ببصرحها	ببصرحها	تذحيلا/طيشن بطيشن قصص ببتارم بكتندم
								ببصرحها لاجلها قديم
9	0	0	2	12	1	24	40	ببصرحها بطيشن
23	0	3	1	9	14	50	76	ببصرحها بطيشن
371	0	9	0	28	45	453	679	ببتارمها ببتارم
18	0	1	0	3	0	22	25	ببتارم
								لولا هائلها تنقي قديم
3	0	1	0	2	0	6	20	ببصرحها
15	0	1	0	45	19	80	128	ببصرحها بطيشن
76	3	14	0	157	6	256	320	ببتارم
13	0	0	0	6	0	19	25	ببتارم
								لولا هائلها تنقي قديم
6	0	0	2	1	0	9	24	ببصرحها
22	1	0	0	0	11	34	60	ببصرحها بطيشن
233	0	19	0	28	45	325	300	ببتارم
31	0	1	2	13	0	47	25	ببتارم
820	4	49	7	304	141	1325	1722	ببصرحها
								Total <sup>1</sup> ببصرحها و ببتارمها ببتارم

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FIGURE 4-3. PERSTAT Example.

c. Monthly Unit Manning Reporting. The monthly Unit Manning Reporting is based on the approved MTOE. The positions are by paragraph and line number (UMD). It shows authorized positions with assigned personnel to identify overages and vacancies. It is due each month with the following suspense date:

- Platoon to Company – 1<sup>st</sup> of the month
- Company to Battalion – 2<sup>nd</sup> of the month
- Battalion to Brigade – 3<sup>rd</sup> of the month
- Division to IGFC – 4<sup>th</sup> of the month
- IGFC to JHQ M1 – 5<sup>th</sup> of the month
- JHQ M1 to Director General for Programs and Budget (Finance Office) – consolidated UMR by the 10<sup>th</sup> of the month

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Soldiers that are not listed will not be paid, and units with extra names will not receive new personnel.

### d. Accountability Problems.

- (1) Daily PERSTAT is not always being done or reported.
- (2) Numbers reported by the Unit don't match those at JHQ.
- (3) Timely Casualty Reporting is often not being done.
- (4) Personnel Dropped from the Rolls are sometimes not reported.

(Improper Personnel Accountability impacts operations, logistics, training requirements, reconstitution, budget and recruiting.)

## 4. Pay.

### a. How Pay is Calculated.

Pay is calculated depending on three different items: rank, grade and the number of dependants (for tax purposes).

### b. Pay Timeline (Sequence Of Events).

(1) The Pay Committee, a three member unit level team, appointed by the unit commander in writing, is in charge of submitting the Accountability/Personnel rosters to the Ministry of Defense from the 1st to the 6th of each month to the MOD, Directorate of Programs and Budget Salary Section. These rosters should be hand carried or delivered by messenger (Divisional pay representative). (Changes to the pay rosters can be made up until the 15th of each month.)

(2) The MOD Finance Section will check the personnel rosters for errors and omissions from the 6th to the 20th of each month.

(3) The Finance Section will print the pay rosters between the 20th and 23rd of each month.

(4) The Accounting section checks the rosters and stamps them on the 23rd of each month.

(5) The Finance Section prints the checks and obtains the Defense Minister's signature between the 23rd and the 26th of each month.

(6) The Pay Committee receives the roster and the checks on the 27th of each month.

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(7) The Pay Committee then announces the day to pay service members.

(8) On the 28th and the 29th the Pay Committee will cash the checks at the bank.

(9) The Pay Committee will distribute the money to the subordinate unit's pay committee. The Pay Committee is responsible for verifying that each service member is paid correctly.

(10) Pay day commences from the 28th of each month.

(11) Service members will sign for their pay and present an official military ID card or official photo identification.

c. Accuracy In Reporting - The timeline for paying an Iraqi service-member can take as long as a month depending on when correct accountability rosters are submitted.

\*Submission of Correct Accountability Rosters Is Key to accurate and timely Pay\*

d. How The Iraqi Soldier Gets Paid.

(1) Battalion S-1 personnel clerks will collect and verify an accountability roster with every service member in their daily status for the month.

(2) The personnel roster will be delivered to the data input section at the Ministry of Defense by secured mode usually the unit G1.

(3) The Ministry of Defense makes a certified pay roster and a certified check is then printed and it is signed for by the pay committee.

(4) The Pay Committee at the unit level receives the check and verifies the pay roster.

(5) The check is then taken to the bank where it is cashed (The Pay Committee will verify the amount is correct).

(6) Service members will then present their military identification and sign for their pay (Ensure the Pay Committee and the soldier count the money). If a service member has a pay problem they should contact their Personnel officer immediately.

(7) Unpaid salaries are returned to the bank where they will receive either a receipt of deposit or a check made out to the MOD which will be returned to the MOD.

(8) The original pay roster with signatures will also be returned to the Audit Section of the MOD.

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(Accuracy In Accountability Is The KEY To Getting Paid Correctly.)

### e. Pay Problems.

(1) The service member must immediately notify the pay/personnel officer along with their chain of command.

(2) The pay officer and chain of command must report the problem to the Directorate General Programs and Budget immediately and allow sufficient time to address the problem (proper documentation will be needed).

(3) If the problem continues regarding Service members' pay, the Division G-8 should be notified to intervene.

(4) A service member who is contacting the Division G-8 should have the following documentation: full name, rank, military service 8 digit number, date of enlistment, name and location of unit, and the dates the service member was incorrectly paid.

(5) If the service member's pay is not corrected during the next pay period, the unit commander and pay officer will contact their respective Divisions' G-8 to correct the problem.

### f. Pay Issues/Challenges.

(1) Centralized pay processes from MOD: All units must travel to Baghdad.

(2) Military personnel paid monthly by cash via Iraqi pay Committees, not Coalition.

(3) Pay roster and check issuing/check cashing process is cumbersome.

(4) Reliance on DIV Monthly Manning Reports.

### g. Good Practices.

(1) Soldiers personally sign documents/pay rosters.

(2) Unpaid salaries are annotated on pay rosters.

(3) DIV Paymaster returns any/all unpaid salaries to bank.

(4) Deposit slip goes back to MOD and reconcile with MOD Finance Office.

(5) Always use the original pay rosters (no copies accepted).

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h. Top 5 causes of problems.

- (1) Direct Recruiting.
- (2) Inaccurate Monthly Manning Reports.
- (3) Unit transfers – with no orders/visibility at MOD.
- (4) No Commencement Report.
- (5) Soldier's failure to report to assigned units (self-PCS'd).

**5. Leave.** No more than 25% of the unit can be on leave at any given time.

### **6. Holidays.**

a. The Normal Iraqi work week is Sunday through Thursday. Friday is a holy day. MOD is usually minimally manned on Friday.

b. Important Muslim Holidays. All Muslims, Sunni or Shi'a, celebrate the two Muslim holidays:

(1) Eid al-Fitr, which marks the end of fasting during the month of Ramadan and occurs on the first day of Shawwal.

(2) Eid al-Adha, which marks the end of the Hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca, starts on the 10<sup>th</sup> day of Dhul Hijja.

(3) Other Muslim Celebrations/Events

There are many other celebrations in the Muslim world -which vary by region and sect- that are *not* always universally considered "Muslim" events. These include:

(a) Ashura (10th day of Muharram).

(b) Eid Milad al-Nabi or Mawlid al-Nabi (The Prophet's Birthday).

(c) Lailat Nisf Sha'Ban OR Shab-E-Barat (Night of Repentance).

(d) Lailat al-Qadr (The Night of the Decree, also known as the Night of the Measure, the Night of Power or the Night of Value).

(e) Lailat al-Miraj (The Night Journey).

(f) Shi`I Celebration of Birthdays and Deaths of Imams Saints (Awlia-Allah).

c. To conclude, most Muslims celebrate the holidays described above. Specifically in Iraq, these holidays are widely celebrated, in addition to the births and deaths of Imams, Saints and Sufis. And, in Iraq in particular, with its slight majority Shi'i population, *Ashura* is an important annual event now that the restrictions of Saddam's Sunni led regime have been removed.

d. Non-religious Celebrations.

New Year's Day (January 1st) is also celebrated in Iraq. January 6th is Army Day. July 14th is National and Republic Day. August 8th celebrates the end of the Iran-Iraq War. On March 21st, the Kurds and many Iraqis celebrate *nau roy* (also *noruz*), also a Persian, Azeri, and Afghan holiday, as is the First Day of Spring. It is also the beginning of the Kurdish calendar year.<sup>1</sup> Labor Day is celebrated May 1st. April 9th is celebrated as the end of the Saddam Hussein regime.<sup>2</sup>

**7. Biometrics.** The Unit Transition Point is a 5 station program developed by the Iraqi Ground Forces Command. It is used during initial rollout and periodically (weekly or monthly with the unit leave and pay cycles) to collect biometrics and biographical data. Its purpose is to improve personnel accountability at the BN level by eliminating erroneous entries, deserters and "ghost" members. The soldiers are given a Military Service which is an 8 digit ID number which is issued by the Ministry of Defense and an official ID card. This Military Service number can be assigned to only one person in the military.

**8. Rank Structure.**



**9. Promotions/Evaluations.**

a. Promotions.

(1) When a service member is promoted the unit must send the service members' full name, 8 digit military service number, old rank, new rank, date the promotion became effective, a copy of their promotion orders issued by the Ministry of Defense, their current unit, and their status.

(2) Unit Level Promotions.

(a) Enlisted committees meet every 3 months (Jan, Apr, Jul, Oct). Officer and SNCO promotion boards meet in Jan and July.

(b) Field Commanders have promotion authority for PVT to SFC.

[1] The selectees must meet the time-in-grade requirements.

[2] A vacancy must exist for the member to get promoted.

(c) Common reasons for denial of or delay in processing promotions.

[1] No vacancy = No promotion.

[2] Not recruited = not actually inducted into IA.

[3] Previously assumed an illegal rank = not able to promote to the next rank.

[4] Committee conducted outside the policy = all results void.

(d) Best records are promoted based on availability of positions (Based on old Iraqi Army procedures).

b. Evaluations.

(1) Officer Evaluations.

(a) This policy is applicable to all officers in the grade of 2LT through LTG in the IAF.

(b) Officer promotions to the next higher rank or to occupy higher positions are based on the officer's physical, technical, or leadership qualifications. Honesty & accuracy during the evaluation process is essential to provide the army with loyal & qualified members to execute the new missions assigned to the Iraqi Armed Forces.

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### (c) Responsibilities of the Director General for Personnel.

[1] The Director General for Personnel has overall responsibility for establishing and overseeing the implementation of the officer evaluation policy across the Ministry of Defense and will monitor compliance with this policy through periodic reports, inspections, and evaluations of program activities across the Iraqi Armed Forces.

[2] Provide periodic reports to the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, and the Commander of the Joint Forces, along with such recommendations as may be appropriate.

### (d) Responsibilities of the Joint Headquarters (M-1).

[1] M-1 is overall responsible for developing and disseminating procedures for implementing the officer evaluation program of the Iraqi Armed Forces.

[2] Provide periodic reports to the Commander of the Joint Forces, and the Director General for Personnel, along with such recommendations as may be appropriate. Reports may include total number of officer evaluations processed (by service), the number of evaluations which are overdue, or recommendations that improve the readiness of the Iraqi Armed Forces.

[3] Review officer evaluations from the field for accuracy and forward to the member's personnel file for filing and entering into the IAF personnel database.

[4] Provide promotion committees with copies of officer evaluation reports for officers who are in the zone of consideration.

[5] Restrict access to evaluation reports at the JHQ to individuals responsible for maintaining personnel files, or authorized to view them for personnel management purposes.

### (e) Responsibilities of Commanders at all levels.

[1] Ensure each individual officer receives a fair and impartial evaluation based on demonstrated performance and future ability to serve in positions of increased responsibility.

[2] Ensure timely and accurate processing of all officer evaluations for members within their command.

[3] Correct or return evaluations which are incomplete, or those which do not meet the minimum reporting requirements as prescribed in this policy.

### (f) Immediate Rater Responsibilities.

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[1] The immediate supervisor is the person who:

[a] Is most familiar with the day-to-day performance of the rated officer.

[b] Most directly guides the rated officer's participation in the unit's mission.

[2] Establish the rating chain and conducting initial counseling.

[3] Discuss the scope of the rated officer's duties and responsibilities to include performance objectives, the unit's mission, problems, priorities and similar matters.

[4] Advise the officer as to changes in his or her duty performance objectives, when needed, during the rating period.

[5] Assist the rated officer with completing the officer evaluation form.

[6] Ensure each individual officer receives a fair and impartial evaluation based on demonstrated performance and future ability to serve in positions of increased responsibility.

[7] Forward the evaluation to the senior rater for processing.

(g) Senior Rater Responsibilities.

[1] The senior rater is the senior rating official in the rating chain. The senior rater uses his or her position and experience to evaluate the rated officer from a broad perspective. His or her evaluation is the link between the day-to-day observation of the rated officer's performance by the rater and the longer term evaluation of the rated officer's potential by promotion and assignment selection boards.

[2] The senior raters assess the ability of the rated officer by placing his or her performance in perspective by considering:

[a] The rated officer's experience.

[b] The relative risk associated with the performance.

[c] The difficulty of the organization's mission.

[d] The adequacy of resources.

[e] The overall efficiency of the organization.

[3] Ensure that rating officials counsel the rated officer throughout the rating period on meeting his or her objectives and complying with the professional standards of the officer corps.

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[4] Evaluate the rated officer's potential relative to his or her contemporaries.

[5] Ensure that all reports, which the rater writes are complete and provide a realistic evaluation.

[6] Ensure each individual officer receives a fair and impartial evaluation based on demonstrated performance and future ability to serve in positions of increased responsibility.

[7] When possible, have the rated officer sign the report after it has been completed.

### (h) Rater and Senior Rater Qualifications.

[1] The rater and senior rater must be at least the rank of Captain and senior to the rated officer by virtue of position, rank, or time in grade. Officers who are on a standing promotion list and in the position for the new grade, are authorized to rate other officers who are of the same rank regardless of time in grade.

[2] Must be in the direct line of supervision and supervises the officer on a daily basis.

[3] Commanders will normally be rated by the next higher officer in the chain of command. For an example: The commander of a company will be rated by the battalion commander, who will be rated by the brigade commander, and so forth.

### (i) Rights of Appeal.

[1] An officer has the right to appeal an evaluation report submitted by a rater or senior rater. The officer must indicate in item 18 of the evaluation form if he or she intends to appeal. The officer then has 10 days to present a written appeal to the rater or senior rater (extensions will be provided if circumstances dictate). The appeal must be in writing and will become part of the official record. If the officer fails to submit a written appeal after 10 days, (unless otherwise extended), the evaluation becomes final and no further appeals will be considered.

[2] Appeal Process. The officer's letter of appeal and a copy of the evaluation report will be submitted to the next higher officer in the chain of command. For example: If an officer wants to appeal an evaluation report from his Brigade Commander, his appeal request will be forwarded to the Division Commander for review and consideration. Upon receipt of the appeal, the appeal authority will review the appeal and approve or disapprove the request. Appeals which are denied will be returned through the chain of command citing the reason. Both the appeal request and comments from the appeal authority will be permanently filed in the officer's military record. Appeals which are favorably considered will be returned to through the chain of

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command with instructions for completing a new evaluation form. Once the new evaluation has been completed, a copy will be forwarded to the appeal authority for their review and comment.

### (j) Disposition of Evaluations.

[1] Once the officer evaluation form has been signed by the rated officer, rater, and senior rater, the unit administrative section will:

[a] Provide a copy of the evaluation to individual officer.

[b] Retain the original evaluation form in the unit files.

[c] Forward a copy to the JHQ for processing.

[2] Annual evaluation determined by specific time for three months starting from the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of January.

[3] The officer should be evaluated by his direct CDR in condition that he was working under his command for at least six months.

[4] If it is less than six months, his former CDR will be responsible of his evaluation.

[5] The direct CDR or who ever is in charge of the evaluation will be responsible of making the evaluation and sending it to the references within the specific period.

[6] Getting the approval of the references on extending the evaluation period or postponing it to the next year during the following conditions:

[7] When the officer is outside the country for training more than six months.

[8] If he is in the hospital for more than 3 months.

[9] Sick vacation for more than 3 months approved by a military hospital.

[10] The officer is allowed by his CDR to see his evaluation and also he has the right to appeal the evaluation decision that the CDR made during one month.

### (k) Enlisted Evaluations.

[1] This applies to all Iraqi Armed Forces NCOs serving in the grade of Sergeant First Class and above.

[2] Enlisted evaluations are considered one of the most important procedures within IAF to ensure promoting NCOs to the next rank or occupying high positions that

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match their physical, technical, and leadership qualifications. Accuracy and honesty by the supervisors in the evaluation process is essential in order to provide the Army with good, loyal members to perform the missions assigned to the IAF.

(l) Responsibilities for Director General for Personnel.

[1] Overall responsibility for establishing and overseeing the implementation of the enlisted evaluation policy across the Ministry of Defense.

[2] Periodic review and revision of this policy as required, in consultation with the Assistant Chief of Staff for Administration (M-1).

[3] Monitor compliance with this policy through periodic reports, inspections, and evaluations of program activities across the Iraqi Armed Forces.

[4] Provide periodic reports to the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, and the Commander of the Joint Forces, along with such recommendations as may be appropriate.

(m) Joint Headquarters (M-1).

[1] Overall responsibility for developing and disseminating procedures for implementing the enlisted evaluation program of the Iraqi Armed Forces.

[2] Oversee the execution of the enlisted evaluation program throughout the Iraqi Armed Forces.

[3] In coordination with MOD, periodically review and revise the enlisted evaluation program as required.

[4] Ensure compliance of MOD policies for the enlisted evaluation program through periodic reports, inspections, and evaluations of program activities across the Iraqi Armed Forces.

[5] Provide periodic reports to the Commander of the Joint Forces, and the Director General for Personnel, along with such recommendations as may be appropriate. Reports may include total number of enlisted evaluation reports processed (by service), the number of evaluations which are overdue, or recommendations that improve the readiness of the Iraqi Armed Forces.

[6] Review enlisted evaluations from the field for accuracy and forward to the member's personnel file for filing and entering into the IAF personnel database.

[7] Provide promotion committees with copies of enlisted evaluation reports for NCOs who are in the zone of consideration.

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[8] Restrict access to evaluation reports at the JHQ to individuals responsible for maintaining personnel files, or authorized to view them for personnel management purposes.

(n) Responsibilities of Commanders at all levels.

[1] Ensure each individual NCO receives a fair and impartial evaluation based on demonstrated performance and future ability to serve in positions of increased responsibility.

[2] Ensure timely and accurate processing of all enlisted evaluations for members within their command.

[3] Correct or return evaluations which are incomplete, or those which do not meet the minimum reporting requirements as prescribed in this policy.

(o) Immediate Rater Responsibilities.

[1] The immediate rater is the person who is most familiar with the day-to-day performance of the rated NCO and supervises them daily.

[2] Establish the rating chain and conduct initial counseling with the NCO.

[3] Discuss the scope of the rated NCOs duties and responsibilities to include performance objectives, the unit's mission, problems, priorities and similar matters.

[4] Advise the NCO of changes to his or her responsibilities or performance objectives during the rating period.

[5] Assist the rated NCO with completing the evaluation form.

[6] Ensure each individual NCO receives a fair and impartial evaluation based on demonstrated performance and future ability to serve in positions of increased responsibility.

[7] Ensure timely processing and submission of all NCO evaluations which they are responsible for processing.

[8] Forward the evaluation to the senior rater for processing.

(p) Senior Rater Responsibilities.

[1] The senior rater is the senior rating official in the rating chain. The senior rater uses his or her position and experience to evaluate the rated NCO from a broad perspective. His or her evaluation is the link between the day to day observation of the

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rated NCOs performance by the rater and the longer term evaluation of the rated NCOs potential by promotion, training, and assignment selection boards.

[2] The senior rater assess the ability of the rated NCO by placing his or her performance in perspective by considering:

- [a] The rated NCOs experience.
- [b] The rated NCOs moral, ethical, and professional attributes.
- [c] The rated NCOs relative risk associated with performance of duty.
- [d] The rated NCOs demonstrated performance to lead subordinates.
- [e] The difficulty of the unit's mission.
- [f] The adequacy of resources.
- [g] The overall efficiency of the organization.

[3] Ensure that rating officials counsel the rated NCO throughout the rating period on meeting his or her objectives and complying with the professional standards of the NCO Corps.

[4] Evaluate the rated NCOs potential relative to his or her contemporaries.

[5] Ensure that all reports, which the rater writes are timely, complete, and provide a realistic evaluation.

[6] Ensure each individual NCO receives a fair and impartial evaluation based on demonstrated performance and future ability to serve in positions of increased responsibility.

[7] Ensure the rated NCO signs the report after it has been completed.

(q) Rater and Senior Rater Qualifications.

[1] Rater.

[a] The rater must be an officer within the chain of command.

[b] Serve in the direct line of supervision of the rated NCO.

[c] Evaluated the NCOs performance for a minimum of 60 days.

[2] Senior Rater.

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[a] The senior rater will normally be the rater's next higher officer in the chain of command.

[b] Have direct visibility to the rated NCOs daily performance.

[c] There is no minimum rating time for the senior rater.

(r) Periods of Evaluations.

[1] Evaluations for NCOs will normally be annually for 12 months unless otherwise directed by the JHQ M-1, for promotion board purposes.

[2] The evaluation period for an NCO begins effective upon assignment or reassignment to a position.

(s) Rights of Appeal.

[1] An NCO has the right to appeal an evaluation report submitted by his rater. The NCO must indicate in item XX of the evaluation form if he or she intends to appeal. The NCO then has 10 days to present a written appeal to the rater or senior rater (extensions will be provided if circumstances dictate). The appeal must be in writing and will become part of the official record. If the NCO fails to submit a written appeal after 10 days, (unless otherwise extended), the evaluation becomes final and no further appeals will be considered.

[2] Appeal Process. The NCOs letter of appeal and a copy of the evaluation report will be submitted to the senior rater for consideration. The senior rater will review the appeal request and provide a recommendation to the next higher officer in the chain of command. For example: If an NCO wants to appeal an evaluation report from his Company Commander, his appeal request will be forwarded to the Battalion Commander for review and consideration. Upon receipt of the appeal, the appeal authority will review the appeal and approve or disapprove the request. Appeals which are denied will be returned through the chain of command citing the reason. Both the appeal request and comments from the appeal authority will be permanently filed in the NCOs military record. Appeals which are favorably considered will be returned to through the chain of command with instructions for completing a new evaluation form. Once the new evaluation has been completed, a copy will be forwarded to the appeal authority for their review and comment.

(t) Disposition of Evaluations.

[1] Once the NCO evaluation form has been signed by the rated NCO, rater, and senior rater, the unit S1 or administrative section will:

[a] Provide a copy of the evaluation report to individual NCO.

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[b] Retain the original evaluation form in the unit files.

[c] Forward a copy to the JHQ M-1 for processing.

[2] Annual evaluations determined by specific time and also determined by the General Command of the Joint Forces.

[3] The NCO should be evaluated by his direct CDR in condition that he was working under his command for at least 60 days.

[4] If it is less than 60 days, the period will be declared as non-rated during the next normal evaluation rating.

[5] The evaluation forms will not be received by the references after the specific period mentioned in item (a).

[6] Physical & medical test will be at specific places within the units & hospitals or medical field units.

[7] The medical test Committee will send report if the NCO failed in passing the medical test.

[8] The direct CDR or who ever in charge of the evaluation will be responsible of making the evaluation and send it to the references within the specific period.

[9] Getting the approval of the references on extending the evaluation period or postpone it to the next year during the following conditions:

[a] When the NCO is outside the country for training more than 6 months.

[b] If he is in the hospital for more than 3 months.

[c] Sick vacation for more than 3 months approved by military hospital.

[10] Based on policy, evaluations are supposed to be done annually but are not being done.

### **10. Medals and Awards.**

a. Medals.

(1) Mesopotamian (Al-Rafeedain ) Medal.

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(a) The Mesopotamian Medal is presented to Iraqi and foreign individuals who provided dignified service to Iraq or to the Coalition during the War, or during consultation duty.

(b) When higher class is granted, the lower class medal will be retrieved, and new class privileges will be granted to the holder.

(c) The Mesopotamian medal has a military and a civilian version with five classes for each version. The military version is distinguished by crossed swords where as the civilian version does not have the crossed swords.

(d) Mesopotamian Medal Privileges.

[1] The holders of 1<sup>st</sup> degree Mesopotamian medals will be granted the following privileges:

[a] Life insurance.

[b] Family health treatment.

[c] An honor membership with all clubs.

[d] Invitations to all national celebrations.

[e] Priority to obtain a house from government's projects.

[f] Free 1<sup>st</sup> class travel on Iraqi Airlines & Railroads, for the family one time a year.

[2] The holders of 2<sup>nd</sup> degree Mesopotamian medals will be granted it the following privileges:

[a] Life insurance.

[b] Family health treatment.

[c] An honor member ship with all clubs.

[d] Priority to obtain a house from government's projects.

[e] Free 1<sup>st</sup> class travel on Iraqi Airlines & Railroads, for the family one time a year.

[3] The holders of 3<sup>rd</sup> degree Mesopotamian medals will be granted it the following privileges:

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[a] Life insurance.

[b] Discounted for travel on Iraqi Airlines & Railroads, for the family one time a year.

(2) Bravery Badge of Honor.

(a) The Bravery Badge of Honor will be presented to all military and civilian personnel for their courageous dedication, and devotion wholeheartedly during their duty during the war or during military engagements.

(b) The Bravery Badge of Honor will be presented by an order from the MOD.

(c) Every time the person receives this medal of honor, another star will be added to the ribbon.

(d) Bravery Badge of Honor Privileges.

[1] Priority in the government positions.

[2] Life insurance.

[3] One time tax free minivan, from the General Company of car trading.

(3) Wounded Medal of Honor.

(a) Will be Issued \ retrieved from an ordered of the MOD.

(b) Will be issued to the military and civilians who received medium to severe wounds during military actions.

(4) The Martyr Medal. The Martyr Medal is awarded to soldiers and civilians that are killed in action during activities supporting the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi people.

(5) General Service Medal of Honor.

(6) The Medal of Honor for Peace.

(7) Palestine War Medal of Honor.

(8) Cooperation Medal of Honor.

(9) 14 of July Medal of Honor.

(10) March Movement Medal of Honor.

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(11) Rescue Medal of Honor.

(12) Iraq. Flag signing.

(13) Civil Defense Medal of Honor.

(14) Air Defense Medal of Honor.

b. Unit Commendations.

(1) If the entire unit is granted a medal or award, then all members of the unit will wear the medal. (Members can continue to wear their medals and awards after the retirement or relocation to a different unit.)

(2) A similarly marked ribbon will be added in the right side of the unit flag.

c. Additional Requirements.

(1) Iraqis may wear foreign medals and awards that they have received for special merit in the field of science and other activities when it enhances the reputation of the country, the government and the Iraqi people. Individuals must have a written endorsement from the commanding general of the armed forces in order to be authorized to wear their foreign awards.

(2) The commander of the artillery and other branches will form committees to establish new logos or flags for each commanding unit. All recommendations will be submitted to the IGFC commander and chief for approval.

(3) The following issues must be followed in regards to presenting medals & merits.

(a) Issuing and retrieval the merits & medals by an order from the MOD.

(b) Medals and awards will be worn at official celebrations, National\patriotic occasions, and occasions decided by MOD policy.

(c) The 1<sup>st</sup> born son has the right to wear his deceased father's medals. The family will keep the medals as an honor to his memory.

(d) A medal holder will be granted privileges ;( yet to be determined,) these privileges will be passed to his wife and his children; if he is a bachelor and is killed, the merits will be inherited by his family according to the law.

(e) Unauthorized wearing of medals and awards is a criminal offense and subject to disciplinary action and imprisonment and fines.

**11. Discharge of Soldiers.**

a. Discharge of Deserters. If a service member is considered a deserter (has been absent without leave (AWOL) 5 consecutive days or more) the service member's current unit will submit the member's full name, military service 8 digit number, date the member deserted, the unit, and the dates that they were absent.

b. Discharge upon completion of Term of Enlistment.

c. Retirement.

(1) Mandatory Legal Age to Retire.

LG-GEN	60
MG	58
BG	56
COL	53
LTC	51
MAJ	49
CPT	49
2LT-1LT	45
TECH-CPL-CWO	55
CPL-CWO	50

**12. Iraqi KIA Procedures (Morgue, Payment to Families)**

a. Burial Procedures.

b. Death Benefits. For a draft copy of the death gratuity/survivor benefits units should use the draft policy to collect the appropriate documentation until the official policy is approved. (Death Gratuity – 12 months pay + Trvl & Danger + salary for the month) Use Iraqi Death Certificates, US death certificates will not be accepted.

**13. Assignments/Transfers.**

a. Gaining A Soldier From Another Unit. The gaining unit must submit the service member's full name, military 8-digit number, arrival date, previous unit, and a copy of their transfer orders.

b. This policy also applies to a transfer within a Division.

**14. Discussion of Common Obstacles/Problems and Recommended Solutions.**

**15. List of Leading Questions for Incoming TT Members to Ask Their American Counterpart Prior to Relief in Place (RIP).**

## **EDITION 1 (FOUO)**

- a. Are all the soldiers being paid?
- b. How are pay problems being handled?
- c. How are reenlistments being conducted?
- d. How accurate are the PERSTATs?
- e. How is the unit conducting leave?
- f. Does the leave system permit continuation of operations
- g. What Biometrics are being used?
- h. How are promotions handled?
- i. Are performance evaluations being done?
- j. Are soldiers being recommended for awards and medals?
- k. How does the unit address and support KIAs and WIAs?

## **NOTES**

**EDITION 1 (FOUO)**

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## CHAPTER 5 INTELLIGENCE

### 1. General.

a. Historically, the former Iraqi regime used the Iraqi Military and Intelligence Services to control and suppress the Iraqi population. While certain elements of the intelligence services focused on external issues and carried out operations against opponents of Iraq and Saddam, the majority monitored, interrogated, coerced, and took direct action against the population. Saddam used the intelligence apparatus to ensure his continued control of the Iraqi population and military forces.

b. Because the former intelligence organizations brutally maintained Saddam's control over the population, a great deal of hatred, mistrust, and fear towards the intelligence apparatus remains in the population. The Coalition Provisional Authority and Iraqi Government instituted several steps when organizing the new intelligence units to support Iraqi security forces to ensure civilian control. Those steps focused on checks and balances for control of intelligence operations, laws limiting the authority and reach of intelligence elements, and prohibitions against charging and holding Iraqi citizens. The Iraqi Constitution specifically authorizes the creation of National Iraqi Intelligence Services (NIIS) to collect information, assess threats to national security, and advise the Iraqi government. The NIIS is under control of civilian authority, is subject to legislative oversight, and operates in accordance with the law and pursuant to the recognized principles of human rights. Military intelligence services comply with these provisions and laws specific to military operations.


### 2. Intelligence Approach.

a. Iraq's culture strongly influences the approach to intelligence operations used by the IA. As the culture strongly relies on personal relationships in day-to-day interaction, so to does the intelligence process. The most pervasive intelligence collection capability in the Iraqi security forces is the development and use of human intelligence (HUMINT). Under the former regime, military intelligence services monitored the activities of commanders and units. The focus of the intelligence services in the new IA is the insurgent threat hiding in the civilian population.

b. Iraqi security forces excel at the ability to gather and assess the relevance of information gathered from sources in the population. Difficulties remain in the capability to assimilate, transmit and analyze intelligence at the operational and strategic levels. Iraqi Army units are adept at collecting tactical or local level information and putting it to use but the capability to analyze and send the resulting HUMINT to higher levels is still not fully developed. Much of the collected information serves a narrow purpose at the battalion and possibly the brigade level but the synchronization to gain full benefit continues to require development.


**3. Capabilities.** The path of the intelligence function within the IA begins at the Ministry of Defense, through the Joint Forces Headquarters, then the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, to the Divisions and subordinate units. The Ministry of Defense sets overall guidance for military intelligence operations and coordinates the intelligence actions and programs of the military with the other Ministries of the Iraqi Government. The Joint Headquarters oversees and directs the activities of the Services of the Iraqi military. While the G2 supports the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) with oversight and direction of the subordinate unit intelligence plans and programs, they also coordinate with the JHQ M2 for policy guidance.

### Iraqi Ground Forces Command G2 - Intelligence



**FIGURE 5-1. Organization of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command G2.**

a. Each intelligence level collects and analyzes information feeds from their sources, develops intelligence summaries and reports, and then disseminates those products up, down and laterally in the intelligence hierarchy as depicted in Figure 5-2. The chain-of-command provides direction to the internal M2/G2/S2 staff sections and subordinate reconnaissance assets. The graphic depicts the C2 of the intelligence sections with a black line. In addition, the Joint Coordination Centers coordinate with comparable IA units and headquarters as indicated by the gold lines.



**FIGURE 5-2. Intelligence Structure and Information Flow.**

b. At the Divisional level, the ISR Company is the primary collection asset of the Division Commander, and also plays an important function in the overall military intelligence structure. In coordination with the Division G-2 staff the ISR Company's collection efforts are synchronized with the Provincial Intelligence Centers operating within the Provincial Joint Coordination Centers (PJCC). The Centers provide the Iraqi Security Forces with shared and integrated intelligence in support of provincial level operations. Intelligence centers within the PJCCs are composed of three core institutions: Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and National Iraqi Intelligence Agency (NIIA), Ministry of Defense (MOD) / Director General Intelligence and Security (DGIS), and Division G2s. Within this architecture, agents report information to the Center as well as to their parent organization.

(1) In Iraq the JCC concept is intended to create a network to synchronize the employment of the Iraqi Security Forces in response to criminal, terrorist and insurgent activity in a designated area of responsibility. The JCC provides point of contact between the Iraqi population and the ISF that coordinates emergency services and public safety responses to incidents in the community. The structure of the Coordination Center organization begins with the National Joint Operations Center that

oversees the activities and information gathered by the Provincial Joint Coordination Centers. The PJCC may or may not have subordinate community JCCs depending on the threat, size and area of the community served.

(2) For intelligence purposes, the PJCC provides a direct link to the local community to gather information from the local population via telephonic tip lines, interviews, and targeted collection efforts. The Joint Intelligence Center collects, analyzes, and disseminates information and intelligence provided by the local community. The analysts at the JIC use information gathered in the community and province to develop products that are channeled to the appropriate ISF staff officer for action such as targeted collection efforts, cordon and search of identified targets, seizure of weapons caches or illegal armories, and capture of identified high value criminal, insurgent, or terrorist leaders.

c. Iraqi Army intelligence capabilities at the division, brigade and battalion levels rely heavily on information from human sources. At this point in the development of Iraqi Army forces, the sophisticated technical intelligence collection systems do not exist and Iraqi intelligence must rely on Coalition platforms to provide intelligence from technical sources. Where Iraqi forces do enjoy an advantage is in their cultural understanding, integration of information from the local population and the resulting situational awareness. For the purposes of the following discussion the term human intelligence (HUMINT) is used even though there are differences between the U.S. and IA capabilities to produce HUMINT. The graphic below depicts the respective strengths of U.S. and Iraqi forces.




FIGURE 5-3. Complimentary Intelligence Capabilities.

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
d. The Iraqi Army Division employs the capabilities of an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Company to conduct information collection and analysis to support operations. The ISR Company has the capability to conduct collection operations for Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Counter-Intelligence (CI), and Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) for the Division. The ISR Company performs the following functions:

- (1) Provides C2 of Division intelligence collection.
- (2) Analyzes, reports & briefs enemy activities, capabilities and intentions to the Division G-2.
- (3) Develops collection requirements and identifies shortcomings in intelligence to refine the collection efforts.
- (4) Processes intelligence into target-worthy information.
- (5) Manages and directs collection assets.
- (6) Plans and executes collection operations.
- (7) Processes and interrogates detainees captured during operations.
- (8) Interviews cooperative sources in the area of operations.
- (9) Develops HUMINT source operations.
- (10) Conducts overt collection from the civilian populace.
- (11) Conducts clandestine reconnaissance and surveillance.
- (12) Conducts the initial assessment and processing of captured documents and sensitive site exploitation.
- (13) Conducts internal security investigations.
- (14) Conducts vulnerability assessments based on threat capabilities.
- (15) Reports collected information to the Division G-2 and other Division elements as directed.

e. The ISR Company reports directly to the Division and receives orders and guidance from the G-3 and G-2 staff officers. The ISR Company passes collected information to the Division G-2 section that is responsible for reporting to the Division Commander and sharing reports with the Provincial Joint Coordination Center. The Division G-2 conducts appropriate dissemination within the Division staff and to the

Brigade S-2s. Subordinate Brigade and Battalion S-2 elements report information collected at their levels through S-2 channels to the Division G-2. Ultimately, the Division Commander is responsible for effective employment and integration of the Division ISR Company.


f. The ISR Company blends intelligence planning and analysis with Human Intelligence (HI) and reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) under a unified whole. This arrangement offers a streamlined process to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) division commanders to gather analyze, and report intelligence. The ISR Company is composed of 3 platoons with approximately 150-200 troops.



**FIGURE 5-4. ISR Company Organization Structure.**

g. This structure is in keeping with historical Iraqi intelligence gathering, making it familiar, and therefore acceptable, to Iraqi military leadership. ISR Companies are critical for the successful establishment of the Iraqi intelligence force structure and for building the collection and analytical capabilities that are essential to defeating insurgency.

(1) Headquarters Platoon. The Headquarters platoon is comprised of four sections: Analysis, Operations and Collection Management, Command and Control, and Services and Supply.



**Figure 5-5. ISR Headquarters Platoon.**


(a) The Analysis Section ensures accurate and timely analysis of combat information under the direction of the Operations Officer in Charge. By reviewing intelligence information the Analysis Section determines shortcomings and disseminates collection requirements and tasks collection assets to meet Commander's collection requirements. Together these sections provide both collection management and analysis of combat information to provide the maneuver commander with actionable intelligence in real-time. Further, the streamlined structure minimizes the number of layers that information must be processed through to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) level, providing a more coherent vision of the battlefield to national decision makers.

(b) The Operations Section drives collection management as well as oversees all other sections to ensure unity of effort in meeting the division commander's intelligence requirements.

(c) The Radio Retransmission Section (RETRANS) provides vital communications links to ISR elements forward deployed during their intelligence gathering roles by redeploying between the forward deployed element and the ISR Command Post when beyond radio range or blocked by terrain. The RETRANS section reports to the ISR Company commander who deploys this section with elements of the Company to provide command and control.

(d) The Supply & Service Section is austere and provides minimal supply and service support to the ISR Company when elements are forward deployed. Services supplied are vehicle recovery, maintenance, and basic repair to unit vehicles. Overall supply and service is provided by the Division Headquarters & Headquarters Company (HHC) and Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment (HHD) companies and the Infantry / Armor battalions.


(2) Tactical Human Intelligence Platoon.



**FIGURE 5-6. Tactical HUMINT Platoon.**

(a) The Tactical Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Section provides organic HUMINT collection teams capable of deriving intelligence by eliciting information through interviews and observing activity among individuals, groups, and organizations in their local environment. These teams can report personally derived information as well as information obtained by developing connections with local individuals capable of identifying unusual behavior and enemy activity. The teams will collaborate amongst one another and develop source directed requirements to pass on to the analytical section. Tactical HUMINT Teams require attached security elements from the supported unit.

(b) The Tactical Interrogation Section performs screening, interrogation, and reporting under the supervision of the senior interrogator.



**FIGURE 5-7. Tactical Interrogation Section.**

(c) The senior interrogator supervises the interrogation process. The senior interrogator ensures the interrogation process is started immediately upon receipt of the source. This process is continuous and can become confused if the senior interrogator does not closely supervise the timely and orderly conduct of each step in the process.


[1] Screening. Screening determines who will be interrogated on a priority basis and in many cases how many times a source will be interrogated. For this reason, the successful accomplishment of the intelligence collection effort depends on qualified screeners. The senior interrogator designates his most qualified interrogators as screeners. He should not assign himself to screening operations. This cannot always be avoided, however, but must be kept to a minimum. He is required to supervise all steps of the interrogation process.

[2] Interrogation. The senior interrogator ensures that detainees are assigned for interrogation according to the screening results. This method of assigning assures the highest probability of obtaining the maximum amount of pertinent information within the time available is chosen. The senior interrogator, then, assigns his subordinates to interrogate screened detainees. He does this by comparing information gained during the screening process to the abilities (linguistic skills, technical expertise, and special knowledge) of his subordinate interrogators. He then selects the interrogator best suited to conduct the interrogation of a particular detainee.

[3] Reporting. The senior interrogator ensures that all reports are prepared and submitted in an accurate and timely manner. Reports must be generated immediately upon identification of information which satisfies an intelligence requirement. Other reports which are generated by an interrogation must be correctly and accurately prepared and submitted upon completion of the interrogation. The senior interrogator ensures that all reports generated in the interrogation process are transmitted within


established time frames. Transmission procedures and time frames should have already been discussed and verified with the site communications officer upon arrival to the holding area.

(3) The Reconnaissance & Surveillance (R&S) Section is designed, equipped, and trained specifically to operate undercover in the urban Counterinsurgency environment to identify insurgent elements in their area of operations. R&S teams can work in conjunction with counterintelligence teams to provide detailed targeting of specific insurgents operating in cities and rural areas. R&S teams can guide follow-on forces to enemy elements for destruction.



**Figure 5-8. Reconnaissance & Surveillance (R&S) Section.**

(4) The Counterintelligence (CI) Section provides the division commander and ISF the means to combat insurgent intimidation campaign. Insurgents use the threat of death against individual soldiers and their families to discourage military service. Numerous incidents of individual and mass assassinations of Iraqi soldiers have occurred, particularly during the current counterinsurgency phase of operations. CI can also provide the commander measures to prevent Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) infiltration and identify possible AIF personnel attempting to infiltrate the Iraqi Security Forces.



**FIGURE 5-9. Counter-Intelligence (CI) Section.**

(a) CI teams will also conduct command driven investigations to validate or dismiss suspected espionage attempts. The CI will also provide briefings to other Iraqi Army units regarding subversion and espionage directed against Iraq and the Iraqi Army. The CI teams will be proactive in educating IA units on reporting procedures and possible indicators of espionage.

(b) Security Assessments will be conducted by CI personnel. The CI will recommend precautions and countermeasures to protect operations, personnel, and defense information from compromise.

(c) CI will conduct interviews of suspects concerning espionage within the ISF. The interviews will be conducted in order to collect enough information to validate or dismiss suspicion, and should sufficient evidence be collected the CI will advise the subject of his/her rights under Iraqi law. The CI will use any information obtained through interview / interrogation in order to exploit or counter the individual or organization responsible for directing the espionage.

**4. Issues.** Several areas are critical challenges for the development of intelligence capabilities within the Iraqi forces.

a. Integration of the intelligence staff into the mission planning process requires specific focus in the training program. The G2/S2 provides critical products for the mission planning process that are essential to effective staff functions at all levels. The Iraqi S2 and S3 must work together to understand the situation and develop credible

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courses of action for mission planning. The cultural propensity is for unit commanders to plan the mission using the executive decision making approach. Training and practice must ensure that the S3 and S2 develops the mission analysis, briefs the mission to the commander, and the commander then provides his input after they are finished.

b. Another aspect of intelligence capabilities that requires focused attention is detainee operations. Intelligence operations must mature to accurately document and track detainees as well as ensure that the results of interrogations are both legal and useful. Use of coercive interrogation techniques generally does not produce reliable information from a detainee. Coalition forces must assist Iraqi intelligence in developing useful tools and procedures that document and track information collected from detainees and that support the intelligence collection process. Not only is there a requirement to collect as much useful intelligence as legally possible from detainees it is also essential that clear means exist to document evidence of criminal activity. Intelligence operations are often the first point which documents the collection and preservation of evidence against an insurgent.

c. Cultural aspects can significantly affect the intelligence operations of Iraqi Army units. A few examples follow;

Use of information or intelligence as power.

Restrict the flow in information or intelligence to avoid attention or criticism.

Providing generic intelligence analysis to avoid blame for faulty analysis.

d. Integration of computers or other automated systems into the intelligence analysis and dissemination process increases the challenge for soldiers that are not computer literate or comfortable with technical systems.

e. The G2/S2 may use stereotypical perceptions of other ethnic or religious groups in targeting intelligence collection and ignore threats originating from his own ethnic or religious group because of bias or family and clan loyalties.

**5. Transition Team RIP/TOA.** As Transition Teams assess the operation of the intelligence section of various Iraqi Army forces, several questions listed below may assist in developing an assessment of their performance. These questions are not all inclusive but indicate areas that are useful in determining the capability of the intelligence operation.

Does the intelligence section understand their role in mission planning?

Does the intelligence section communicate effectively with the unit commander and staff in developing a common operational picture of the battlefield?

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Does the intelligence section effectively integrate all available intelligence to form a credible assessment of the threat?

Are there ethnic or religious cultural attitudes that restrict the effectiveness of the intelligence operation?

Are detainees treated humanely, interrogated expeditiously and the resulting information analyzed and passed to the appropriate levels?

Does the unit commander interfere with the flow of intelligence or information?

Does the intelligence section employ effective means to document and track intelligence and information received?

Is there a level of trust within the intelligence section? As a result, are NCOs tasked and allowed to contribute to operation?

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## CHAPTER 6 LOGISTICS

Note – the primary sources for detailed process flows and descriptions for this chapter were a “smart book entitled – “Iraqi Security Force Logistics 101, Edition 1” Dated March 2006, a document entitled “Ministry of Defense, Iraqi Armed Forces Concept of Logistics Support” various dates, mostly in January 2006 and a document entitled “Supply Ops at RSU and below”. There are discrepancies between the three documents, in most cases this chapter was written according to the procedures documented in the MOD document. Where there were gaps the Iraqi Security Force Logistics 101 smart book was used. Most of the rest of the general information in this chapter was derived from multiple briefs provided by IAG, MNSTC-I and MNF-I.

Additional materials like a ppt entitled – “Log Concept Comparison 19 Feb” illuminate the evolving nature of Iraqi Army Logistics. It was my intent in writing this chapter to capture what best approximates how the logistics functions are currently being executed.

### 1. Introduction.

a. Within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, logistic support is performed across two dimensions—Capability Support and Operations Support—each with distinct characteristics and requirements. While the Director General Acquisitions, Logistics and Infrastructure and Joint Headquarters – M4 share responsibilities within the Ministry of Defense for acquisition, logistics, base management and infrastructure, they focus on different dimensions as follows:


(1) Director General Acquisitions, Logistics and Infrastructure. The Director General Acquisitions, Logistics and Infrastructure focuses on the Capability Support dimension or support over the life cycle of its capabilities. It encompasses the logistics of acquiring and determining the logistics arrangements required to support a particular capability. The outcome is to have prepared capabilities to support the Armed Forces Logistic mission.

(2) Joint Headquarters – M4. The Joint Headquarters – M4 focuses on the Operations Support dimension or logistics supporting operations. It encompasses the support needed to be planned to deploy, sustain and reconstitute a force tailored to meet a particular operation. The outcome of the operations is the mission.


(a) There are two basic subdivisions of operations support for the Iraqi Army. The first type of logistics unit is a unit that reports to the Iraqi Armed Forces Support Command (Subordinate to the Joint Headquarters). These units are garrison organizations that provide logistical support to a geographic region. An example of this type of unit is a “Garrison Support Unit.” Figure 7-1 depicts the command relationships of Support Command units. The second type of logistics units are

**EDITION 1 (FOUO)**

those which fall under the control of the operational army. They are directly subordinate to tactical organizations and receive their orders from the same. An example of this type of unit is a Motorized Transport Regiment. Each Iraqi Army division has logistical units within their chain of command. Some of these units will be directly subordinate to the division and some of these units will be directly subordinate to infantry battalions or brigades.



**FIGURE 6-1. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.**



**FIGURE 6-2. LOGISTICS WITHIN A TYPICAL IRAQI INFANTRY BN.**

**2. Concept of Iraqi Army Logistics Support.** The concept of Iraqi Army logistics support is defined by “Levels of Support” and “Lines of Support”. These are further defined below. Figure 6-3 depicts the Iraqi Army logistics concept. Figure 6-4 depicts the locations of the Taji National Depot, Regional Support Units, and Garrison Support Units.



# Logistic Concept – Diagram




FIGURE 6-3. IRAQI ARMY LOGISTICS CONCEPT.




FIGURE 6-4. OVERVIEW OF MAJOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT UNITS

**3. The Strategic Sustainment System.** The strategic sustainment system is a logistics interface managed by the Director General, Acquisition, Logistics and Infrastructure. There are 5 key sub-systems. These sub-systems are synchronized by control points and linked by a logistics information management system (LMIS). The sub-systems are:

- a. Requirements (linked to national strategy)
- b. Programming and budgeting.
- c. Procurement.
- d. Distribution.
- e. Maintenance.

**4. Levels of Support.** There are **three levels of support** in Iraqi Army logistics:

- a. Strategic Level (Ministry of Defense, Director General Acquisition, Logistics and Infrastructure)
- b. Operational Level (Joint Headquarters, Support Command, Taji National Depot, Regional Support Units and Garrison Support Units)
- c. Tactical Level (Logistics Battalions, Motorized Transport Regiments and Headquarters and Service Companies)

**5. Lines of Support.** There are **four lines of support** in Iraqi Army logistics:

- a. First Line – Organic to a unit. Normally this line of support is given to operating units by the unit's Headquarters and Service Company.
- b. Second Line – Organic to a formation (brigade or division). This line of support is given to operating units by Logistics Battalion and Motorized Transport Regiments. The 9<sup>th</sup> Iraqi Division is the only Division that has a Logistics Battalion organic to the Division (9<sup>th</sup> Iraqi Division is Mechanized). The remaining Iraqi divisions have logistics capabilities within their Motorized Transport Regiments.
- c. Third Line – This line of support is external to the operating Army and is given by Garrison Support Units and Regional Support Units.
- d. Fourth Line – This line of support is provided by the Taji National Depot.

**6. Iraqi Army Logistics organizations and how they fit into the Levels and Lines of Support.** (Refer to figure 6-3.)

a. Ministry of Defense Director General Acquisition, Logistics and Infrastructure (DG AL&I): The DG AL&I operates at the strategic level. Subordinate to the DG AL&I there are Directors of Logistics, Transportation, Contracting, Acquisition, and Infrastructure and Base Management. The DG AL&I is responsible for:

- (1) Directing and developing the overall logistic capability,
- (2) Development of ministerial policies on acquisition, logistics, infrastructure and contracting policy.
- (3) Life cycle management of infrastructure.
- (4) Acquiring capital equipment as approved through the defense requirements process.
- (5) Funding and arranging support to strategic maintenance and distribution capabilities.
- (6) Input to the capability requirements process.
- (7) Budgeting.

b. Joint Headquarters (JHQ) – M4. The JHQ M4 works at the operational level and is responsible for:

- (1) Input to plans and orders for sustainment and garrison support operations.
- (2). Monitoring sustainment and garrison support operations.
- (3). Forecasting requirements for sustainment and garrison support operations.

c. Support Command: The Support Command works at the operational level, commands the Taji National Depot and the Regional Support Units. Support Command is responsible for –

- (1) Providing operational level logistics command and control for sustainment and garrison support operations.
- (2) Provides input to plans and orders for sustainment and garrison support operations.

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(3) Provides support required by plans and orders and monitors those requirements for sustainment and garrison support operations.

(4) Forecasts requirements for sustainment and garrison support operations.

d. Taji National Depot: The Taji National Depot works at the operational level. It provides:

(1) Fourth line maintenance and supply support.

(2) Commands ammunition supply points.

e. Regional Support Units (RSU). RSUs work at the operational level. They provide:

(1) Third line logistics support to operational units.


(2) Health clinics.

(3) Third line Supply and Maintenance.

(4) Garrison support management.

(5) Contracting support.

(6) Commands the Garrison Support Units.



**FIGURE 6-5. REGIONAL SUPPORT UNIT LOCATIONS.**

f. Garrison Support Units (GSU): GSUs provide support to permanent bases only. The GSU is not intended for temporary bases or forward operating bases. Garrison Support Units come in four sizes – extra large, large, medium and small. Their responsibilities include:

- (1) Working and living accommodations.
- (2) Showers, toilets & laundry facilities.
- (3) Kitchens and dining facilities.
- (4) Power and light.
- (5) Water.
- (6) Waste removal.
- (7) Fuel.

(8) Fire protection.

(9) Infrastructure maintenance.




FIGURE 6-6. GSU EXTRA LARGE LOCATIONS.




FIGURE 6-6. GARRISON SUPPORT UNITS (LARGE).




FIGURE 6-7. GARRISON SUPPORT UNITS (MEDIUM).




FIGURE 6-8. GARRISON SUPPORT UNITS (SMALL) AL KASIK.




FIGURE 6-9. GARRISON SUPPORT UNITS (SMALL) KIRKUSH.




FIGURE 6-10. GARRISON SUPPORT UNITS (SM) TAJI.






FIGURE 6-11. GARRISON SUPPORT UNITS (SMALL) HABBANIYAH.



**FIGURE 6-12. GARRISON SUPPORT UNITS (SMALL) NUMANIYAH.**

g. Motorized Transport Regiment (Refer to Figure 7-13): The Division Motorized Transport Regiment is organic to every division except the 9<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Division. It works at the tactical level and provides second line support to its division. Some capabilities of the Division Motorized Transport Regiment are –

- (1) Transportation of supplies from the Regional Support Unit to supported units within the Division.
- (2) Limited second line maintenance capability to supported units within the Division.



**FIGURE 6-13. DIVISION MOTOR TRANSPORT REGIMENT.**


h. Logistic Battalions. The Logistic Battalions work at the tactical level. They provide second line combat service support to their brigade or division including – health, maintenance, supply and transport. Logistic Battalions exist only within the 9<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Division. One Logistic Battalion exists in each mechanized brigade and one Logistic Battalion directly supports the 9<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Division Headquarters.

## 7. Maintenance.

a. The maintenances processes described below will vary in capability and capacity from division to division and within each Regional Support Unit (RSU) and Garrison Support Unit (GSU). Currently, the National Maintenance Contract (NMC) at five RSUs and five GSUs supports maintenance for the Iraqi Army. The National Maintenance Contract will be discussed at the end of this section. The coalition established and maintains the National Maintenance Contract – this will be transitioned to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense in the mid-term future.

b. The Iraqi Army concept of maintenance support fits within the concept of overall logistics support as it is described by three levels and four lines of support. Maintenance support is service, repair and overhaul of vehicles, weapons, and other equipment in accordance with maintenance plans and unit equipment priorities. Further explanation of these three levels and four lines are described below. Figure 6-14 depicts the Iraqi Ministry of Defense Concept of Maintenance Support.

# Maintenance



**FIGURE 6-14. CONCEPT OF MAINTENANCE SUPPORT.**

c. Lines of Maintenance Support.

(1) First Line Maintenance: Provided by the maintenance element organic to the organization (for example, the maintenance platoon of the organization's Headquarters and Services Company or the Maintenance Company of the Motorized Transport Regiment). Note that preventative maintenance actions occur before entering the first line of maintenance. The Iraqi Army forms required to initiate maintenance action at first line are indicated below.

IA 105 (Non-technical inspection Light/Medium vehicles) – This is an operator form for preventative maintenance. If faults are discovered the form IA 462 is used.

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IA 106 (Non-technical inspection heavy vehicles) - This is an operator form for preventative maintenance. If faults are discovered the form IA 462 is used.

IA 462 (Equipment inspection and maintenance sheet) – This form is maintained at the unit's maintenance office. Mechanics verify problems with the vehicle. If the mechanic at the unit level cannot repair the vehicle this form is filled out for evacuation to the next line of maintenance.

IA 101 (Stores Request) This form is used to request parts.

IA 410 (Maintenance request register) This form is used to track maintenance requests. It will be maintained at the unit's maintenance shop and will display the status of all repair actions.

(2) Second Line Maintenance: Provided by the Maintenance Company within any Logistic Battalion supporting a formation (for 9<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Division only). Second line maintenance support to the other divisions is provided by the maintenance companies within the Motorized Transport Regiments. The forms identified below are used at the second line of maintenance. Examples of these forms in Arabic and English can be found at the end of this chapter.

IA 462 (Equipment inspection and maintenance sheet). This form accompanies the piece of equipment undergoing repair. It is initially filled out by the unit requesting repair.

IA 101 (Stores Request) This form is used to request parts. It is not known if the IA 101 filled out at a lower level accompanies the item to be repaired if the parts ordered on that IA 101 were not received prior to evacuation of the item.

IA 410 (Maintenance request register) This form is used to track maintenance requests. It will be maintained at the unit's maintenance shop and will display the status of all repair actions.

(3) Third Line maintenance: Provided by the maintenance element of the supporting Regional Support Unit. Once an item is evacuated up to this line of maintenance additional determinations can be made regarding whether or not the item is economical to repair. The forms identified above (IA 462, 101, and 410) are used at this level in the same manner as above. In addition to these forms the following other forms are used at the third line of maintenance.

IA 092 (Loss or damage report). This form is used for equipment that has been deemed uneconomical to repair. This form will be forwarded to the M4 (MOD level). The M4 will approve or disapprove the request to "code out" the vehicle. If approved the IA Form 523 will be sent to the M4 requesting that the JHQ AL&I allow the unit to drop the item from their property book and be issued a new piece of equipment.

IA 523 (Vehicle code out form).

(4) Fourth Line maintenance: Provided by the Taji National Depot. This line of maintenance is where direct exchange of major items, complete rebuilds (if economical) and final disposal of major items will occur.




FIGURE 6-15. LINES OF SUPPORT FOR PARTS ORDERING.

d. Steps for Unit Maintenance.

(1) User Maintenance: The equipment operator will perform (Daily, Weekly and Monthly) equipment inspections using the IA 105 Non-Technical Inspection: Light/Medium Vehicles (OR) IA 106 Non-Technical Inspection: Heavy Vehicles, whichever is appropriate for the piece of equipment. The operator will use the appropriate form to do a complete inspection of the equipment. If the operator finds a fault with the equipment, the fault will be noted on IA 462 Equipment Inspections and Maintenance Work Sheet. The IA 462 then goes to the unit maintenance shop, the unit mechanic from the unit maintenance shop will verify the fault noted on the IA 462 and repair. If the unit mechanic can not repair the fault - the IA 462 Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Work Sheet along with the vehicle will be passed forward to the Headquarters Support Company (HSC) for further support.

(2) First Line Maintenance: Once the vehicle arrives at the HSC the IA 462 Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Work Sheet will be documented on the IA

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410 Maintenance Request Register. The vehicle enters the shop along with the IA 462 Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Work Sheet. If repair parts are required, an IA 101 stores request will be filled out to request the required parts. If the parts are available the vehicle is repaired and the job is closed out on the IA 410 Maintenance Request Register. The vehicle is then returned to the owning unit. If the parts have to be ordered the job will remain open until the parts are received and the vehicle is repaired. Once the vehicle is repaired the job is closed out on the IA 410 Maintenance Request Register, and vehicle is returned to the owning unit. If the HSC cannot repair the vehicle the IA 462 Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Work sheet and the IA 101 Stores Request along with the vehicle will be passed on to the MTR for further maintenance support.

(3) Second Line Maintenance: Once the vehicle arrives at the MTR the IA 462 Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Work Sheet will be documented on the IA 410 Maintenance Request Register. The vehicle enters the shop along with the IA 462 Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Work Sheet. If repair parts are required, an IA 101 stores request will be filled out to request the required parts. IF the parts are available the vehicle is repaired and the job is closed out on the IA 410 Maintenance Request Register. The vehicle is then returned to the owning unit. If the parts have to be ordered the job will remain open until the parts are received and the vehicle is repaired. Once the vehicle is repaired the job is closed out on the IA 410 Maintenance Request Register, and vehicle is returned to the owning unit. If the MTR can not repair the vehicle the IA 462 Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Work sheet and the IA 101 Stores Request along with the vehicle will be passed on to the Regional Support Unit (RSU) for further maintenance support.

(4) Third Line Maintenance: Once the vehicle arrives at the RSU the IA 462 Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Work Sheet will be documented on the IA 410 Maintenance Request Register. The vehicle enters the shop along with the IA 462 Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Work Sheet. If repair parts are required, an IA 101 stores request will be filled out to request the required parts. If the parts are available the vehicle is repaired and the job is closed out on the IA 410 Maintenance Request Register. The vehicle is then returned to the owning unit. If the parts have to be ordered the job will remain open until the parts are received and the vehicle is repaired. Once the vehicle is repaired the job is closed out on the IA 410 Maintenance Request Register, and vehicle is returned to the owning unit. If the RSU can not repair the vehicle the IA 462 Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Work Sheet and the IA 101 Stores Request along with the major assembly will be passed on to the DX Site (Direct Exchange ) for further maintenance support. Once the major assembly has been received from the DX Site, the vehicle is repaired, the job is closed out on the IA 410 Maintenance Request Register and the vehicle is returned to the owning unit. If the QA/QC Inspection team determines that the vehicle is no longer repairable based on cost, A Form 092 Loss or damage report will be prepared and forwarded to the M4 EME. The M4 EME will approve or disapprove the request to code out the vehicle. If approved, form IA 523 code out, will be sent with a letter requesting a favorable action to the JHQ/AL&I to drop from property book and issue a new piece of equipment.

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(5) Fourth Line Maintenance.

e. Levels of Maintenance Support.

(1) Light Grade Repairs. Light grade repairs are those maintenance tasks that can be carried out in the unit by maintenance personnel organic to the unit, using portable tools and a limited range of fast moving repair parts. In the main, this grade is restricted to common minor repairs involving adjustment and quick replacement of repair parts and minor assemblies.

(2) Medium Grade Repairs. Medium grade repairs are those maintenance tasks that require greater engineering capacity than can be provided by unit maintenance personnel. In the main, these tasks are limited to assembly and module replacement. Medium grade repairs may include some repairs to assemblies and modules including those repair tasks which need light machine tool support and a wider range of repair parts and specialized facilities.

(3) Heavy Grade Repairs. Heavy grade repairs are those maintenance tasks that require extensive engineering facilities. These range from repairs to individual components and overhaul of assemblies and modules, to overhauls and rebuilds of major items of equipment. Heavy grade repairs are generally time consuming and require the use of extensive machine tools, test equipment and facilities. They require a comprehensive range of repair parts. Heavy grade repairs generally require some form of equipment exchange for the customer unit. For this reason a supply chain repair pool is usually required.

f. Equipment Condition Codes. The Iraqi Army uses a simple set of three codes to identify equipment conditions. These codes are:

U – equipment is safe and usable

UR – equipment is usable with restrictions

NU – equipment is not usable

g. Readiness Reporting: The IA Form 406 is reported each week up the chain of command to provide the current maintenance status of a unit's equipment.

h. Maintenance Information Systems.

i. The National Maintenance Contract.

**8. Supply.** The supply support concept aligns strongly with the logistic support concept. In particular, there are three levels of supply support and four lines of supply support. There are however, specific differences in supply that apply to maintenance.

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### a. Levels of Supply Support.

(1) Strategic Level of Supply. The primary focus of the strategic level is to ensure sufficient stocks of all classes of supply are provided from the international and national supply chains to sustain the operational and tactical levels, with delivery either to the Tadjji National Depot or the Regional Support Units; and to establish and manage national level supply contracts. The Director General of Acquisition, Logistics & Infrastructure within the MOD holds responsibility for oversight of the strategic level of supply.

(2) Operational Level of Supply. The operational level focuses on using the stocks provided by the strategic level to support the Tadjji National Depot, to support 4<sup>th</sup> Line supply support to the Regional Support Units, and to support the Regional Support Units' 3<sup>rd</sup> Line supply support to their supported units. The organizations primarily responsible for the operational level of supply are the Joint Headquarters Staff and Support Command.

(3) Tactical Level of Supply. The tactical level focuses on using the supply support provided by the operational level to support operations. There is not a clear line drawn between organizations at the top edge of the tactical level of supply and the operational level of supply. For example: The Tadjji National Depot and the Regional Support Units conduct supply support operations that can be considered both tactical and operational. Examples of organizations that conduct pure tactical supply are: Motorized Transport Regiments within Iraqi Army Division, Logistics Battalions within the 9<sup>th</sup> Iraqi Mechanized Division, and Headquarters and Support Companies.

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b. Lines of Supply Support. The Iraqi Armed Forces has four lines of supply support:

(1) 1<sup>st</sup> Line. 1<sup>st</sup> Line supply support is provided by the supply element integral to the organization (for example, the supply platoon of the organization's Headquarters and Services Company).

(2) 2<sup>nd</sup> Line. 2<sup>nd</sup> Line supply support is provided by the Supply Company within any Logistic Battalion supporting a formation.

(3) 3<sup>rd</sup> Line. 3<sup>rd</sup> Line supply support is provided by the supply element of the supporting Regional Support Unit.

(4) 4<sup>th</sup> Line. 4<sup>th</sup> Line supply support is provided by the National Depot at Tadjji.

c. Functions of Supply. The functions of supply include:

(1) Determination of stockholding requirements to meet current and future requirements.

(2). Procurement actions to be initiated through the Director of Contracting.

(3). Receiving/storage/issue of items.

(4). Stocking of items.

(5). Inventory/security control mechanisms.

d. Classes of Supply. There are 10 classes of supply. These classes of supply mirror the classes used within the U.S. DOD. See figure 6-16 below.

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<b>Class</b>	<b>Supplies</b>
I	Subsistence, gratuitous health and comfort items
II	Clothing, individual equipment, tentage, organizational tool sets and kits, hand tools, administrative and housekeeping supplies and equipment
III	Petroleum fuels, lubricants, hydraulic and insulating oils, preservatives, liquids and gases, bulk chemical products, coolants, deicer and antifreeze compounds, components, and additives of petroleum and chemical products, and coal
IV	Construction materials including equipment, and all fortification and barrier materials
V	Ammunition of all types, bombs, explosives, mines, fuses, detonators, pyrotechnics, missiles, rockets, propellants, and other associated items
VI	Personal demand items such as health and hygiene products (soaps and toothpaste), writing material, snack food, beverages, cigarettes, batteries, and cameras (non-military sales items)
VII	Major end items such as launchers, tanks, mobile machine shops, and vehicles
VIII	Medical material including repair parts peculiar to medical equipment
IX	Repair parts and components to include kits, assemblies and sub-assemblies (repairable or non-repairable) which are required for maintenance support of all equipment
X	Material to support non-military programs such as agriculture and economic development (not included in Classes I through IX)
Miscellaneous	Water, maps, salvage and captured material

**FIGURE 6-16. CLASSES OF SUPPLY.**

e. The Supply Chain Flow. At each level of the supply chain identified below, stocks will be held and managed, and requisitions will be processed. There are varying degrees of stocks on hand when expressed as “Days of Supply.” The ability of the Iraqi Army to accurately forecast demands is limited without automated systems to support decision making. For example, expressing repair parts (Class IX) in terms of “days of supply” is not likely to produce a meaningful result in the Iraqi Army due to wide variance in types of equipment and inadequate automated forecasting systems. Figure 6-17 depicts the flow of requisitions within the Iraqi Army’s supply chain.

f. Supply Information Systems.

g. How to get supplies. Getting supplies requires significant lead time, good planning, and supervision of the flow of paper. Different classes of supply (see above)

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require different processes. Supplies are generally characterized as “mission essential” and “non-critical/routine.” Mission essential items are managed by units on the Iraqi Form 249. Figure 6-17 below details the supply requisition process for mission essential/critical items. Figure 6-18 details the requisition process for non-critical/routine items.





FIGURE 6-17. REQUEST FOR MISSION ESSENTIAL/CRITICAL ITEMS.



**FIGURE 6-18. REQUEST FOR ROUTINE ITEMS.**

(1) Class I – Subsistence and Water: Iraqi Army units obtain food and water through “Life Support” contracts. While in Garrison, an Iraqi Army unit will eat fresh food provided by their life support contract. They will also be provided bulk water and bottled water based on these life support contracts. When in the field, Iraqi Army units will draw their subsistence and water from the closest established base. If unable to draw Class 1 from a nearby base, units should deploy with five days of food and water. The field ration for Iraqi units is the hard ration (Halal). Iraqi Army units need to plan for drawing life support from nearby bases if their operation exceeds their capacity to resupply. Based on the guidelines described above, Iraqi Army units should plan for sufficient lead time to order hard rations prior to executing an operation. The Iraqi Army Form 101 is used to order rations from the next echelon in the supply chain.

(2) Class II – Individual soldiers are issued equipment prior to arriving to their units. Of course, this does not mean that equipment is never lost. Figure 6-18 above illustrates the requisition flow for this type of equipment. Class II also consists of clothing, tentage, organization tool sets, maps, admin supplies and housekeeping supplies. These items are also requisitioned per the flow depicted in figure 6-18.

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(3) Class III – Obtaining bulk fuels and packaged petroleum products is a constant challenge for Iraqi units. Packaged petroleum products are normally procured through the National Maintenance Contract. Bulk fuel is procured through a system of vouchers based on a unit's equipment density. Units that are co-located with an RSU may be able to draw their bulk fuel directly from the RSU.

(a) The ability of a unit to obtain fuel depends on several factors:

[1] Is the unit located with an RSU?

[2] If the unit is not located by an RSU, does its Division MTR have the capability to transport fuel? If not, does the unit have a contractor with the capability to transport fuel?

[3] Is the unit authorized to buy fuel on the local economy through fuel vouchers issued by the Ministry of Oil (MOI)?

[4] Is the unit still working directly with a coalition unit for logistics support, and therefore draws fuel from coalition stocks?

(b) Essentially, the ability to transport, store, and issue fuel at all echelons will largely dictate the method by which an Iraqi unit obtains fuel.

(c) The fuel voucher process – The process detailed below is normally used to support an Iraqi Army division operating with the support of an RSU. The RSU ultimately provides the information for its supported units to the Ministry of Defense (M-4) in order to obtain fuel for all of its supported units (including garrison units). There will be multiple variations of this process depending on the level of support an Iraqi Army unit is provided due to the varying degrees of capability and maturity in the overall logistics systems. Fuel authorizations are not produced as a result of forecasting operational tempo and requirements. Fuel authorizations are produced based on a unit's equipment density. Each unit will be authorized the same amount of fuel per month based on the quantity and type of equipment they possess. The authorizations below are used to calculate the monthly fuel allotment for an Iraqi unit.

[1] Fuel authorizations per day.

[a] Motorized vehicles – 20 Liters.


[b] Heavy Motorized vehicles – 40 Liters.

[c] Armored vehicles – 40 Liters.

[d] Generators, Sm, Med, Lg, XL - 20, 50, 200, 400 Liters

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(d) Fuel Voucher Process Flow – The RSU calculates the fuel requirements of its supported units based on the authorizations above. The RSU receives reports from each unit it supports to generate this information. Units report their requirements up the chain of command normally to division level where it is passed to the RSU. The fuel representative from the RSU will take this report and walk it through the Ministry of Defense the rest of the process is detailed in figure 6-19 below.




**FIGURE 6-19. FUEL REQUEST PROCESS.**

(e). It is imperative that deploying transition teams and coalition units partnered with Iraqi forces understand the fuel process particular to the Iraqi units they are working with. The fuel process will vary widely from location to location. To some degree, the processes indicated above will be used. A complete walk through of the Iraqi unit's fuel process will highlight potential problems.

(4) Class IV Construction and Barrier Material. Class IV items can be drawn from existing stocks at the supporting GSU/RSU. These items are acquired through contract action. Items anticipated prior to operations will require sufficient lead time to procure through contract.

(5) Class V Ammunition. Ammunition is primarily stored at the National Ammunition Depot (NAD). The NAD issues ammunition to the RSU's based on forecasted training and operational requirements. The RSU's hold ammunition based

on MOD M4 authorized stockage levels. The IGFC allocates ammunition to the Divisions. Ammunition resupply is executed by the Division's supporting MTR. Ammunition is classified as a critical item or a non-critical item depending upon the type of ammunition requested by using units. Ammunition stockage levels are reported weekly on the IA ammunition form 101. **The submission and consolidation of this report up the chain from Battalion to JHQ is critical to forecasting short term requirements for ammunition.** Figure 6-20 below depicts the flow for an ammunition requisition.



**FIGURE 6-20 AMMUNITION REQUEST FLOW**

(a) Organizational Responsibilities in the ammunition flow

[1] DG AL&I. Overall responsibility for in-theater receipt, accountability, and management of munitions stocks.

[2] MOD M4 Ammo. Monitors ammunition status to coordinate the purchase of ammunition to fill shortages, develops and funds plans and policies involving munitions supply demilitarization and maintenance, develops munitions safety and security policies, maintains a continuous estimate of munitions requirements, conducts annual review of ammunition needs to develop future requirements.

[3] MOD M3. Approves issues for training and operations support.

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[4] JHQ. Reviews the ammunition supply standard for each service. Establishes control standards if ammunition supply is limited. Reviews and reports ammunition status and consumption of inventory to MOD. Ensure Ammunition Accountability Officers are appointed at each storage location – responsible to maintain adequate stocks for issue and accurate timely resupply. Manages demilitarization, maintenance, and quality assurance programs for compliance with MOD guidance. Executes the MOD explosive safety program for the Iraqi Armed Forces and serves as the action officer for investigations.

[5] JHQ Munitions Branch. Process requisitions and approve distribution of critical ammunition to support subordinate units. Provides staff input for ammunition planning to JHQ, coordinates munitions requirements with Support Command and subordinate units, establishes ammunition supply levels based on MOD directives, reviews the consolidated consumption report to determine future ammunition requirements. Coordinates with Division Ammunition Officers on cross-leveling munitions.

[6] IGFC Ammunition Officer. Coordinates munitions operations within the 10 Iraqi Army divisions. Serves as a liaison between IGFC and JHQ. Responsibilities include: Processes ammunition requisitions from subordinate units and submits consolidated requests to the Joint Headquarters Munitions Branch for critical items and to the Iraqi Support Command for non-critical requests, directs distribution of ammunition between subordinate units as necessary, reviews usage rates and inventory status for subordinate units, coordinates changes to stock levels with JHQ as required, reviews, consolidates, and submits inventory and consumption reports from subordinates to Joint Headquarters as required.

[7] Support Command serves as the initial point of coordination for resolving ammunition support problems. Support Command Ammunition Officer serves as the primary coordination point for the Iraqi National Munitions Depot and Regional Support Unit personnel in regards to munitions and transportation movement to accomplish the following: Serves as the National Inventory Control Point for ammunition and coordinates munitions assets across the services under Joint Headquarters guidance, item managers monitor and cross-level stocks as required, assigns a trained Ammunition Accountable Officer at every ammunition storage location, monitors ammunition usage and recommends adjustments to ammunition stockage levels to the Joint Headquarters Ammunition Officer, monitors supply status data on munitions stock at all Regional Support Units and the National Ammunition Depot and submits status report to the Joint Headquarters Munitions Branch, assists in synchronizing activities of subordinate ammunition units, provides technical assistance and monitors quality assurance, ammunition safety, demil, and ammunition maintenance programs of subordinate units.

[8] The Iraqi National Munitions Depot serves as the National Depot storage area for all ammunition in support of Iraqi Armed Forces. The Munitions Depot must

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maintain sufficient stocks to ensure timely re-supply to the Regional Support Units and subordinate units. The assigned Ammunition Officer is responsible for the following: serves as the Ammunition Accountable Officer for the National Depot, responsible for all facility operations, conducts required inventories to ensure current and accurate status of available stocks, investigates discrepancies to determine loss or gain of munitions, ensures adequate security and safety measures are provided for ammunition, ensures equipment and trained personnel available to safely handle ammunition, coordinates shipments to the Regional Support Units as required, coordinates receipts of stocks through the JHQ.

[9] Regional Support Units directly sustain the combat units in their regional area of responsibility. The assigned Regional Support Unit Ammunition Officer is responsible for the following areas: serves as the Ammunition Accountable Officer for his assigned Regional Support Unit; responsible for all facility operations, conducts required inventories to ensure current status of available stocks, investigates discrepancies to determine loss or gain of munitions, ensure adequate security and safety measures are provided for ammunition, ensures equipment and trained personnel available to safely handle ammunition, coordinates re-supply for the Regional Support Unit with the National Ammunition Depot Ammunition Officer, coordinates re-supply to the Divisional Headquarters and Services Company with the appropriate Motor Transport Regiment.

[10] The Division/Squadron Ammunition Officer is responsible for ammunition re-supply for all units operating in the division area. The Division/Squadron Ammunition Officer has five broad missions: validates ammunition requests from the brigades, consolidates requests, and submits to Joint Headquarters for approval, validates battalion level required ammunition standard and submits to Joint Headquarters for approval if changes are required, prepares plans and procedures for ammunition operations, monitors ammunition operations and status of stocks on hand, maintains liaison with the Headquarters and Services Company supporting the division and with the ammunition staff officers at the Brigade, consolidates the division consumption and inventory reports and submits to the Military Services Ammunition Officer.

[11] The brigade ammunition officer is responsible for coordinating ammunition supply to his assigned subordinate units. His tasks include the following: determines brigade ammunition requirements based on input from subordinate battalions and knowledge of upcoming operations, determines consolidated brigade required ammunition standard and submits it to the Division Ammunition Officer, provides a consolidated unit requisition to the Division Ammunition Officer for approval, provides subordinate battalion ammunition officers with their allocations of the brigade controlled ammunition standard and redistributes ammunition as necessary, consolidates brigade consumption reports and submits them to the Division Ammunition Officer.

[12] The battalion Ammunition Officer is responsible for coordinating ammunition supply to his assigned subordinate units. His tasks include the following: determines battalion ammunition requirements based upon input from his subordinate units and knowledge of upcoming operations, consolidates company level ammunition

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requisitions for submission to the brigade Ammunition Officer, provides oversight to the Ammunition Section of the Headquarters and Services Company, consolidates battalion ammunition consumption and inventory reports and submits them to the brigade Ammunition Officer.

[13] The Headquarters and Services Company operate one ammunition storage point in direct support to its parent battalion, brigade or division headquarters, inspect, inventory, and sign for the shipment upon arrival at Headquarters and Services Company (A copy of the shipping document is returned to the originating Regional Support Units), coordinate issue to using unit once request is approved, maintain accountability, safety, and security of ammunition stocks on hand, inventory and report on hand quantity status to battalion Ammunition Officer as required.

(6) Class VI Personal Demand Items. Iraqi Soldiers receive an initial issue of personal demand items while undergoing basic training. Thereafter they may purchase these items from local vendors who run small shops at their garrison post.

(7) Class VII Major End Items. Iraqi Army units will require major end items (trucks, weapons systems...) based on table of equipment short falls and combat/non-combat loss of major end items. MNSTC-I has primary responsibility for issuing equipment to the Iraqi Army. MNC-I C3 assigns priority for Iraqi units that need equipment. MNC-I C4 coordinates with MNSTC-I to fill requirements. The MOD, JHQ, Support Command and lower echelons of the Iraqi Army are involved in this process.

(8) Class VIII Medical Supplies. Medical support is primarily provided at the 3<sup>rd</sup> Line Regional Support Unit. Medical supplies are kept at the 4<sup>th</sup> Line and 3<sup>rd</sup> line organizations per authorized stockage levels.

(9) Class IX Repair Parts. Repair parts are procured as part of maintenance actions. The HSC of an IA unit will hold a limited amount of stocks for the most common repairs. The MTR or Log Bn at the Division level will hold additional stocks and a more robust capability. The detailed process for requisitioning repair parts to complete maintenance actions are detailed in paragraph 7 above in the Maintenance section of this chapter.

(10) Class X

(11) Miscellaneous - maps, salvage and captured material:

h. How to Account for Supplies. Each Iraqi Army unit will have a property book officer. A MTT or partner unit should inspect unit property records to see if there are any shortages of equipment within an Iraqi unit. Without proper documentation and properly routed & supported requests shortages will not be filled. The Iraqi Army uses manual records to account for its equipment and supplies. The primary forms used for property accountability are detailed below.

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(1) IA Form 249. This form is used to account for weapons, vehicles, radios, general equipment, supplies and accessories that are issued to end users. This form is updated whenever equipment is added or dropped from a unit's inventory. Unit commanders submit a signed updated copy of the form 249 to their higher headquarters annually, each time mission essential items are added or dropped, or when a new commander is appointed. This form functions as the overall master property book form for an Iraqi Unit.

(2) IA Form 251. Internal Stores Issue Receipt Voucher: This form is used to record the issue of property to subordinate units.

(3) IA Form 58. This form is used to account for items that are kept in storage by the supply section. The IA Form 58 is a running warehouse inventory form that accounts for on hand quantities, receipts and issues for all items.

(4) IA Form 092. This form is used to report losses and damage. This form is used by unit commanders to justify losses to their unit's mission essential equipment list. This form is used to justify a request for mission essential equipment replacement. When equipment is lost, stolen, damaged or destroyed, a Loss and Damage Report (IA 091) is to be submitted to the Quartermasters store. The form IA 091 is to be filled in by the soldier reporting the incident. The form can be used to report the loss or damage of equipment issued to the member or under their care. Appointment of investigating officer is to be directed by Commanding officer for all Mission essential equipment and stolen equipment. The Commanding Officer can appoint all investigating officers but if not appointed the Platoon commander or Officer commanding will investigate all other reports.

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- (5) IA Form 102. Internal issue/receipt form –
- (6) Form 3. Division Weapon Report
- (7) Form 4. Division Vehicle Report
- (8) Form 5. Division Miscellaneous Items Report

(9) IA Form 91. Personal Equipment and Uniform List: All personal equipment and uniforms will be accounted for on this form. Each individual will sign and update this form for all equipment and uniforms issued to him. A copy of the updated form will be kept at the battalion level for each individual.

(10) IA Form 60. Weapon Issue Sheet: Each weapon in the unit's inventory will be recorded on a separate Form 60. All weapons not secured in the unit's arms room will be signed out from the arms room using the Form 60 and signed back into the arms room using the same form.

(11) IA Form 092.

(12) Inventories. There are three basic types of inventories, Regular, Irregular, and Receipt. Regular Inventories will be done annually, quarterly, or semi-annually according to the class, type, and value of the stock. Irregular Inventories (Special Inventories) are command directed for specific stocks for specific reasons. Receipt Inventories will be conducted each time stocks are received for at all levels.

### 9. Transportation.

a. General. Iraqi Transportation capacities will vary greatly by region and unit. There is no adequate description that generally applies to the transportation capacity of a given organization described below due to differences in equipment levels, and availability of transportation assets. As such, Iraqi Army organizations may choose to pool several units' transportation assets to meet an operational requirement. Until standard units are created and equipped capacity planning for transportation will remain difficult.

b. Organizational responsibilities for transportation.

(1) MOD Director General Acquisition, Logistics & Infrastructure. There is a Director of Transportation with this Directorate. The Director of Transportation manages and controls the national transportation systems.

(2) JHQ Staff. Plan, direct and monitor transportation support to operations. Responsible for providing transportation input to operational plans and orders, monitoring the execution of transportation against plans and orders, and forecasting

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short and long term transportation requirements by consolidating lower level input and providing budget input to the MOD.

(3) Support Command. Responsible for planning, directing and monitoring transportation support.

(4) Tadjil Nation Depot/Ammunition Supply Points. Provides 4<sup>th</sup> Line transportation support for the armed forces.

(5) Regional Support Units. Provide 3<sup>rd</sup> line transportation support for units within their region.

(6) Logistics Bn's/Motor Transport Regiments. Provide 2<sup>nd</sup> line transportation support to their supported units.

(7) Headquarters and Services Companies. Provide 1<sup>st</sup> line transportation support to supported units.

c. In concert with other portions of the Iraqi Army Logistics Concepts, transportation support falls within four lines.

(1) First Line – Transportation is provided by the elements organic to an organization (i.e. the transport platoon of a Headquarters and Service Company).

(2) Second Line - Provided by the Motorized Transport Regiment supporting a division or by the Logistics Bn supporting the mechanized division.

(3) Third Line – See Comment number 47.

(4) Fourth line transportation support is provided by the Nation Depot at Tadjil.

d. How to get transportation. The Motor Transport Task Order (Form 101) is the primary form used by a supported unit to request transportation capacity. Transportation capacity is limited in the Iraqi Army. If the Iraqi Army transportation system cannot support a movement request, the information in this form is transmitted into the MNFI transportation management system and may ultimately lead to a coalition unit being tasked with transportation support to the Iraqi Army. Figure 6-21 depicts this flow.




FIGURE 6-21. TRANSPORTATION REQUEST FLOW.

**10. Health services.**

a. General: Health Service Support is defined as the single, integrated system that consists of all services performed, provided, or arranged to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental and physical well-being of personnel in the Iraqi Armed Forces. It is a continuum of care and support from the point of injury or wounding through successive levels to the National healthcare apparatuses. Health Service Support fits into the overall construct of the Iraqi Armed Forces Logistics Concept with one exception, there are 5 lines of support instead of the 4 lines found within the other logistics functions. Iraqi Army health services also have a direct link into the Ministry of Health since the Iraqi health system is nationalized.

b. Organizational responsibilities.

(1) Director General of Personnel (MOD). Strategic level responsibility with technical advice from the JHQ staff and the Surgeon General.

(2) Joint Headquarters Staff. Responsible for planning, directing and monitoring the health support to operations. Responsible for providing health input to operational plans and orders, monitoring the execution of health against plans/orders, forecasting

## EDITION 1 (FOUO)

short and long-term health requirements (for both training and operations), consolidating lower level input and providing budget input to the Ministry of Defense.

(3) Support Command. Responsible for planning, directing and monitoring health support, while Support Command's subordinate units provide the required operational level health support.

(4) Tadjji Nation Depot. Warehouses requisitions, maintains and distribute the 4<sup>th</sup> Line stocks of Class 8 supplies. Line 4 and 5 medical care is provided by Ministry of Health hospitals.

(5) Regional Support Units. Responsible for supporting a particular region. They comprise military and defense civilian staff, and include Clinics providing 3<sup>rd</sup> line health support to units within their allocated region. The Regional Support Units are capable of providing Lines 1, 2 and 3 medical care.

(6) The Logistic Battalion/Motorized Transport Regiment/Special Operations Support Battalion. Provides 2<sup>nd</sup> Line health support.

(7) Headquarters and Services Companies. Provides 1<sup>st</sup> Line health support to its unit. Capable of undertaking up to Line 2 medical care via the battalion aid station, combat medics and other personnel within the unit.

### c. Lines of Health Service Support.

(1) Line 1. Immediate medical care rendered by a non-healthcare professional (self-aid, buddy aid, and combat lifesaver skills). This line of care is not specific to a section within an organization but is provided by personnel closest in proximity to the casualty at the point of injury.

(2) Line 2. Care is rendered by a healthcare professional. This line of care is provided by the trauma specialist/special operations forces combat medics (at the battalion aid station by the physician and physician assistant). This line of care includes immediate lifesaving measures, prevention of death and non-battle injury, preventive measures, patient collection, and medical evacuation to supported medical treatment.

(3) Line 3. Care rendered at Regional Support Unit Clinics. They examine and evaluate the casualty's wounds and general status to determine treatment and evacuation precedence. This level of care duplicates Line 2 and expands services available by adding limited dental, laboratory, optometry, preventive medicine, health service logistics, mental health services, and patient-holding capabilities

(4) Line 4. First line of care with hospital facilities and comprises higher level resuscitation, wound surgery and postoperative treatment requiring static clinical capabilities.

(5) Line 5. Definitive care to all categories of patients. It comprises surgical capability (as in Line 4), further therapy during the recovery and rehabilitative phase

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as well as definitive care including the full range of acute convalescence, restorative, and rehabilitative care.

d. Emergency medical care. Rendered in cases of non-battle injury, or battle wounds. Health support is to be provided as far forward as possible in order to quickly return troops to their units and maximize the combat power for operations. The process for emergency medical care is detailed below.

(1) Lines 1 and 2. When a soldier is injured (or ill), buddy aid, combat lifesaver or medic provides immediate medical care in order to stabilize the patient, prepare them for transport to the organization's battalion aid station and, if necessary, move them to the casualty collection point. The ambulances from the battalion aid station are called forward to pick up casualties from the casualty collection point. The casualty is transported to the battalion aid station. The patient is treated and returned to duty or evacuated to next higher line of medical care. If line 3 care is required, the patient is stabilized and prepared for transport to the next higher line of medical care located in the Regional Support Unit.

(2) Line 3. The supporting RSU is called forward to pick up the casualty from the battalion aid station. The casualty is transported to the Regional Support Unit's clinic. If Line 3 care is all that is required, the patient may remain in the clinic for short period of time before returned to duty. If higher level medical care is required, the clinic stabilizes the patient as much as possible and prepares them for transport to the next level medical care.

(3) Lines 4 and 5. If further treatment is required, an ambulance from the Regional Support Unit or from the Ministry of Health transports the casualty from the clinic. The Ministry of Health Hospital's provides Line 4 and 5 medical care. The patient will remain in the Ministry of Health Hospital until well enough to return to work or decisions are made on the long-term needs of the casualty.

(4) For medical evacuation, the gaining line is responsible for arranging for the evacuation of patients from lower levels of care.

(5) Casualties can be transported directly to the facility providing the line of medical care that they require without going through all the intermediate stages. For example, a casualty could (and should) be transported directly from where they were injured to the appropriate Ministry of Health Hospital if they are expected to require Line 4 or 5 medical care.

e. Routine medical care.

f. Tracking casualties. Medical Regulating is the coordination and control of evacuating patients to the Ministry of Health treatment facilities that are best able to provide the required specialty care.

(1) This system is designed to ensure the efficient and safe movement of patients.

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(2) Within the division, informal medical regulating is known as patient tracking.

(3) Medical regulating or the formal tracking of patients begins at the first Line 3 facility that encounters the wounded soldier (normally at the Regional Support Unit Clinic).

### **11. General Engineering.**

**12. Life Support.** Defined as those functions required to sustain Iraqi Army organizations at their garrison bases. Life support functions are contracted through different vendors. As such, the management and oversight of these contracts has a direct impact on the quality of life, and sustainment capabilities of the Iraqi Army base system.

a. General: Iraqis took lead for Life Support beginning in April and May of 2006. Prior to these dates, the coalition provided most life support contracts with a few MoD exceptions.

b. There are currently 62 MoD Life Support contracts, 31 for food and 31 for services. At each site, a single vendor is responsible for both the food and service contracts. All sites have the same requirements as outlined in the Statement of Work, and each individual contract identifies which IA units the contract covers.

c. Food Contracts. Deploying MTT teams and Partner units should obtain the most current statement of work for food contracts from MNSTC-I or their Iraqi Unit. Generally, a food contract under life support will detail the following requirements for the contractor:

- (1) Meal Times
- (2) Holiday meals
- (3) Special meals (VIPs etc...)
- (4) Food quantity and quality
- (5) Eating utensils, ice, and bottled water
- (6) Dry field rations

d. Service Contracts. Deploying MTT Teams and partner units should obtain the most current statement of work for service contracts in their AO from MNSTC-I or their Iraqi unit. Generally, a service contractor will specify the following requirements in support of a garrison location:

- (1) Bulk water and water removal

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(2) Buildings Services – (Dining Facility, Barracks, Offices, and Warehouse and tents and roofs), maintenance of buildings

(3) Bedding

(4) Shower Facilities

(5) Toilet Facilities/Sewer

(6) Laundry

(7) Fire protection

(8) Power/Lighting

(9) Medical Facilities

(10) Trash Storage and removal

(11) Cleaning

(12) Maintenance of all facilities/generators/plumbing, electrical

(13) Office Supplies

(14) Market, Barbershop, recreation facilities

(15) Pest control

e. Quality Assurance is the key to successful life support. Deploying MTT teams and partner units should download/obtain current quality assurance checklists from MNSTC-I or their Iraqi unit. Continuous assessment of contract performance directly affects the quality of life of the Iraqi soldiers. Iraqi units should have quality assurance teams assigned to inspect contract performance for all life support functions. All of the functions covered under these life support contracts are worked through the Iraqi contracting process detailed in chapter 7.

## NOTES

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## CHAPTER 7 CONTRACTING

**1. Contracting Background.** The Iraqi Ministry of Defense has a formal contracting process defined by ministry policies and procedures.

a. Indications are that MiTT interface with the contracting process, other than those directly involved in the logistics, will be minimal. Understanding the basic structure of the system and the function of the Regional Support Units may assist in getting responsive support to the maneuver units. This is particularly true in life support areas, where contracts account for a large portion of services provided.

b. Supplies/Services are acquired via a contract only when they are not available through the regular Iraqi Military Supply System. Contracts fall into three basic categories: Supplies, Services, and Construction.

**2. Contracting Organization and Responsibilities.** The contracting structure begins in the Ministry of Defense and extends to officers appointed to execute the contracts.

a. The Director General of Acquisitions, Logistics and Infrastructure (DG, AL&I) serves as the Head of Contracting Authority and is responsible for:

(1) Awarding contracts in excess of MoD Director of Contracting warrant finance authority level

(2) Issuing warrants to qualified MoD Contracting Officers

(3) Ensuring that all contractual actions comply with the law and acquisition regulations

(4) Ensuring the appropriate placement of each contracting office within the organizational structure and that each office is adequately structured and staffed

(5) Ensuring that only properly warranted contracting officers execute contractual actions

(6) Streamlining acquisitions to ensure effective and economic contracting that allows for a high degree of competition--avoiding unduly restrictive requirements, unnecessarily vague or overly detailed specifications or statements of work, inadequate or untimely procurement planning, and preparation, encouraging the development and application of innovative contracting

(7) Providing necessary assistance to and oversight of the Regional Support Unit's (RSU) contracting offices

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b. The Director of Contracting, as the direct subordinate of the DG AL&I, is responsible for:

- (1) Awarding contracts up to his warrant financial authority level
- (2) Training and providing oversight of all Matrixed Contract Officers serving in the Director of Infrastructure, Director of Acquisition, and RSU's Contracting Sections
- (3) Accurately tracking and reporting current contract status
- (4) Conducting semi-annual reviews of the RSU Regional Contracting
- (5) Centers contract administration
- (6) Submitting recommendations to the HCA on Contracting Officer warrant finance authority levels
- (7) Issuing Vendor Cure Notices for poor performance
- (8) Recommending Contractor Termination

c. The individual Warranted Contracting Officer is responsible for:

- (1) Issuing Solicitations
- (2) Contract Formation
- (3) Awarding Contracts up to his warrant financial authority level
- (4) On-Going Contract Administration
- (5) Contract Closeout
- (6) Maintaining training required to keep Warrant active
- (7) Insuring that all laws, regulations and policies are followed and obtained
- (8) Insuring funds are available
- (9) Insuring that contractors receive impartial, fair and equitable treatment
- (10) Training and appointing CORs

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d. An Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) is a warranted Contracting Officer who assumes responsibility for administering the day-to-day contractual activities after award (on supply and service contracts).

e. A Contracting Officers Representative (COR) is a government employee (military or civil service) who serves as a technical expert in the area of the contracted effort. Key COR functions are to observe, document and communicate contractor performance to contracting officer and contractor.

f. Regional Support Unit Contracting Section. The Regional Support Units (RSUs) have an organic ability to provide contract support and contract administration to their habitually supported units.


(1) The decentralization of contracting is an effort to provide Iraqi Armed Forces with a more responsive system to quickly procure low value critical supply.

(2) Decentralization will also provide each region a capability to have local administration of service and construction contracts. This will improve the amount of time required to provide the customer response to problems/issues and allow more frequent on site inspections of the quality of service or construction.

(3) The RSU Contracting office will also be able to find local sources of supplies to assist in providing wider access to government work.

(4) The RSU Contracting Center also will serve as a learning ground for new Contracting Officers so that as they gain experience they can move to positions of more responsibility in the RCC or at one of the MoD Contracting Sections.

(a) Organization



**FIGURE 7-1, Regional Support Unit**

(b). Regional Contracting Center Manager. Senior office manager who is responsible for the following:

- [1] Serves as the RSU Commander’s Contracting Advisor
- [2] Recommends warrant level not to exceed 50M ID for Contracting Officers to DG AL&I
- [3] Insures all local office policies, procedures, and standard operating procedures are IAW published laws and regulations.
- [4] Develops local training program for all Contracting Officers and Administering Contracting Officers.
- [5] Assigns out KO/ACO workload
- [6] Maintains status of all current requirements and contracts
- [7] Develops program to allow for new vendors to gain access to information on conducting work and future work opportunities with the government

(c). Office Administration Section. The administration section is composed of two civilian employees: A legal representative and an administrative clerk. This section is responsible for the following tasks:

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[1] Maintains Contract Files

[2] Submits all reports on contracting status to RSU Commander or MoD as required

[3] Maintains Requirement, Solicitation, and Contract Logs

[4] Legal Advisor reviews all solicitations before they are issued

[5] Legal Advisor reviews all contracts before they are awarded

[6] Legal Advisor conducts all required ethics training.

[7] Legal Advisor reviews all RCC policies and SOPs to make sure they are in compliance with laws and regulations

(d). Supply Branch. The supply branch is composed of four civilian employees: Three are warranted Contracting Officers and one is a Contracting Clerk. This section is responsible for the following tasks for supply requirements equal to or below 50M ID:

[1] Issuing solicitations

[2] Selecting bids for award

[3] Contract formation

[4] Awarding contracts up to 50M ID

[5] Contract administration

[6] Contract closeout

[7] Insuring that all laws, regulations and policies are followed and obtained

[8] Insuring funds are available

[9] Insuring that contractors receive impartial, fair and equitable treatment

[10] Serve as part of the Regional Distribution Point Supply Acceptance Committee

[11] Insures Form 102 is sent to MoD Program and Budget for payment

(e). Service Branch. The service branch is composed of three civilian employees: Two are Administering Contracting Officers (ACOs) and one Contracting

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Clerk. This section is responsible for the following tasks for all service requirements award to support units in there prescribed region:

- [1] Contract administration
- [2] Maintain contract files
- [3] Provide Contract Officer Representative Training to unit representatives
- [4] Insuring that all laws, regulations and policies are followed
- [5] Conduct period QA Inspection of services rendered under contracts they administer
- [6] Consolidate Management Review Committee Reports
- [7] Submit Management Review Committee Reports to M4 and MoD Contracting
- [8] Meet with vendors and unit as required to conduct contract dispute resolutions

(f). Construction Branch. The construction branch is composed of three civilian employees: Two are Administering Contracting Officers (ACOs) and one is a Contracting Clerk. This section is responsible for the following tasks for all construction requirements award to support units in there prescribed region:

- [1] Contract administration
- [2] Maintain contract files
- [3] Provide Contract Officer Representative Training to unit representatives
- [4] Insuring that all laws, regulations and policies are followed
- [5] Conduct limited QA Inspection of construction projects with assistance from MoD Infrastructure QA Inspectors
- [6] Submit Management Review Committee Reports to M4 and MoD Contracting

(g) Value-based approval levels have been established as follows:

- [1] > 5 billion Iraqi Dinar – Minister of Defense
- [2] < 5 billion Iraqi Dinar – DG, AL&I
- [3] < 50 million Iraqi Dinar – RSU commander

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[4] < 5 million Iraqi Dinar – GSU commander

[5] A Simplified Acquisition Threshold has been established at 50 million Iraqi Dinar for procurements that do not require extensive time, approval or competition. Similarly, supply purchases (major end items) in excess of the DG AL&I approval threshold are designated major acquisitions.

### 3. Important Elements of Contracting.

All contracts are “firm fixed price” with allowable option periods if mutually acceptable to the government and the vendor. Contracts below the SAT level are archived for one year, those below DG AL&I level, for 5 years and those at the MoD level for 10 years past final payment.

a. Quality Assurance Program. Quality assurance is an integral part of the contracting process. Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans are prepared in conjunction with the Statement of Work (SOW).

b. Contracting Officer Warrant. All warrants are issued and signed by the DG AL&I. Warrant level is based on each contracting officer’s individual ability, experience, and position requirements. Desired experience and training includes:

(1) Iraqi Contracting Officer Training Course

(2) COR Training

(3) 1 year experience as a Contracting Specialist/Clerk

(4) A 2- week internship at either MoD Contracting or another Ministry Contracting Section, Coalition Joint Contracting Command, or Coalition Regional Contracting Center (RCC)

c. Authorized Vendors.

(1) In order to complete for business with the Iraq Government all vendors must have a valid business license issued by the Ministry of Trade.

(2) Any foreign companies shall have a local office in Iraq and be registered with the Ministry of trade in accordance with all applicable Iraqi registration laws.

(3) The MoD Directorate of Contracting will maintain and update an updated excluded vendor list.

(4) All Service and Construction Contracts will require the vendor to provide proof of insurance and work guarantee bonds. (not to exceed 10% of the total contract value)

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d. Procurement Integrity. Ethics and Integrity in our personnel and professional conduct are absolutely essential to maintain the public's confidence in MoD's acquisition process.

(1) Directorate of Contracting and RCCs are expected to have procedures for educating those assigned to the RCC, customers, and contractors on the rules pertaining to gratuities and must have a plan coordinated on by DG AL&I for addressing offers of gratuities from contractors to any government official.

(2) Soliciting or accepting bribes. Contracting Officer or Contracting Officer Representatives may not solicit or accept any gratuity, gift, favor, entertainment, loan, or anything of monetary value.

(3) Ethics Training. It is an annual requirement to conduct ethics training to all members of the contracting workforce to include CORs. Ethics training will be taught by a qualified legal representative.

(4) Inspector General. The MoD Inspector General is tasked with providing oversight of the procurement process to make sure that all government officials are in compliance with the law and all ethics training, monitoring of activities, and transparency is achieved.

e. A Contracting Status Committee meets twice each month to discuss the current status of all contracting actions and major requirements. Standing members of the committee are the Director General of AL&I, Director of Contracting, Director of Acquisitions, Director of Infrastructure, Director of Programs and Budget, General Counsel Legislative Representative, JHQ M4, and Service A-4/G-4/N-4/S-4.

### **4. Contracting Processes.**

The Iraqi MoD has processes for requesting supplies, services and construction, but for MiTT teams, supply (Food, Water, Individual Equipment, Office Equipment & Materials, Petroleum, Oils, & Lubricants, Construction Materials (including small amounts of lumber), Personal Demand Items, Ammunition, Medical Equipment and Materials, Repair Parts, Automation, and other end items of equipment) will probably be the most often encountered and serves as an example of how the system is designed to work. The processes for other types of contracts vary, but the principles remain essentially the same. This paragraph will examine the processes used for contracts over 50 million Iraqi Dinar, under 50 million, and emergency contracts. Note that the process begins as a unitary process, then divides at the RSU based on contract value, then re-integrates at the RSU for contract management.




Figure 7-2. Contract Process Diagram (Supply).


## EDITION 1 (FOUO)

a. The contracting process begins the same regardless of the projected amount. Once the request reaches the RSU, it will be directed further based on the end amount, going to JHQ M4 for amounts over 50 M ID and to the Regional Contracting Center for lesser amounts.

b. Requesting Activity. Items to be purchased thru a contract must not be readily available through the Military supply system. If the requesting activity determines that the item is not available thru regular supply method then they can pursue a contract as a means to fulfill the requirement. Customers requesting contracting support for the procurement of supplies will prepare the Iraq Form (IF) 53, Support Tracking Form (a sample is located on page 152 of this book) in accordance with (IAW) example provided below. They will complete all information to include Block 5. The IF 53 will provide detailed specifications on the item description, make/model number, salient characteristics, quantity required, an estimated unit price, required delivery date, method of shipping, and a point of contact for further information. This document is then sent to the Brigade Commander/Air or Naval Base Commander for endorsement/approval (IF 53 Block 6). The Brigade Commander/Air or Naval Base Commander and his staff are responsible for determining if the request is within its current MTOE Authorization. If the request is in excess of the current authorization the unit must submit a Letter of Justification thru the M4 on why they need supplies or equipment in excess of current authorization level. Once the IF 53 has been approved by the Brigade Commander it is then forwarded to the Division for endorsement/approval (IF 53 Block 7). The Division then forwards the completed packet to his supporting RSU.

c. RSU. Once the IF 53 is received by the servicing RSU Commander, he is responsible for confirming that the item is not available for issue from the normal Iraqi Supply system and within the MTOE authorization. If the purchase is expected to be below 50M ID then the RSU Commander will sign the IF 53 (Block 8) and forward the IF Form 53 to his Regional Contracting Center for action. If it is expected to exceed 50M ID, then it will signed and forwarded to the Ministry of Defense (MoD) JHQ M4 for approval.

d. Requests over 50M ID. (MoD Contracting Supply Contract Process)



**FIGURE 7-3. MoD Director of Contracting Internal Supply Contract Process**

(1) Assignment of Contracting Officer (KO). Once the complete, approved, and funded IF 53 packet is submitted to MoD Contracting it is reviewed by one of the administrative assistants. Once the assistant has verified that all the required paperwork is included they will log the requirement into the Requirements Master Log. Each requirement will be numbered sequentially with the appropriate calendar year for easy identification (ie. The first request of CY 06 would be logged and labeled as MoD-R-06-0001). Once the requirement is logged, the entire packet is given to the MoD Director of Contracting. The Director will then assign the work to one of his warranted KO. Upon receipt of the requirement the KO will read the packet to gain a detailed understanding of the requirement and then contact the requesting activity point of contact to get clarification on any details required.

(2) Solicitation Formed. The KO will then create a solicitation that will adequately describe the requesting unit's requirement. Solicitation will include at a minimum the following information: Detailed description of the requirement, required delivery date, delivery location, method of evaluation (LPTA or Best Value), required response date and time, point of contact for additional information, and any other contract special instructions. Once the KO has completed a draft of the solicitation it is sent to legal for a review of its completeness and compliance to Iraqi Law and regulations and to the requesting activity to make sure it meets there initial requirement.

## EDITION 1 (FOUO)

Once the KO has received feedback from both Legal and the Requesting Activity he will incorporate any comments into the final solicitation. The KO is required to coordinate any significant changes of the specification with the requesting activity prior to releasing the solicitation.

(3) Solicitation Issued. After the KO has incorporated the feedback from Legal and the Requesting Activity into the solicitation, they will then assign a number to the document from the Solicitation Master Log. Each solicitation requirement will be numbered sequentially with the appropriate calendar year for easy identification (i.e. The first solicitation of CY 06 would be logged and labeled as MoD-S-06-0001). Once the solicitation is logged it will be release for bidding. Methods of announcing the requirement include: advertising in the newspaper, posting in a public place for all potential vendors to view, posting on the Internet, or sending the requirement to a limited number of qualified vendors. Although Full and Open Competition is preferred sole source or limiting competition may be appropriate in limited cases (security concerns, only one known source, or emergency requirement). The announcement will be open for the time period specified. No later then the date/time specified in the solicitations potential bidders will submit offers into the Director of Contracting.

### (4) Offers Reviewed.

(a) Once the solicitation close time has passed, two central committees are formed: Responsiveness Committee and Evaluation Committee. These committees are established by the DG AL&I. The first is the Responsiveness Central Committee. It is composed of the following personnel: A Contracting Officer, Financial Officer, Legal Representative, and IG Representative. They will open all offers received in a public forum. Upon opening of offers, the committee will check each offeror for responsiveness (i.e. to check to see that the items offered meet the specifications listed in the solicitation and that all required documentation has been included). If an offer is deemed to be responsive, the committee will log the offerors name and price per item. If the offer is deemed to be non-responsive, the committee will annotate the reason for the evaluation and notify the vendor in writing that its offer received is non-responsive and the reason.

(b) Once all offers have been opened, they are forwarded to the Evaluation Committee. It is composed of: the member of the Responsiveness Central Committee plus technical representatives from the requesting activity. This committee will determine using either a Lowest Price, Technically Acceptable (LPTA) or "Best Value" criteria which is the winning offer. LPTA is used for non-complex commercial items. As long as the item offered meets the minimal specification in the solicitation award will be made to the vendor with the lowest overall price. When factors other then cost are important, a "Best Value" evaluation will be conducted. In a best value evaluation a trade off of characteristic (delivery time, quality, cost, etc) is conducted, with the item providing the most value at the best price being selected. In all cases were Best Value is used as an evaluation method, the committee will give consideration to a contractors relevant past performance history, management (key people and financial management

## EDITION 1 (FOUO)

system), and technical approach in meeting the requirements outlined in the SOW. The Evaluation Committee will document all offers, the number of offers received, the winning vendor, total price, and justification for selection for the contract file.


(5) DG AL&I Approval. Once the Evaluation Committee has completed its selection and documented its findings, a recommendation will be forwarded to the Director General for Acquisitions, Logistics, and Infrastructure. The DG AL&I will review the findings of the Evaluation Committee and endorse or reject the findings. If endorsed, it will be forwarded to the Director of Contracting for contract award, if rejected a reason for the rejection will be annotated and instructions to form a new Evaluation Committee will be given. In certain high cost procurement, the DG AL&I may consult with the Minister of Defense before issuing an endorsement or rejection.

(6) Contract Formation and Award. Once the DG AL&I has given his endorsement to the decision of the Evaluation Committee, the entire packet is returned to the Directorate of Contracting to begin drafting the contract. The Director of Contracting Administrative Assistant will log the requirement into the Contract Master Log. Each requirement will be numbered sequentially with the appropriate calendar year for easy identification (ie. The first contract of CY 06 would be logged and labeled as MoD-C-06-0001). Once the requirement is logged, the entire packet is returned to the assigned KO. The KO takes the information in the solicitation, the vendors offer, and all applicable clauses to form the contract. Once the KO has completed a draft of the contract it is sent to legal for a review of its completeness and compliance to Iraqi Law and regulations. Once the KO has received feedback from Legal he will incorporate any comments into the final contract. Once the contract is finalized it requires three signatures for "acceptance". The three required signatures are those of the vendor, legal, and the KO or DG AL&I (based on the contract value and the KO warrant financial authority level).

(7) Distribution of the Contract. Once the contract has all three signatures and acceptance has occurred it must be distributed to all the interested parties. The Director of Contracting Administrative Assistant will make copies of the signed contract (either paper or electronic) and distribute them. Copies will be sent to the following parties: Vendor, JHQ M4, Requesting RSU, Requesting Activity, Contracting Office, and MoD Program and Budget. The original copy of the contract and all documents will be given to MoD Program and Budget.

(8) Assignment of an Administering Contracting Officer (ACO). Once the contract has been distributed, the MoD KO will provide a copy of the contract and all relevant information to an Administering Contracting Officer (ACO) at the RSU that provides support to the division which initiated the request. The ACO will be tasked to assist in the monitoring of the delivery and payment of the vendors for the supplies.

e. Requests under 50M ID. (Regional Contracting Center Supply Section Request Process)



**FIGURE 7-4. RCC Internal Supply Contract Process**

## **EDITION 1 (FOUO)**

(1) Assignment of Contracting Officer (KO). Once the complete, approved, and funded IF 53 packet is submitted to Regional Contracting Center by the RSU Commander it is reviewed by one of the administrative assistants. Once the assistant has verified that all the required paperwork is included they will log the requirement into the Requirements Master Log. Each requirement will be numbered sequentially with the appropriate calendar year for easy identification (i.e. The first request of CY 06 would be logged and labeled as RCC Name-R-06-0001). Once the requirement is logged, the entire packet is given to the Chief or the Regional Contracting Center. The Chief will then assign the work to one of his warranted KO. Upon receipt of the requirement the KO will read the packet to gain a detailed understanding of the requirement and then contact the requesting activity point of contact to get clarification on any details required.

(2) Solicitation Formed. The KO will then create a solicitation that will adequately describe the requesting unit's requirement. Solicitation will include at a minimum the following information: Detailed description of the requirement, required delivery date, delivery location, method of evaluation (LPTA or Best Value), required response date and time, point of contact for additional information, and any other contract special instructions. Once the KO has completed a draft of the solicitation it is sent to legal for a review of its completeness and compliance to Iraqi Law and regulations and to the requesting activity to make sure it meets their initial requirement. Once the KO has received feedback from both Legal and the Requesting Activity he will incorporate any comments into the final solicitation. The KO is required to coordinate any significant changes of the specification with the requesting activity prior to releasing the solicitation.

(3) Solicitation Issued. After the KO has incorporated the feedback from Legal into the solicitation, they will then assign a number to the document from the Solicitation Master Log. Each solicitation requirement will be numbered sequentially with the appropriate calendar year for easy identification (i.e. The first request of CY 06 would be logged and labeled as RCC Name-S-06-0001). Once the solicitation is logged it will be released for bidding. Methods of announcing the requirement include: advertising in the newspaper, posting in a public place for all potential vendors to view, posting on the Internet, or sending the requirement to a limited number of qualified vendors. Although Full and Open Competition is preferred sole source or limiting competition may be appropriate in limited cases (security concerns, only one known source, or emergency requirement). The announcement will be open for 3-7 days. No later than the date/time specified in the solicitations potential bidders will submit offers into the Regional Contracting Center.

(4) Offers Reviewed.

(a) Once the solicitation close time has passed, the KO will open all offer received in a public forum. Upon opening of offers, the KO will check each offeror for responsiveness (i.e. to check to see that the items offered meet the specifications listed

## **EDITION 1 (FOUO)**


in the solicitation and that all required documentation has been included). If an offer is deemed to be responsive, the KO will log the offerors name and price per item. If the offer is deemed to be non-responsive, the KO will annotate the reason for the evaluation and notify the vendor in writing that its offer received is non-responsive and the reason.

(b) Once all offers have been opened and determined to be responsive, they will use Lowest Price, Technically Acceptable to determine which the winning offer is. As long as the item offered meets the minimal specification in the solicitation award will be made to the vendor with the lowest overall price. The KO will document all offers, the winning vendor, total price, and justification for selection for the contract file.

(5) Contract Formation and Award. Once the KO has determined who to make the award to, they will request the Administrative Assistant to log the requirement into the Contract Master Log. Each requirement will be numbered sequentially with the appropriate calendar year for easy identification (i.e. The first request of CY 06 would be logged and labeled as RCC Name-C-06-0001). Once the requirement is logged, the entire packet is returned to the assigned KO. The KO takes the information in the solicitation, the vendors offer, and all applicable clauses to form the contract. Once the KO has completed a draft of the contract it is sent to legal for a review of its completeness and compliance to Iraqi Law and regulations. Once the KO has received feedback from Legal he will incorporate any comments into the final contract. Once the contract is finalized it requires three signatures for "acceptance". The three required signatures are those of the vendor, legal, and the KO.

(6) Distribution of the Contract. Once the contract has all three signatures and acceptance has occurred it must be distributed to all the interested parties. The Regional Contracting Center Administrative Assistant will make copies of the signed contract (either paper or electronic) and distribute them. Copies will be sent to the following parties: Vendor, Requesting RSU, Requesting Activity, Contracting Office, and MoD Program and Budget. The original copy of the contract and all documents will be given to MoD Program and Budget.

f. Contract Management



**FIGURE 7-5. Supply Requirement Thru Contract Process Diagram**

(1). Vendor Delivers Item to Regional/Central Distribution Center. Once the contract has been awarded and distributed the RCC will monitor the delivery and payment of the supplies. The vendor NLT the required delivery date specified in the contract will deliver the items purchased to either a central distribution point (for supplies ordered for the MOD Directorates or multiple units) or the servicing RSU regional distribution center. The RSU will establish an Acceptance Committee that will have the responsibility to conduct an inventory and inspection of the items delivered for compliance with the specification. The committee will consist of the following individuals: A representative from the requesting activity (unit), the Administering Contracting Officer, and a RSU Supply Management Specialist. The Acceptance Committee will complete the Form 102. Once the receiving report is completed it is forwarded to the Ministry of Defense Program and Budgets for payment.

(2). Vendor Payment. The Acceptance Committee sends completed original Form 102 – Acceptance Report and all supporting documentation to MOD Director General Program and Budgets Contracts Payments for payment and a copy of the completed Form 102 to MOD Director General Acquisition, Logistics and Infrastructure Contracting Department. Once the Contracting Department has received its copy, the KO will notify the vendor to submit the invoice to the MOD. The Vendor will take the invoice to the agreed Focal Point within MOD Director General Program and Budgets Contracts Payments. MOD Director General Program and Budgets Contracts

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Payments will compare the Contract, Form 102 (and supporting documentary evidence) and the vendors invoice. If all documents are in agreement, funds will be dispersed to the vendor via a Check. MOD Director General Program and Budgets Contracts Payments will inform the Contracting Department of the sum paid and any deductions made for unsatisfactory performance.

(3). Contract Closeout. Once the final payment to the vendor has been conducted, MOD Director General Program and Budgets Contracts Payments will send a notification letter to the MOD Contracting Department or the RCC informing them that the final payment against the Contract has been made. The letter will also list any partial payments, the date the partial payment was made and the amount of such payments made against the Contract. The contracting office (either MOD or RCC) will place the final payment letter in the Contract file and then move the file from the active to closed file storage container until the required time to hold all files has expired.

### g. Emergency Requests (Compelling Urgency).

(1) Principles. Although it is generally considered in the governments best interest to promote Full and Open Competition, there are certain conditions when other than full and open competition are required. One of these conditions is processing emergency requests of Compelling Urgency. Emergency request of Compelling Urgency are defined as any supply, service, or construction that meet any one of four general conditions:

(a) Provides immediate assistance to the prevention of the loss of life, limb, or eyesight

(b) Has an immediate direct impact on the ability of an operational unit's ability to conduct combat operations

(c) It is of such a compelling urgency that the result of delay in award of the contract would result in serious injury, financial or other to the government

(d) Ensure the continuous availability of a reliable source of supply or service

(2) When any one of these conditions is met it is permissible to limit the number of sources from which bids or proposals are sought and in some cases seek only a sole source of the supply, service, or construction.


(3) This authority shall not be justified on the basis of a lack of advance planning or concerns related to availability of funds (ie. funds set to expire). The use of this authority should only apply to the minimum requirements require to meet the compelling urgency. All other requirements should be processed through normal process.

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(4) Requests to use this authority must be made in writing by the requesting activity and include sufficient facts and rationale to justify its use. The following information shall be provided:

- (a) Description of the supply or service required
  - (b) Detailed reason this authority was cited or used
  - (c) A description of what efforts were made to receive offers from as many potential sources as practical
  - (d) Extent and nature of the harm to the government
  - (e) Unit Commander or Directorate General certification that the justification is complete and accurate to the best of his knowledge
- (5) Approval authority for all emergency requests is the same as listed in the first section of this chapter.

(6). Emergency Request Procedures.



**FIGURE 7-6. Emergency Requests Requirement Thru Contract Process Diagram**

(a) Requesting Activity. If the requesting activity determines that a supply, service, or construction requirement meets the criteria for an emergency request it will prepare the Iraq Form (IF) 53, Support Tracking Form, in accordance with (IAW) example provided above. The IF 53 will provide a detailed Statement of Work (SOW) or specification, the Emergency Request Justification Letter signed buy the Unit Commander or Directorate General, the recommended source, price quote, and a company point of contact for further information. The complete packet is forwarded directly to the approval authority listed in the first section of this chapter.

(b) Request Submitted to the Approval Authority. Once the IF 53 is received by the approval authority, they are responsible for confirming that the request is truly of a compelling urgency. If it not deemed to be a compelling urgency the approval authority will notify the requesting activity in writing and instruct them to submit the requirement through the normal process. If it is identified as a truly compelling urgency the requirement will be approved and funding authorization obtained from MoD Programs and Budget. The Approval Authority will then submit the complete packet with his endorsement and funding approval to the appropriate contracting office for immediate action.

(c) Requirement Submitted to Contracting. Once the complete, approved, and funded IF 53 packet is submitted to MoD Contracting it is reviewed by one of the

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administrative assistants. Once the assistant has verified that all the required paperwork is included they will log the requirement into the Requirements Master Log. Each requirement will be numbered sequentially with the appropriate calendar year for easy identification (ie. The first request of CY 06 would be logged and labeled as MoD-R-06-0001).

(d) Assignment of Contracting Officer (KO). Once the requirement is logged, the entire packet is given to the MoD Director of Contracting. The Director will then assign the work to one of his warranted KO. Upon receipt of the requirement the KO will read the packet to gain a detailed understanding of the requirement and then contact the requesting activity point of contact to get clarification on any details required.

(e) KO Fair and Reasonable Price Determination. Once the KO has received the requirement it is his responsibility to determine if the sole source quote is at a fair and reasonable price. This determination must be made in writing. It should also take into account the emergency nature of the request. The following methods can be used to determine if the sole source price is considered fair and reasonable:

[1] The contracting officer can look at recent contracts awarded for similar requirements that were fully competitive and determine if the price offered would have been competitive. It is not necessary that the price offered is the lowest but is comparable to what was offered in the previous acquisition.

[2] Compare price offered with an Independent Government Estimate.

[3] Conduct market research using the Internet, Catalogs, or Advertisements.

[4] Use qualified expert opinions. If the KO can determine that the price offered is fair and reasonable, then he begins to draft the contract for the requested supply, service, or construction.

[5] If the KO can not determine if the sole source vendor is offering a fair and reasonable price, then the KO will contact a limited number of vendors to get additional price quotes and award it to the lowest price vendor in the quickest time possible.

(f) Contract Formation and Review. Once the KO has completed and documented his Fair and Reasonable Price Determination, he coordinates with the Contracting Administrative Assistant to log the requirement into the Contract Master Log. Each requirement will be numbered sequentially with the appropriate calendar year for easy identification (ie. The first contract of CY 06 would be logged and labeled as MoD-C-06-0001). Once the requirement is logged, the KO takes the information in provided to include the vendors offer and all applicable clauses to form the contract. Once the KO has completed a draft of the contract it is sent to legal for a review of its completeness and compliance to Iraqi Law and regulations. Once the KO has received feedback from Legal he will incorporate any comments into the final contract. Once the contract is finalized, it along with the Fair and Reasonable Price Determination is sent to

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the approval authority listed in Chapter 1.4.4. for review. If endorsed, it will be returned to the KO for contract award, if rejected a reason for the rejection will be annotated and specific instructions as to how to proceed will be given.

(g) Contract Award. Once the contract has been reviewed and approved by the approval authority it is finalized. The Contract requires three signatures for "acceptance". The three required signatures are those of the vendor, legal, and the KO or DG AL&I (based on the contract value and the KO warrant financial authority level).

(h) Distribution of the Contract. Once the contract has all three signatures and acceptance has occurred it must be distributed to all the interested parties. The Director of Contracting Administrative Assistant will make copies of the signed contract (either paper or electronic) and distribute them. Copies will be sent to the following parties: Vendor, JHQ M4, Requesting RSU, Requesting Activity, Contracting Office, and MoD Program and Budget. The original copy of the contract and all documents will be given to MoD Program and Budget.

### h. Completing Iraq Form 53.

(1) General. Completion of Iraq Form 53, Support Tracking Form (ST), is the customer's (requiring element's) responsibility. The form must be filled out in sufficient detail and be routed through command channels to the servicing Contracting Office. It is critical that the customer identifies and describes the item of support, required service, or the construction project needed in detail (identify the specific requirement).

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(2) Preparation. The following will provide block by block instruction on preparing the Iraqi Form 53.

IA FORM 53, Version 3		SUPPORT TRACKING FORM (STF)		DATE
53 قوتيلنا عطقا اتقارفا شوي ليل		معلا تخدم جنون		1 (تاريخ)
DOCUMENT NUMBER / LOCATION / UNIT				
تسلفا قرا/قوتيلنا/ تدرجنا				
PURPOSE FOR REQUEST - SHORT DESCRIPTION				
بلطفا فاغ اوصرف نصرو				
JUSTIFICATION				
ويوتنا				
REGIONAL SUPPORT UNIT COORDINATION (8)		DIRECTORATE GENERAL OR DIVISION COMMANDER (7)		BRIGADE OR GSU OFFICERS - APPROVAL (6)
قوتيلنا لديرنا تدرج قونوم		اقوتيلنا ردآ وادلفا رودي		رلس علفا ديرنا تدرج وا كتقيلنا طلفن قياوم
SIGNATURE RANK NAME DATE Phone#		SIGNATURE RANK NAME DATE Phone#		SIGNATURE RANK NAME DATE Phone#
قوتيلنا بقتل مهل تاريخ رقم		قوتيلنا بقتل مهل تاريخ رقم		قوتيلنا بقتل مهل تاريخ رقم
CONTRACT NUMBER (13)	DATE REQUIRED (12)	TYPE OF SUPPORT (11)	QUANTITY (10)	ITEM DESCRIPTION (9)
قوتيلنا قرا	معلا بلط مورث	معلا عين	قوتيلنا	تدالنا نصرو
COMMENTS (1)				
تاطح ليلنا				
MOD CONTRACTING - APPROVAL (18)		MOD PROGRAM & BUDGET - APPROVAL (17)		JHO CoS or DEFENSE SEC GENERAL (16)
قوتيلنا مع قياوم (18)		قوتيلنا قياوم (17)		قوتيلنا قياوم (16)
SIGNATURE NAME/RANK DATE		SIGNATURE NAME/RANK DATE		SIGNATURE NAME/RANK DATE
قوتيلنا مهل/رتب تاريخ		قوتيلنا مهل/رتب تاريخ		قوتيلنا مهل/رتب تاريخ
JHQ/IM - APPROVAL (15)				
قوتيلنا قياوم (15)				
SIGNATURE NAME/RANK DATE				
قوتيلنا مهل/رتب تاريخ				

**DO NOT FILL IN COLORED AREAS = All gray boxes are for coordinating and/or approving agencies.**

Block 1 = Enter date of request

Block 2 = Enter Document Number - Description and example listed below:

Example Document Number = G 2006 066 0001 Habbaniyah 1 / 1 / 1

1<sup>st</sup> Digit

A = Air Force

N = Navy

G = Ground Forces Army

S = Special Forces

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T = Training Command    M= MOD Directorate

2<sup>nd</sup> -5<sup>th</sup> Digit - Calendar year 4 digits ( Example: 2006 )

6<sup>th</sup>-8<sup>th</sup> Digit - Julian Date 3 digits ( Example: 065 )

9<sup>th</sup>-12<sup>th</sup> Digit - Serialized Number 4 digits ( Example = 0001)

Name of Location ( Example: Habbaniyah )

Number or Name of Unit ( Example: 1 / 1 / 1 or BDU or 96th Helicopter Unit )

Block 3 = Enter the short description of requested support

Block 4 = Enter justification (Why it is needed)

Block 5 = S-4/G-4 of Requesting Activity submitting request prints their rank, name, date and signs the form

Block 6 = Requesting Unit Commander approves the request before coordination

Block 7 = Division Commander or Directorate General Information and Signature

Block 8 = Coordinate with Regional Support Unit (RSU)

Block 9 = Description of exact item requesting (what is it)

Block 10 = Quantity requested along with Unit of Issue (Box, Each, Job, etc.)

Block 11 = Type of Support requested: Supply, Service, or Construction

Block 12 = Input date required (be realistic)

Block 13 = This box is filled out by Contracting Officer once it has been approved and processed

Block 14 = Comments area

Block 15 = This box is filled out by Joint Headquarters (JHQ) Logistics (M4) when approved

Block 16 = Joint Headquarters (JHQ) Chief of Staff (CoS) or Defense Secretary General approval

Block 17 = Ministry of Defense (MOD) Program and Budget Approval

Block 18 = This box is filled out by Contracting Officer who approves the support once contract is awarded.

### 5. Leading Questions for TT members for RIP/TOA.

- a. What services/supplies does your unit receive by contract?
- b. What services/supplies shortages should be filled by a contract where no contracting action has yet been initiated?
- c. What services/supplies that are currently contracted, that are now available through the logistics/support systems and can be cancelled?
- d. When will your unit start the renewal process on a service or supply contract?

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- e. What contracts in support of your unit are near expiration?
- f. If there are contracts near expiration is there a capacity outside the contracting system in place to provide that service or supply?
- g. What is the mix of Iraqi or Coalition contracts supporting your unit?
- h. Who are the people in your contracting chain physically administrating/inspecting your contracts?
- i. What is the quality assurance plan for each contract supporting your unit?
- j. What contracts supporting your unit are not performing to standards?
- k. What are the security/vetting procedures for your vendors?
- l. What steps has your unit taken to rectify poorly performing contracts?
- m. Does your unit's chain of command get involved in fixing problem contracts, or initiating contract action when there are requirements?

## NOTES

**EDITION 1 (FOUO)**

NOTES

**EDITION 1 (FOUO)**

NOTES

## CHAPTER 8 COMMUNICATIONS

### 1. Communications Organizations and Functions.

- a. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) develops strategic policy and acquires communications systems to meet the needs of Iraqi Joint Forces.
- b. The Joint Headquarters (JHQ) provides direction to operational headquarters; develops, prioritizes, and advocates communications requirements and oversees allocation of systems to meet operational objectives.
- c. Tactical units of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) provide soldiers to operate and perform first-line maintenance on C2 communications systems.
- d. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) acquires C2 communications systems on behalf of and in direct coordination with the Iraqi MoD, while the MoD develops its own direct acquisition capability. Moreover, MNSTC-I provides advisory services directly to the operations and communications staffs of the MoD, JHQ, Iraqi Air Force and Iraqi Navy, along with the staff of the Iraqi Signal School.
- e. Multi-National Corps-Iraq provides advisory and training services on operational concepts and communications systems to fielded forces at all levels, in the form of Military Training Teams (MiTTs). MiTTs are embedded with operational forces throughout Iraq.

**2. Force Structure.** The objective force structure envisions approximately 3,600 soldiers, sailors, and airmen to operate and maintain Iraqi C2 communications systems, in concert with contractor support which will be responsive to program managers at the Iraqi Joint Headquarters.

- a. The MOD and JHQ have staffs objectively numbering approximately 300 (between the two staffs), to provide policy, organization, acquisition, training, logistics, and budget support.
- b. Operational Headquarters each have a small communications staff to provide operational direction and to sustain the C2 communications systems within the headquarters itself.
- c. Each Iraqi Army Division is supported by a Signal Company which, when complete, will number about 120 soldiers to provide support to the division headquarters and to sustain the systems that connect the headquarters to higher, lateral, and subordinate formations.

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d. Below the division level, each Army formation has a small number of embedded communications personnel.

**3. Command and Control.** Command and Control (C2) is a function of the Operations Directorate (M3). In order to support rapid, flexible C2, the Ministry has built an office of the Director General of Communications to handle communications policy and acquisition issues at the Ministerial level and a military Directorate of Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems (M6) within the JHQ to handle operational C2 communications issues.

a. Modern C2 communications essentially make every unit commander a “C2 site” wherever the commander happens to be. However, major C2 nodes within the Iraqi Joint Forces exist at the Joint Headquarters (Joint Operations Center), the IGFC headquarters, and each Iraqi Army Division Headquarters (Tactical Operations Centers). Operations in each of these nodes is conducted by members of the Iraqi Forces, with direct support from Transition Teams who are embedded with them.

b. The initial operating capability for the Iraqi C2 communications system is essentially complete, and further expansion will be at the discretion of and within the funding priorities of the Iraqi MOD. The current system consists of infrastructure computer and telecommunications systems and radio communications linking units in the field.

### **4. Iraqi Defense Network (IDN).**

a. IDN is a suite consisting of a router, file server, print server, and e-mail server at 33 locations across the Iraqi military. IDN provides internet connectivity with a minimum of 35 computers and 3 phones per site. The system can send e-mail to the Iraqi C2 Network (IC2N) and Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) can call the Defense Private Network or other IDN nodes. IDN provides an MOD medium for all Iraqi battalion and higher units and commanders. It will eventually synchronize and automate Iraqi Armed Forces Management:

- (1) Iraqi Personnel Network - PERSTATs, Payroll, Records, Promotions, etc
- (2) Iraqi Financial Network - Command funding, budget development, etc
- (3) Iraqi Logistics Network - Assets tracking, spares/replacement ordering, etc

b. It also centralizes control of Nation-wide Network Management and Iraqi to Coalition Forces Data Synchronization.

c. The Iraqis will determine the number of additional locations they wish to fund for installation, but their plans are to install IDN to serve every brigade in the Iraqi Army. The number of brigades currently totals 36, although many brigades are collocated, so the Iraqis will not need to install 36 additional IDN

suites to cover all brigade headquarters. The Iraqi MOD is actively working to complete a Statement of Work to support this expansion. By the end of the first quarter of 2007, the system will be maintained under a contract that is responsive to a program manager in the Iraqi MOD.




Figure 8-1. IDN Locations and Status.

**5. Defense Private Network (DPN).**

a. DPN is the cellular telephone system at each of 18 locations throughout the Iraqi Joint Forces. DPN provides an immediate digital (Global Service for Mobile (GSM)) cellular network for voice and data to the Iraqi Armed Forces. Each switch is capable of handling 5500 users and up to 96 simultaneous calls. Current call completion rate is 98%.

b. The Iraqis will determine the number of additional locations they wish to fund for DPN installation. However, they are actively considering 5 additional locations, and they are in the process of soliciting offers for a contract that would support their plans. By the end of April, 2007, the system will be maintained under a contract that is responsive to a program manager in the Iraqi JHQ.





Figure 8-2. DPN Locations

**6. Iraqi Command & Control Network (IC2N).** The IC2N connects C2 nodes among government agencies. It is comprised of the Iraqi Government Network (IGN) and the Iraqi Secure Government Network (ISGN). IGN is a non-secure, restricted private voice and data network (comparable to “NIPRNET”). ISGN is an encrypted, restricted private voice and data network (similar to SIPRNET). The network is Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) satellite based.

a. Iraqi Government Net. The IGN consists of computers, VOIP phones and uninterrupted power sources. It can connect to the commercial internet, communicate via e-mail with any non-secure network, and call other VOIP phones on the net.

b. Iraqi Secure Government Network (ISGN). The ISGN system is comprised of computers, secure VOIP phones, uninterrupted power supplies and Borderguard Encryption Devices. The system can send and receive encrypted e-mails to/from any

other ISGN e-mail addresses and provide secure voice communications to any other SVOIP phone on the ISGN.



**Figure 8-3 Iraqi Command & Control Network (IC2N) Connectivity**

## 7. C2 Radios.

a. The Iraqi military uses several variations of the Harris 5800 High Frequency radio to command and control forces. There are now 221 Harris 5800 high-frequency radios, located at every echelon of command, from the Joint Headquarters to battalions and other joint forces. The Iraqi military is currently soliciting bids for a contract that will enable them to acquire additional radios on an as-needed basis when new units are created or they identify additional requirements. First-line maintenance for these systems is performed by troops in the field. Higher-level maintenance is accomplished through the NMC, which is currently responsive to a program manager in MNSTC-I J4. NMC is supposed to be responsive to a program manager in the Iraqi Support Command.

(1) The Harris Radios are the primary ISF C2 means, providing semi-survivable secure voice and data and the only secure data messaging capability for ISF. Harris has a Capability for multiple nets (up to 99) and comes in 400W, 150W, 20W configurations. Radios have been fielded down to the battalions in Mar-Jun 06. The principal limitation is that the Harris is difficult for the Iraqis to learn but many have proven proficient.

(2) The Harris net is mirrored by a net of Codan high frequency (HF) radios. Codan provides capability in the 1-30Mhz range and is capable of Automatic Link Establishment. The 125 watt fixed base station has a range of 500-1000 km. The 25

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watt mobile variety can achieve ranges of 100-200 km with the NVIS antenna and 50-100 km with an auto-tuning whip. Barrett 950s provide similar capabilities, and are used for secure communications between Army brigades and adjacent Border Defense Elements. Secure capability for the Codan is currently unfunded. Barrett-Codan interoperability remains under study. Not all mobile units have both types of antennas. Skip zones require changing channels to maintain connections.

(3) Motorola UHF radios are used for local communication only. Systems include GM 360 base stations and vehicular radios, GP 340 and 360 handhelds, and GR 500 repeater stations. The Motorolas provide UHF coverage in the 403-430 Mhz range. Handhelds have an operational range of 5km, base stations and repeaters have 50km and mobil base stations, 40km. Frequency management issues, lack of programming hardware and the fact that they are unencrypted limit their use.

b. Radio Maintenance. Maintenance is performed under the provisions of the National Maintenance Contract. NMC contractors are currently responsive to program managers in MNSTC-I, but responsibility for the NMC will transfer to the Iraqis. The contract provides for logistical, maintenance and repair support. It also includes radio installation for all vehicle types, a web-based logistical tracking system, and radio maintenance training. The Taji National Depot will be the main repair facility, with turn-in points at the major RSUs – Kirkush, An Numaniyah, Habbaniyah, Al Kasik, and Taji. HMMWVs and APCs installations take place at Taji. The remaining UHF vehicle repeaters and HF radios will be sent to units to be installed at the servicing RSU by NMC Mobile Install Teams.

### 8. Training.

a. The Iraqi Signal School (ISS), located at Taji, is responsible for providing communications training to Iraqi Security Forces personnel. The school has the capacity for both initial Military Occupational Specialty Qualification training and follow-on specialized and advanced training. Furthermore, embedded Transition Teams at every level of the operational forces are actively engaged in training/reviewing/reinforcing a variety of operations and front-line maintenance tasks for their C2 communications troops. ISS provides Training on Harris 5800H, Barrett 950 Fixed and Mobile, Codan SR and VR, Motorola GP 340 & GM 360 Fixed and Mobile and GR500 Repeater. The scope continues to grow with fielded demands.

b. The ISS recently activated a new facility that increases training capacity 2 ½ times (from about 120 per class to 300 per class). The school should be reaching full capacity. Additionally, the JHQ M6 will begin focusing on the number of signal troops in the operating forces, with monthly reports on manning and training levels, to encourage unit commanders to send qualified soldiers to the ISS for training. Furthermore, the M6 is working with personnel officials to send some troops directly to ISS after the completion of basic training but before being assigned to a field unit (much as in the United States). Finally, as part of a comprehensive review of pay and incentives,

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personnel officials will consider the use of targeted incentives to recruit and retain qualified Signal troops in the future.

c. As of this writing, over 1,000 Iraqi soldiers, sailors, and airmen have received formal initial training through the Iraqi Signal School, and those troops are distributed throughout the Iraqi Joint Forces, with heavier concentrations in the Iraqi Army Divisions. Additionally hundreds of other Iraqi troops have received informal, task-oriented training from embedded Transition Team advisors at every level of the Iraqi Joint Forces.

### 9. Challenges facing Communication TTs

a. One of the major challenges in the communications area is transportation: The security situation in Iraq has, unquestionably, affected the rate at which systems have been installed and made operational. In particular, the security situation has delayed transportation of material and installation crews to many locations throughout the Republic of Iraq. Nonetheless, MNSTC-I, in concert with the Iraqi MoD and JHQ, completed 100% of DPN installs by the planned IOC date of December 2006, 94% of the originally planned IDN installs by the IOC date of 2006, and 100% of the C2 radio deliveries within the planned delivery window.

b. As the Iraqi Army activates 9 motorized transport regiments, the number of assets available for protected travel in theater should increase, easing transportation scheduling difficulties. Additionally, under Iraqi contracts for expanding system capacity, contractors will be responsible for their own transportation security, which should increase flexibility by reducing the dependency on scarce military transportation assets.

c. A second challenge is the availability of trained personnel. The number of trained Iraqi communications personnel continues to lag behind the number needed. Field commanders are reluctant to send troops to training from units that are heavily involved in an ongoing counter-insurgency fight. Moreover, an average of 10-15% of the troops that arrive for each Iraqi Signal School class are unable to enter the class because they lack the basic literacy skills required to learn effectively. A delay in the activation of a new, higher-capacity schoolhouse facility also reduced the number of trainees who could be trained per class. Changes outlined in the ISS section above should ameliorate some of these problems.

**10. Transition.** The goal of the communications community is to have all major functions transitioned to Iraqi control.

### 11. Leading questions for TT members for RIP/TOA.

- a. Does your unit have its TOE fill of communications gear and personnel?
- b. Are personnel filling communications positions school-trained?

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- c. How is the responsiveness of the communications maintenance process?
- d. How do you maintain connectivity with coalition forces in the AO?

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## CHAPTER 9 RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (RM)

**1. Resource Management Participants.** The Iraqi Resource Management (RM) System is administered by a series of offices at various levels of command and committees dedicated specifically to the process.

a. The Directorate General of Policy and Requirements (MOD) owns the RM policy, promulgates appropriate documents to govern it, and ensures compliance.

During the PPBES process Policy and Requirements ensures that subordinate plans are in consonance with the National Security Strategy and other national/defense-level guidance.

b. The Directorate General for Budget and Programs (MOD) consolidates budget requests and coordinates with other key members of the process in order to keep it on track.

c. Joint Headquarters (JHQ) M8 provides budget interface with the Services and subordinate commands.

d. Joint Planning and Operations Committee (JPOC) synchronizes the Service plans.

e. IRROC is the major prioritization body.

f. Defense Council endorses the defense budget as it is passed to the interagency.

g. Council of Ministers is ministerial-level coordination body that meets to resolve conflicting budget priorities.

h. National Assembly, the Iraqi parliament appropriates funds to meet program requirements of the entire government.

**2. Resource Management Documents.** Allocation of defense resources begins with the National Security Strategy. The Defense Policy captures the MOD portion of that strategy and provides the basis for subordinate plans.

**3. Resource Management Procedure.** Iraqi Ministry of Defense Resource Management policy follows basic Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) tenets. Adhering to the principles of PPBES ensures that resources are procured in support of validated requirements and that budgets are executed in an

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effective manner. However, by U.S. standards, the process is very centralized, thereby limiting the influence of lower level headquarters.

a. Planning Phase. Defense policy is based on the National Security Strategy which includes all elements of national power: economic, military, diplomatic and informational. Based on that policy, the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Joint Headquarters, Services Commands and other subordinate commands prepare the plans required to build required capabilities. These plans will be validated by the Joint Planning and Operations Committee (JPOC) to ensure they are coordinated and agreed by all services and affected commands subordinate to the Joint Headquarters.

b. Program Development Phase. In this phase, resources are prioritized against required capabilities. This is a critical step in the process, as resources available never suffice for all the requirements identified in the planning phase. The IRROC (NFI) establishes priorities based on recommendations from its subcommittees: force structure, infrastructure, personnel, etc. For programs requiring Defense Council, MOD or cabinet approval, the system outlined in Figure 9-1 applies. These programs can include capital investment programs, infrastructure programs, life support, operations & maintenance programs and personnel programs.



### Decision Flow to the IRROC




Figure 9-1

For programs involving equipment and devices required within approved investment programs, the process in Figure 9-2 applies.





FIGURE 9-2

c. Budget Preparation Phase. All directorates and subordinate organizations submit budget proposals to the Director General of Budget and Programs, who then prepares a general budget for the Ministry. MOD then negotiates with the Ministry of Finance to arrive at a final budget.

d. Budget Execution Phase. After the Council of Representatives passes the budget, it is executed according to the previously established plans and priorities as shown in Figure 9-3.



**FIGURE 9-3**

e. Budget Execution Review Phase. The Inspector General reviews and audits the expenditures of the MOD and submits his findings to the Defense Council.

**4. Unit Budget Management Overview.** The Ministry of Defense (MOD) uses very centralized fund control procedures so that execution occurs only at the MOD level. Units at division level and below must submit a requisition through their higher HQs to the Joint Headquarters (JHQ) M4. The M4 orders, denies or provides the item requested from existing stocks. The M4 purchases new or reorders depleted stocks causing funds to be spent. Concern about corruption is the primary reason for not decentralizing fund control.

a. At this time there are no plans for expanding the existing delegation of authority authorization. Fund control will remain at the MOD level. In the interim, advisors to the JHQ M8 will continue to recommend trying to implement:

b. Fund management practices mirrored after a western style system using the procedures of a Defense Resources Board (DRB) or Program Budget Advisory Committee (PBAC).

c. Decentralizing fund control to all individual budget holders with spending approval authority set by the limits of their approved budgeted amounts

e. Delegating fund control for the Iraqi Military Forces to the M8. This means that the M8's signature on a check request eliminates the need for any further review of the request. A check can be produced, sent to the appropriate signatories, and released to the payee.

### **5. Budget Management Inspection Procedures.**

There is no current budget inspection program. Fund control is restricted to the MOD level. Decentralized fund control will require a complementing system of internal controls and audit procedures for it to succeed. Within the JHQ, a system of commitment tracking and reporting is being implemented for 2007. This type reporting will provide visibility to actions that have spending potential and will allow leaders to compare actual commitments to their budgets. Starting in the second quarter of 2007, commitments will be reported based on age. This will place visibility on those transactions that take an excessive amount of time reach the payment cycle.

### **6. Discussion of Common Obstacles/Problems and Recommended Solutions.**

a. Obstacles. Lack of authority to execute approved budgets at the JHQ M – Staff level or the Iraqi Service Command Headquarters is a major obstacle to aligning priorities, requirements, and funds. This situation led to under-execution of the 2006 budget and forced coalition forces to seek alternative means to resource the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF). The Government of Iraq (GoI) has handicapped itself by establishing an excessive number of oversight groups outside the Ministry of Defense. These organizations, combined with a culture of mistrust, have created many obstacles to decentralized fund control and more effective budget execution.

b. Solutions.

(1) Decentralized Fund Control. This is one key to better budget execution. Allowing more entities within the MOD structure to spend funds will improve actual execution when coupled with some streamlining of the numerous committees' involved in the approval process.

(2) Financial Reporting. In January 2007 a Joint Headquarters (JHQ) initiative resulted in fielding a commitment tracking system to its nine distinctive budget beneficiaries: Air Force, M4, Navy, ISOF, Surgeon General, M2, M7, TDC & IGFC. The purpose of the tracking system is to give the five direct reporting headquarters and four JHQ staff sections a way to accumulate and track their budgets' execution. In addition,

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use of this system will demonstrate the value of decentralized fund execution while maintaining centralized control through timely reporting and account variance analysis. This system is considered an interim step in achieving MOD – wide decentralized fund control. Each will be provided an Excel-based commitment tracking system, training on the use of the system, and be required to report their status of funds on a monthly basis. These reports will be used to analyze the cause of spending variances as compared to operational plans. The cause of these variances will be addressed by the JHQ senior leadership for purposes of implementing corrective actions that may include redistributing funds throughout the year. This institutes a system that holds fund holders accountable for planning expenditures and spending IAW their plans, which will assist in improving execution.

### 6. Leading questions for TT members at RIP/TOA.

- a. Can we review the year to date status of funds report?
- b. Have people with resource management responsibility been adequately trained?
- c. Are the incumbents showing improved performance or are they stagnant?
- d. What policies need updating, complete revision, or elimination?
- e. Does the MOD DG P&B provide the JHQ M8 with adequate staff guidance and supervision to accomplish their mission?
- f. Do you have a job description for each authorized position in the M8? Are they all current or do they need review and updates?
- g. How good is your working relationship with your counterpart? Do you and he or she work as an effective team in the JHQ?
- h. Are there any people working in the M8's area that you think need to be replaced? If so, why? What is being done to make this happen and how long will it take?

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## CHAPTER 10 LEGAL

**1. General.** The origins of the legal basis for the Iraqi Armed Forces began with Coalition Provisional Authority order #22 and transitions to the current Iraqi Constitution. Both documents specify civilian control of the Iraqi armed services and security services with the express goal of defending the nation. Both the Constitution and the CPA order before it also seek to establish fair treatment of military personnel in the context of a public set of laws and rules.

### **2. Historical Context.**

a. Under the former Iraqi regime the military conducted operations based on the direction of the President, Saddam Hussein even though there were standing laws that guided the actions of the military. Saddam used the Iraqi military to further his own aims often to the detriment of the Iraqi population and the military itself. The former regime often used both military force and action by a militia type forces such as the Saddam Fedayeen to isolate and destroy any indication of rebellion or dissidence in the population.

b. To further control the possibility of dissent within the military itself, the regime imposed harsh measures under a body of military law. Discipline in the former Iraqi forces was very harsh by Western standards. Unit leadership was subject to execution if their subordinate units were defeated. Soldiers were subject to amputation of hands, being thrown off buildings, beatings with whips or canes, stoning, and cutting out tongues for a variety of infractions. In some cases military personnel were imprisoned for making a simple joke about the security apparatus.

### **3. Iraqi Constitution.**

a. The Iraqi Constitution specifies several requirements in establishing the Iraqi armed services. Article 9 mandates the composition of the forces and several other aspects of the security apparatus intended to defend the nation. A synopsis follows:

b. The armed forces and security services are to be composed of all elements of the population with due consideration given to balance and representation. They are subject to the control of the civilian authority, shall defend Iraq, shall not be used to oppress the Iraqi people, shall not interfere in political affairs, and shall have no role in the transfer of authority.

(1) Militias are prohibited outside the framework of the armed forces.

(2) Political action by members of the armed forces is prohibited with the exception of the continued right for individuals to cast their vote.

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(3) The focus of the Intelligence Service is to identify threats to the nation and report to the Iraqi government. All intelligence operations are subject to legislative oversight and civilian control. All operations shall be in accordance with the law and comply with the recognized principles of human rights.

(4) The Iraqi government will respect international provisions to prevent proliferation of WMD and development of systems to support delivery capabilities of such weapons.

(5) Finally, the military services are subject to criminal law and provisions that address offenses unique to military operations.

c. As with Title X in the U.S. Code, the Iraqi Constitution identifies the required action of the Iraqi military in support of the nation. The guidance under the Constitution is broad and there will continue to be refinement of the level of authority and responsibilities of the Iraqi military services under the constitutional guidance. In the interim many of the CPA orders remain in effect to describe in more detail the law and its application to the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF).

### **4. Iraqi Code of Military Discipline.**

a. Creation of new Iraqi armed services mandated the need for a new disciplinary code to fill the gap created by the defeat and dissolution of the former Iraqi regime. To achieve that end the Coalition Provisional Authority published the Code of Military Discipline that continues to serve as the basis for further development by the new Iraqi Government. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense General Counsel's office continues to develop a more complete military justice system in order to publish a new Iraqi Code of Military Justice.

b. Under the Code, not only are Iraqi Army soldiers and officers subject to civil law, they also serve under a set of laws specifically related to military discipline. The goal of the new Code is to preserve the commander's inherent right to maintain good order and discipline within the IA while simultaneously preserving the rights of the soldiers of the new IA.

c. IA personnel are subject of the following set of specific military offenses:

- (1) Mistreatment of IA personnel of inferior rank
- (2) Causing or engaging in a disturbance or behaving in a disorderly manner
- (3) Behaving in an insubordinate manner
- (4) Striking a senior ranking person
- (5) Sentries failing to perform duty as instructed or engaging in misconduct

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- (6) Disobeying a lawful order
- (7) Drunkenness resulting in being unfit for duty, behaving in a disorderly manner, or behaving in a manner likely to bring discredit on the IA
- (8) Absence without leave
- (9) Avoiding the performance of duty or negligent performance of duty
- (10) Making a false statement concerning any official IA matter
- (11) Fighting with other IA or other Service personnel
- (12) Willfully or by negligence causing damage or loss of IA property
- (13) Conduct contrary to the good order and discipline
- (14) Behaving in a manner likely to bring discredit on the IA

**5. Application of the Code of Discipline.** While the enforcement and administration of the Iraqi Code of Military Discipline is similar to United States military procedures, there are unique aspects that require discussion. Disciplinary authority in the IA rests with junior (JDO) and senior disciplinary officers (SDO).

a. JDOs are of the rank of captain or higher who command either a company or an equivalent-size unit of which an accused is a member. A brigade commander can also appoint a JDO in writing to administer disciplinary action for an accused soldier. Junior disciplinary officers have jurisdiction over members of the IAF below the rank of lieutenant for true military offenses. Under the IAF Code, superior commanders cannot retain the authority or restrict the authority of company commanders in administering discipline for senior NCO misconduct.

b. Senior disciplinary officers are LTCs or higher in rank who command the battalion of which the accused is a member or who the commander of the IAF appoints to be the SDO of an accused. Unlike the U.S. military system, the Code allows a brigade commander to appoint, in writing, a JDO to administer discipline in separate or other units that may not have a company commander available to fill the role. Additionally, the Iraqi system clearly contemplates appointing a JDO after the commission of an offense. If a company commander is unavailable or disqualified from administering Non-Judicial Punishment (NJP), it is unnecessary to resort to the next superior commander, because they can appoint a JDO to administer the case.

c. A SDO's authority is considerably different from that of a field grade's NJP authority in the U.S. military system. A SDO only has original jurisdiction over true military offenses concerning personnel of the IAF in the rank of lieutenant and above, as

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long as the SDO is at least one rank above the accused. They also have jurisdiction over appeals of JDO decisions. The jurisdiction of Iraqi battalion commanders as SDO is much more limited than that of their American counterparts. American field grade NJP authorities have jurisdiction over all members of their command. Although there are arguably many drawbacks to this limitation in a SDO's jurisdiction, it enforces a strict application of the policy to dispose of offenses at the lowest appropriate level.

d. As with the commanders' jurisdiction, the Code also contains differences in the available punishments for military offenses and their administration. In the Iraqi system, a JDO can administer the following punishments in respect to each military offense of which he finds an enlisted IAF member guilty:

- (1) detention for a period not longer than seven days;
- (2) fine not exceeding fourteen days' pay;
- (3) a reprimand;
- (4) extra duties to a maximum of seven days;
- (5) in respect of a private first class, corporal, or sergeant, reduction by one rank;
- (6) stoppages of pay in respect [to] damage or loss caused by the act or acts which formed the basis of the offense charged, not exceeding fourteen days' pay.

The Iraqi system permits a combination of most punishments for a finding of guilt for each offense. A JDO may combine certain punishments except for reduction in rank that cannot be combined with any other punishment. Only corporals and below may be detained, and detention can only be combined with stoppage of pay. A JDO may combine both a fine and a stoppage of pay for a single offense, but no more than twenty-eight days pay may be taken in a single disciplinary hearing.

e. As the SDO's non-appeal jurisdiction is limited to IAF commissioned officers, the punishments available are also very different from those of the U.S. field grade NJP authority. The SDO's punishments, however, are very similar to the junior disciplinary officer's punishment, though a SDO may not impose detention. The rules for senior disciplinary officers combining punishments are otherwise identical to those of the junior disciplinary officers. Unlike U.S. field grade NJP, SDO disciplinary actions do not expose IA soldiers to greater maximum punishments. Additionally, Iraqi commanders do not have the variety of punishments available as their American counterparts (e.g., restriction to specified limits). The Code also lacks provisions to suspend, mitigate, remit, or set aside punishments.

f. During disciplinary hearings, the accused IA soldier enjoys several rights under the Code. An IA soldier has the right to request the assistance of an officer of his choice to prepare for a disciplinary hearing. The right to request assistance of a specific

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officer in preparing for a disciplinary hearing may not be as effective as having a trial defense representation, but this officer could influence the commander and serve as a highly effective advocate for the accused. An IA soldier is entitled to additional protections, including:

- (1) 24 hours to prepare for the Disciplinary Hearing;
- (2) the assistance of an Officer of his choice, subject to;  
reasonable availability, in preparing for and during the Disciplinary Hearing;
- (3) the right to have the charge explained by the Disciplinary Officer;
- (4) the right to question witnesses called to give evidence against him;
- (5) the right to present evidence in support of his case;
- (6) if convicted, to present evidence or speak in mitigation of his punishment
- (7) the right to remain silent and have no adverse consideration taken by the exercise of this right.

### 7. Operational Impacts.

a. While there are broad definitions of the role and responsibilities of the IA under the Iraqi Constitution, there will continue to be additions and changes to the interpretation of those definitions. In general, the IA is expected to respond to the civilian government and defend the nation against enemies and threats to national security and existence. IA commanders and units have the authority to conduct operations to protect the country. How that authority actually plays out in conjunction with the other government agencies such as the Ministries of Interior and Justice remains to be seen.

b. Discipline within the IA is also experiencing significant change from the methods used under the former regime. Based on the experiences of the former military forces and cultural influences the unit discipline will be immediate and direct against IA members. Transition team members must be aware of the infractions to military discipline specified under the Code and the punishments allowed as a result. Misunderstanding of the level of authority and the disciplinary measures allowed will cause significant disagreement and resistance to TT advisory efforts in this area. The following leading questions may assist in developing an understanding of the disciplinary process in the IA unit:

- (1) How are the disciplinary procedures found in the Code of Discipline commonly applied at your unit?

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- (2) What authority does the commander use to enforce discipline at your unit?
- (3) Are there administrative as well as judicial disciplinary procedures used within your unit?
- (4) Does the senior disciplinary officer review disciplinary actions as identified in the Code?
- (5) Are the principles outlined in the Iraqi Code of Discipline followed in your unit (e.g. maintaining the rights of soldiers...)
- (6) Does your unit have the Iraqi Code of Discipline in Arabic?
- (7) Is there an advocate or representative process for the accused?
- (8) What is the legal basis for use of the Iraqi Army in support of civil authority?

## **NOTES**

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## Chapter 11 Training and Education

**1. Introduction.** The Iraqi military school system is administered by the Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command, although there are some exceptions to this (e.g. SOF school). The situation is further complicated by the fact that the Training and Doctrine Command is still in the generating phase while several of the schools themselves are at full operational capability. The system to date comprises eight branch schools, six regional training centers, three training battalions, and three military academies. Joint Headquarters (JFQ) M7 develops strategies to provide long term direction for training and education of the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines and Special Forces). The department sets key objectives, defines responsibilities, provides guidance and allocates priorities.

**2. The Iraqi Training and Education System** includes Basic Combat Training, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Qualification courses, Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Training, Officer and NCO Education, Academies and Staff Training, and other Service Schools. Pre-command courses for company, battalion and brigade commanders are scheduled to begin in the future. The system consists of institutional and operational training defined as follows:

a. Institutional Training. Initial, or subsequent, qualifying training takes place in authorized IAF Training institutions, based on MOD ratified Programs of Instruction (POIs) and delivered by qualified instructors. Examples include basic infantry training, role-specific training (e.g. medics) and career progression training (e.g. squad leader, platoon sergeant).

b. Operational Training. Training directed by Army, Navy, Air Force and Special Forces commanders, at all levels, to ensure that the standard of individual and collective training within their units meet mission essential task list (METL) requirements. (e.g. ranges, tactical exercises, crew certifications).

### **3. Institutional Training.**

a. IAF Policy. IAF Training and education policy is formulated and propagated by JHQ M7 and the Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command (ITDC).

b. Responsibilities. All IAF officer cadet and enlisted military and academic training is delivered by the institutions established by ITDC. These institutions include Iraqi Training Battalions, Regional Training Centers, Military Academies, Navy, Air Force and Special Forces Schools and a number of other specialist training establishments. All training delivered by these institutions is based on carefully researched POIs and delivered to clear standards set by CMATT/M7, and ITDC.

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c. Institutional Training Organizations. The schedule for Institutional Training was controlled by the M7 Interim Tactical Training Cell, but recently transitioned to the Tactical Training Command (TTC). Types of training institutions and the training they provide is outlined below:

(1) Iraqi Training Battalions (ITBs). The ITBs conduct basic combat training (BCT), Military Occupational Specialty Qualification (MOSQ) and specific NCO training courses:

### **Basic Combat Training (BCT)**

#### **MOSQ**

- Infantry
- Admin Clerk
- Armorer
- Maintenance
- MP
- Signal
- Supply
- Transport
- Medic

#### **NCO Training**

- Methods of Instruction
- Squad Leaders
- Platoon Sergeants

#### **At 1 ITB, NCO Academy in the Future**

- Sergeant Major
- Chief Warrant Officer

(2). Regional Training Centers (RTCs). The RTCs conduct BCT, MOSQ and NCO training and support operational training (see para 4 below). The Mission of providing individual training is temporary. In the future, this role will reside solely in the ITBs and the RTCs will focus on support to Operational Training. Current RTC training includes the following:

### **-Basic Combat Training (BCT)**

### **-Combat Life Saver**

#### **MOSQ**

- Infantry
- Medic

#### **NCO Training**

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- Squad Leaders
- Platoon Sergeants

(3) Specialist Schools. Specialist schools train IAF servicemen in the specialist areas listed below:

### **Engineer School**

- Engineer MOSQ
- Engineer Officer Basic
- IEDD Train the Trainer
- IEDD Training

### **IASSI**

- Log Officer 1+2
- Med Officer Basic
- Medic T3
- Supervisor Supply
- Supervisor Maint
- Supervisor Transport
- Finance, Resource, Contract operators
- Legal Advisor's Course
- Med Log Officer's Course
- Public Affairs Officers
- Supervisor, Pay + Pers
- Civil Affairs
- Cook T3
- Warehouse Supervisor

### **MP School**

- MP Officer Basic

### **Signal School**

- Signal basic+advanced

### **EOD School**

- Explosive Ordnance Disposal

(4) Branch Schools. The Branch schools conduct follow-on/advanced training in specific areas:

### **CATC (Besmaya)**

- Sniper Training
- Advanced marksmanship-Basic Mortar (Train the Trainer)-Combat Arms Officer Basic
- PI Commanders

## COIN Academy

(5) Military Academies and Colleges. IAF Military Academies and Colleges teach leadership to senior NCOs, officer cadets, officers and MOD civil servants. Unlike other institutions listed above, academy and college training/education is under the management of National Defense University (NDU). Courses and institutions include:

### **Military Academies (Rustimayah, Zahko and Qualachulon)**

-Cadet Commissioning

### **Staff Colleges**

-Junior and Senior Staff courses

- Coy Commanders

-Bn Commanders

-Bde Commanders

### **NCO Academy (NDU)**

-Sergeant Major

-Chief Warrant Officer

### **DSSI**

### **NDC**

### **DLI**

## 4. Operational Training.

a. Types of Operational Training. Operational training encompasses any type of individual and collective training conducted at the unit level in order to maintain proficiency.

b. Operational Environment. The IAF training system recognizes that regular refresher training is required if individuals and units are to be effective. The demands of the operational environment in Iraq requires:

(1) The **practicing** of skills and competence and the exercising of knowledge.

(2) The **testing** of skills, competence and knowledge.

(3) The continuous **review** of training and training methods for their effectiveness, including where appropriate, the assessment of training against set standards.


c. Operational Units. Operational units of the Army, Air Force, Navy and Special Forces require refresher training in order to practice and test skills previously

acquired in the Training Institutions. This is the responsibility of the operational commander. Additionally, specific mission requirements may demand special training, even for those units at a high level of training. Training does not cease once operations begin. Individual, crew and collective skills are subject to deterioration, and operational practices have to be refined and rehearsed. Training on operations should always seek to remedy shortcomings, improve performance and adapt to new tactical techniques and procedures.

d. Operational Training Establishments. Operational training can take place anywhere: in divisional training areas, barracks or operational battlespace. Divisional training areas are not part of the TDC structure and receive no funding from that command. Each Division (or single service equivalent) may operate and manage its own training areas as funds are available. The divisional training area is the standard venue for local training. Each Army Division is authorized a Division Training Officer and staff. These leaders are a key link for issues related to individual training and education management. Division Training Officers may coordinate the use of the facilities at a Regional Training Center or Iraqi Training Battalion or other Institutional Training sites as schedules permit. The Division Training officer is the primary training representative of the war fighting Division Commander through which subordinate training plans offices within each division will coordinate training.

**5. School Allocation and Management Process.**

The school allocation and management process is outlined in Figure 11-1.



**FIGURE 11-1. Allocation Management Process.**

For some MOS schools, students are selected from units, sent to training bases, then returned to the units. Future plans include trying to take students directly from basic training and providing advanced training enroute to their units.

**6. School Locations Overview.**

Figure 11-2 gives an overview of the locations of the various schools.




FIGURE 11-2.

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**7. Leading questions for TT members to ask at RIP/TOA.**

- a. Who is the Division training officer at your HHQ?
- b. Is your unit aware of the available school quotas?
- c. How does your division publish the list of available schools?
- d. How does your unit manage their order of merit list?
- e. What is the quality of trainees coming out of the training pipeline?
- f. Does your unit have an OJT process (formal or informal)
- g. Does your unit use soldiers who have completed an MOS school within that MOS?
- h. Is there a re-training system for soldiers with substandard skills?
- i. How does your unit get the trainees to and from school?
- j. Does your unit process the correct personnel transactions when sending soldiers to schools?
- k. Does your unit have a training area?
- l. Does your unit maintain training records indicating which soldiers have been to schools?
- m. Is there a training plan/schedule at your unit?
- n. Does your unit's training plan comply with training requirements established by HHQ?
- o. Has your HHQ established a training plan?
- p. How does your unit document operational training?

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. **JCISFA Contact Information.** JCISFA maintains the “How the Iraqi Army Operates,” Smartbook on the organizational website under the Defense On-Line (DOL) portal. The content of the JCISFA page will transfer to Defense Knowledge On-Line (DKO) beginning in May of 2007. The JCISFA DOL page will remain available after the transfer is complete but any updates or changes to the document will reside on the new DKO site. JCISFA will post information concerning procedures to access the JCISFA DKO site on the DOL page once the transfer of information is completed. For interim questions email to [LEAV-JCISFA@conus.army.mil](mailto:LEAV-JCISFA@conus.army.mil) or call commercial 913-684-3627 or DSN 552-3627.

To access the JCISFA DOL page for the Iraqi Army Smartbook follow the next steps.

1. Navigate to the Defense On-Line portal page at <https://gesportal.dod.mil> and register for access.
2. Once registration is complete navigate to [https://gesportal.dod.mil/sites/JCISFA/Iraqi\\_Smartbooks/default.asp](https://gesportal.dod.mil/sites/JCISFA/Iraqi_Smartbooks/default.asp) and look under the Shared Documents section of the page. Depending on your level of access, you may be required to request access rights to the page.